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This thesis examines and evaluates F. C. Baur's philosophical and
theological ideas as they relate to the writing of Church history and
historical theology.

The study is undertaken within the context of the

problem of the relation between faith and history, which can be stated
in more rele'1'ant categories for Church historiography as the problem of
the relation between subject (faith) and object (history), and proposes
that Baur's thought on this problem can be useful for the modern faith/
history debate, and especially for the consideration of writing Church
history.

The overall methodological approach of the study is historical,
and begins (Chapter II) with a general description of the cultural environment in which Baur lived and worked.

Here, four major cultural events

are discussed which had an impact on his life, i. e. post-Kantian philosophy, with its rejection of the noumenal/phenomenal bifurcation of knowledge; the French Revolution; the Romantic Revolt; and, the early Historicist movement.

Following this, in Chapter III, Baur's life, works, in-

tellectual development, and theological thought are surveyed, in order
to show how he fits into the cultural milieu of his day.

It is discovered

that he is essentially a romantic theologian, greatly influenced by
Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, yet he does not quite fit the des'

cription of "romantic" due to his insistence on the objectivity, as well
as the subjectivity, of reality.

This is well illustrated, in Chapter IV

by an analysis of his two works, The Epochs of Church Historiography,
and Introduction to Lectures on the History of Christian Dogma, in which
he asserts that both the objectivity (institutions and dogmas) and subjectivity (theological thought) of Christianity must be preserved in dialectical tension if the Church's true historical and ideal nature is to
be understood.
In evaluation and conclusion (Chapter V), it is maintained that
Baur's greatest legacy to theology is his firm insistence on both object
and subject as factors in the historical development of Christianity,
rather than on just one or the other.

Within this balance, Baur points

the way toward a view of Christianity which is neither overly-historical
nor overly-theological, and calls for a Church historiography which
incorporates them both.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important and consuming questions of theological
investigation today is the problem of the relationship between faith
and history.1

The problem of faith and history can actually be con-

sidered as a particular theological form of a more general question
1The question of faith and history has been recognized as crucial
for Christian theology since at least the early nineteenth century, yet
the problems associated with this question, particularly the problem of
the development of Christian doctrine, have recently caused both Catholic and Protestant theologians to consider the question more seriously.
On the Catholic side, the second Vatican council has created a more
tolerant attitude toward open speculation on sensitive theological
issues, and has thus opened the way for consideration of the place of
history for faith and the matter of doctrinal development. The ecumenical movement has also caused more concern over the question of faith
and history because the division between Catholicism and Protestantism
has been traced to a divergence over the question of doctrinal development. John Courtney Murray has written: "I consider that the parting
of the ways between the two Christian communities (Roman Catholicism
and Protestantism) takes place on the issue of development of doctrine"
(quoted in Jaroslav Pelikan,~evelopment of Christian Doctrine: Some
Historical Prolegomena (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1969), p. 1.) If Murray is correct, then an adequate and acceptable
solution to the problem of faith and history is vital to the life and
success of the ecumenical movement.
On the Protestant side there is also a new and burgeoning interest
in the question of faith and history. One example of this new interest
is the so-called "New Quest for the historical Jesus" led by many of
Rudolph Bultmann's former disciples such as Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebling,
Ernst Kasema.nn, and Gunther Bornkamm. This new quest is based on the
dissatisfaction with dialectical theology's concept of history, and
hopes to recover at least some element of historical value in the life
of Jesus. ·Other examples are provided by Wolfhart Pannenberg's work
Revelation as History, and the new interest in nineteenth century
liberal theological thought focusing on such persons as F. C. Baur and
Ernst Troeltsch (for Baur see especially Peter c. Hodgson, "The
Rediscovery of Ferdinand Christian Baur ••• ," Church History XX.XIII: 2
(June, 1964), pp. 206-214; for Troeltsch see Ernst Troeltsch and the
Future of Theology, ed. John P. Clayton, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
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concerning the relation between form and content in all reality which
might be formulated historiographically as the relationship between
ideas and history, or philosophically as the relationship
lutes and particulars.
various ways.

between·abso~

The theological problem can be considered in

• faith-response,
For example, as applied to a believers

the question of faith and history can be stated as:

"To what extent

is the truth and validity of the Christian faith dependent upon the
occurrence of certain historical events?".

In other words, is the truth

of Christianity dependent upon the historical occurrence of such events
as the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus as portrayed in
the Gospels?

Stated this way, the problem of faith and history is more

a problem of theology.

There is, however, another way of putting the

question which makes it as much a question of historiography as of
theology.

From this perspective the question can be formulated:

"To

what extent, if any, does the absoluteness of Christianity reside in the
historical structure and theological expressions of the Church?''.

In

·"other words, is it necessary that the phenomenal Church should embody

absolutely, the ideality of Christianity for it to retain its dogmatic
authority?

It is with the latter formulation of the question of faith

and history that this thesis is concerned, especially as it was addressed
and answered by Ferdinand Christian Baur.
How the question of faith and history is answered in general will
determine how the history of the Church and theology is written, for
it is upon one's conception of the relationship between faith and history
(between idea and history) that one's concept of the Church and its
history is formulated.

Those who separate faith and history will tend

to separate Christianity (the ideal) from the Church (the historical)

3
and consequently separate Church history from the history of theology.
Those who identify faith and history as absolutely synonymous will be
committed to one monolithic, absolute Church in history and will tend

to see its dogrnatical pronouncements as unqualifiedly single, unchanging
and transhistorical.

Both of these positions have difficulties.

In modern Protestant theology, the tendency has been to radically
separate faith and history.

This is most clearly seen in so-called

Neo-Orthodox theology epitomized by German theologian Karl Barth who has
'!'

insisted on a radical disjuncture between the faith-response of an. individual and the historical details of Jesus' life. 2

With this separation

accomplished, Barth, as a theologian, cared little for history; either
New Testament history or Church history as a whole since it had so little
to do with faith.

He expressed his careless attitude toward history thus:

How frightfully indifferent I have become about the purely
historical questions. Of course, that is nothing new for me.
Already under the influence of Hermann, I always thought of
historical criticism as merely a means of attaining freedom
in relation to the tradition, not, however, as a constituting
factor in a new liberal tradition.3
Consequently, either Church history is considered as a completely theelogical discipline (i.e. a function of dogmatics) separate and distinct
from the methodology of history, or it is considered as a completely
historiographical discipline, separate and distinct from the methodology

2For Barth's treatment of history in the theological task see his
commentary The ~pistle to the Romans, especially the discussion under
Ch. iv. 17b-25 where he considers the value of history in relation to
the Genesis account of Abraham.
3Quoted in Carl E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, Vol. II of
New Directions in Theology Today (Phiiadelphia: The ~estminster Press,
1964), p. 24. This statement not only indicates Barth's careless
attitude toward history but also hints that he considers the historicalcritical method to be an essentially negative approach such as is
exemplified in D. F. Strauss' Leben Jesu.
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of history, or it is considered as a completely historiographical
discipline, separate and distinct from the methodology of theology.

Although there may be justification for both of these approaches to
Church history, according to Barth they must be carried on in total
isolation from one another.

Thus, as Hodgson has pointed out,

Barth would remove Church history from the concept of history
generally, and also, presumably, from the catagories of historical knowledge. In so far as the history of the Church can be
regarded as an essentially theological discipline, it can be of
interest and concern only to the theologian, not to the historian. There can be no critical, scientific, and at the same
time theological historiography; critical historical science is
not part of an authentically theological discipline. History
can be rightly understood only from within the framework of
dogmatics.4
Barth is insistent about the separation of faith and history.

In his

history of nineteenth century theology, for example, he writes:
To describe and understand the history of Protestant
theology from the time Schleiermacher onwards is a theological (italics) task • • • it is a conditio sine qua non
of the success of our undertaking that it should be
approached theologically, in accordance with its subject
matter.5
This method of approach to Church history is not an adequate one because it does not do justice to the historicity of the Church.

In

its zeal to understand the Church theologically or dogmatically, it
fails to consider it historically.

As F. C. Baur recognized in the

nineteenth century and as other theologians are coming to realize today,
Church history must involve both a theological and historical approach
together if the Church is to be wholly understood.

Jaroslav Pelikan,

4Peter C. Hod.gso~ The Formation of Historical Theology (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 270.
Forge:

5Ka.rl Barth,Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (Valley
Judson Press, 1973), p. 15.
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for example, has stated that the "investigation of the development of
Christian doctrine in the history of theology is too important to be
left to the theologians",6 meaning that the history of theology is not
to be monopolized any longer by theology alone.

On the other hand,

Pelikan recognizes the place of theology in the writing of Church history
and states:

"The history of the development of doctrine also deserves

to be sttrlied in its own right, without constantly being interpreted as
an explicit function of the organizational, political and liturgical
life of the Church."7
But i f the writing of 1 Church history suffers when the Church's
abiding significance and its historical transitoriness are radically
separated, the same is true when the historical Church is considered to
be synonymous with Christianity itself.

Under this concept of the

Church, the historian must first demonstrate that something called the
Church has always existed historically and that it has always remained
unchanged.

This concept of the Church was at the root of the Vincentian

canon which identified Church dogma as that "quod ubique, quod semper,
quod ab ominibus credi tum est. "8
In some ways, this dogmatic approach is founded upon a better
model of the Church than the Nee-Orthodox approach, since it seems to
consider both the theological and historical aspects of the Church.
Yet this is only appearance.

For when it absolutely identifies

Christianity and the historical Church as synonymous, it is not able
6Jaroslav Pelikan, Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 43,
7 Ibid . , p • 44 .
8Jan Walgrave,Unfolding Revelation (Philadelphiaa
minster Press, 1972), p. 87.

The West-
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in the final analysis to take the historicity of the Church seriously.
Those who write Church history on the basis of the Vincentian canon are
ultimately committed to present a Church which has not really changed at
all, one which is not subject to the flux of history, and, thus, a Church
which is transhistorical.

In some cases, this method of Church history

has led to some unfortunate results as, for example, is seen in treatments of the theology of the early Church fathers.

Pelikan describes

the method and its results thus:
Identifying those criteria of orthodoxy as· a summary of what,
according to the Vincentian canon, must also have been in force
during an earlier age, this method feels competent to adopt as
fathers those who were the ancestors of orthodoxy and to condemn
as heretics those who deviated from these later norms. Unfortunately, the ancestors pf orthodoxy were in many instances also
the thinkers who were found to have deviated from a later definition of orthodoxy. Thus an orthodoxy that, humanly speaking,
could not have come into existence without them takes it upon
itself to charge them with false doctrine.9
In sum, if the Nee-Orthodox solution, which either radically
separates Church history and theology, or makes Church history a theological discipline, is inadequate to produce a wholistic

trea~ment

of

the Church; and if, on the other hand, the dogmatic solution, based as it
is on a conception of the Church that is essentially unhistorical, is
also inadequate for the same purpose, then what is necessary is a
method of Church history which takes into account both the Church's
theological significance and its historicity, without over emphasizing
either.

This is perhaps the most important task in the field of Church

history today, and, as Pelikan has indicated, vital to the endeavor of
producing a wholistic understanding of the Church.

It is within the

9Jaroslav Pelikan, Historical Theology: Contin~ity and Change in
The Westminster Press, 1971), p. 21.

~~ristian Doctrine (Philadelphia:
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context of the current need for a new theory of the relation between
theology and Church history (i. e. between faith and history) that
Ferdinand Christian Baur is introduced as the ma.in subject of this
theses.
STATEME:NT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this thesis is to critically and historically
consider Ferdinand Christian Baur's life and works on Church history,
and to attempt to interpret these in the historical context of his own
time.

The primary emphasis of this work is historical, although Baur's

theological views will be alluded to and discussed as they relate to his
significance for the historical development of theological thought.
Stated more specifically, this thesis will attempt to interpret Baur in
the setting of nineteenth century Germany, in the light of political,
cultural, and intellectual movements.

It will attempt to understand

his views on the Church including not only his concept of its nature
(i. e. theological nature) and positivity, (its historical nature), but
also how he combines ideality and positivity in his treatment of Church
history.

Baur's views on the Church within the categories stated above,

will also be considered for their abiding significance in the field of
Church history but this is not included in the primary purpose of the
paper.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE

PROBLE~~

This study is undertaken in the belief that Baur cannot be fully
understood only from a theological perspective, and therefore that a
predominantly historical (but also theological) treatment is necessary
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for an adequate understanding of him.

Baur has been thoroughly treated

theologically in a number of works, both in English and German,10

but

relatively very little has been written on him which specifically seeks
to understand him in the light of his historical surroundings. 11

In

addition, Baur's work has not received much attention for its historiographic importance.12
Beyond these reasons, a study of Baur such as this one, is important in considering the nature of Church history and the task of writing
it.

In fact, Baur is particularly important in this regard, for he was

personally concerned with developing a method of Church history which
would include and balance both the ideality and positivity of the Church.
He is somewhat unique in his attempt at this, for as Hodgson has observed:
Baur is an essential link between Schleiermacher at one end
of the nineteenth century and Ritschl and Harnack at the other;
but his historical theology belongs neither to Schleiermacher on
the one hand nor to the Protestant liberalism of which Ritschl
was the father on the other. It represents a third, independent
and autonomous theological position, yet one which links the
other two together. 3

10rmportant here are, in English, Hodgson's book already cited and,
in German, Wolfgang Geiger's Spekulation und Kritik: Die Geschichtstheologie Ferdinand Christian Baurs Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964.
11 Apart from brief comments in encyclopedia essays and journal
articles, I have discovered no such account of Baur's life, except
Gustav Fraedrich's Ferdinand Christian Baur: Der Begrunder der Tubinger
~g~ule als Theologie, Schriftsteller, und Charakter, which was published
in 1909.
12Most liturature discussing Baur as an historian is found in the
form of journal articles in the German language. Refer to the bibliography for these references. Peter Hodgson has published an English
translation of some of Baur's writings on Church history in Ferdinand
Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968.
13Peter C. Hodgson, The Formation of Historical Theology,
pp. 277-78, in the footnotes.
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In distinction from those who preceded him (Schelling, Schleiermacher,
.and Hegel) Baur worked against the acosmic tendencies of idealism which
threatened to swallow up (aufheben) the particular aspects of history,
specifically Church history, in general.

In this regard he can be

viewed as a champion of immanence for he strove to maintain a sense of
historicity in the writing of Church history.

On the other hand, in

distinction from those who chronologically followed him (Ritschl,
Harnack, and Troeltsch) he worked against the atheistic tendencies of
extreme historicism which tended to reduce history, specifically Church
history, to mere particulars.

In this regard he can be viewed as the

champion of transcendence, for he strove to maintain a sense of absoluteness in Church history.

His methodology of Church history is the locus

of his abiding importance and greatness which, according to Hodgson,
consists in his recognition of the radically historical quality
of the Christian Church and Christian faith, and in his concommi tant development of an historical method appropriate to a
critical and theological study of the Church and its founding
events, a study which he understood to be an intrinsically
proper and necessary theological discipline.14
DELIMITATION
As indicated above, this paper is more concerned with an historical
explication of F. C. Baur's life and work, specifically his works on
Church history and the history of dogma, than it is in his theological
ideas.

Therefore, this study will primarily be limited to a considera-

tion of his ideas on historiography as applied to Church history.

The

primary works for consideration will be Baur's The Epochs of Church
14Peter C. Hodgson , "Rediscovery of F. C. Baur. • • , '' p. 206.
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Historiography, and the Introduction to Lectures on the History of
Christian Dogma.

There is good reason to consider these works as the

most important of Baur's life, because, coming at the end of his life,

they represent his most independent works and are also reflective of his
most mature development as a scholar.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURE
This work will follow the inductive method in evaluating Baur's
works and proceed in five separate chapters.

Chapters one and two aim

at describing the historical milieu in which Baur lived and worked,

The

introduction in chapter one attempts a formulation of the problem of
faith and history in terms of the writing of Church history and discusses
the relevance of F. C. Baur's thought to this contemporary methodological
problem.

Chapter two will consider nineteenth century Germany in general,

in terms of philosophy, politics, and culture.
Chapters three and four are devoted to F. C. Baur himself.

In

chapter three, Baur's life and thought will be considered in historical
context, specifically regarding his intellectual development and theological position.15

Chapter four will be strictly devoted to Baur's

15 Here, the emphasis can only be on Baur's place in historical
theology rather than his political opinions, since he rarely spoke out
on political issues except when duty called for it, and then he demonstrated more concern for his theological work than political events. An
example is a speech which he wrote and delivered on the occasion of the
twenty-fifth year of the reign of King Wilhelm I of Wurttemberg. According to Hodgson, the speech "extolled the liberality and beneficence of
the Wurttemberg regime, pointed to the growing sense of national (i.e.
German) unity and identity, and then argued for the place of Hegelian
speculation in scientific theology", (The Formation of Historical
I.heology, p. 18.)
-
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ideas on the writing of Church history and dogma, and will be essentially
descriptive.
Chapter five will be both a critical evaluation of Baur's ideas
on the writing of Church hist~y, and a consideration of the significance of his ideas and work for the task of writing Church history today.

CHAPrER II

GERMANY AND THE Roars OF ROMANTICISM
The nineteenth century was an extremely revolutionary time for all
of Europe in general, but the Germanic countries especially, experienced
cultural ferment and social
since the Reformation.

displacem~nt

such as had not occurred there

Much of this displacement was born out of

Germany•s 1 own unique historical circumstances, yet, two areas of
Germanic life, in particular, philosophy and politics, contributed to,
and

exempli~y,

the uncertainty of the age.

Philosophy provided the in-

ternal impetus towards change; and politics, specifically the French
Revolution, provided the external impetus.

In philosophy, the idea that

man, through his own reason, could perceive and have access to nature and
history, was challenged and undermined by Immanuel Kant in his Critique
of Pure Reason.

This development effectively brought about a decline in

the Enlightenment belief in the efficacy of human reason, and also paved
the way for a split between faith and history, or, more specifically,
between the material of Christianity (the historical facts), and the
1It is with qualification that I speak here of Germany, for there
was no "Germany" at this time at least as it existed later in the late
nineteenth century. Still, there did exist some sense of unity among
Prussians, Austrians and Rhinelanders in contrast to the French or the
English. Crane Brinton writes of the Holy Roman Empire "As Ml-:_ ~i:'P
tution it was no doubt already dead, and certainly, in the opinion of
literary men, buried. Yet it has some claim to be considered a real
Germany, a Germany which provided even in the late eighteenth century
some sort of focus for patriotic feelings," (A Decade of Revolution
(New York: Harper and Brothers.Publishers, 1934), p. 73,)
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meaning of Christianity (its essential idea).
In the meantime, while this philosophical upheaval was going on in
Germany, an event of earth-shaking consequences occurred outside of
Germany which was ultimately to catapult it into the modern world
politically, i.e. the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic
wars.

Indeed, as Brinton remarks, the history of Germany as a modern

nation truly begins with the Revolution.2

These revolutionary events

acted like a catalyst to activate cultural movements already present

i~

Germanic society, which, when combined with the work of Kant, produced
a new flowering and effulgence of culture.
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly sketch these two movements, i.e. the philosophical and political developments in Germany, in
order to better understand the cultural environment which resulted from
them.

Having done this, the discussion will proceed to a consideration

of two culture responses to these forces, Romanticism and Historicism.
These two cultural phenomena are especially important to this discussion
because they are not only paradigmatic examples of cultural developments
in Germany during this time, but were also tremendously influential in
F. C. Baur's intellectual development and scholarly writings.

The exam-

ination of the philosophical preparation as seen in the problem of the
relation between faith and history will be discussed first, followed by
the political movements of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.
2As Brinton notes, "The Revolution was to destroy the Empire as
an institution: The nineteenth century was to build up a German nation
state on a pattern quite as modern as that of England and France."
A Decade of Revolution, p. 73-74.
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THE INTELLECTUAL PREPARATION:

FAITH AND HISTORY

In discussing the movements which led up to a bifurcation of faith
and history, it is necessary to begin outside of Germany, with two
English philosophers, John Locke (1632-170'+) and David Hume (1711-1776).
Locke was most concerned with the philosophical question of epistemology
and outlined his views on this subject in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.

In this work, Locke showed himself to be a rationalist,

fully committed to a belief in the efficacy of reason, maintaining that
the subject (man) can know the world simply through his perception and
reason.

His emphasis on rational perception through the senses place

him in the category of an empiricist philosopher.

As a Christian,

committed to reason, Locke had, naturally, to come to grips with the
question of faith and reason and did so by making a distinction between
truths, above, contrary, and according to reason.

On the content of

each of these categories, he wrote:
!~cording to reason are such propositions whose truth we can
discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true
or probable. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or
probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles.
Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent
with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus,
the existence of one God is according to reason; the existence
of more than one God, contrary to reason; the resurrection of
the dead, above reason.3

His classification of "resurrection of the dead" as only above reason
may seem surprising, coming from a rationalist, yet Locke had not developed the further implications of rationalism as did later Enlightenment
philosophers.

He did not polarize faith and reason, but rather,

3John Locke, An Essay Conce~ning Human Understanding Bk 4, Ch. 17,
para. 24.
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considered them as functioning together.

Still, in Locke's view, reason

must take priority in the relationship of faith and reason for "he that
believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his
own fancies".4

Locke essentially reverses Anselm's fides quaerens

intellectum to read intellectus quaerens fidem and this represents an
important shift with far reaching implications.

He left a place for

faith, but it was a faith based upon data, which, even though provided
by GOO., was to be recognized and understood by reason alone.
is clear by the way he distinguished faith and reason.

This fact

He writes:

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I
take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such
propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction
made from such ideas, wh~ch it has got by the use of its natural
.faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection. Faith, on the other
side, is assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the
deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as
coming from God, in some extra ordinary way of communication.
This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation.5
In the above quote, Locke provides a clue to his understanding of the
relation of faith and reason.

The miraculous accounts in the Bible are

only "above reason" because of Locke's juigment that they are reliable
historical documents (given by GOO.) which attest to events as they
actually occurred.

In other words, the Gospel miracles a.re so well

attested by such trustworthy persons that we can be confident of their
occurrence.

Locke stated this clearly in his A Third Letter Concerning

Toleration:
For, when you tell us that "you are sure, I cannot say the
Christian religion is still accompanied with miracles, as it
was, at its first planting", I hope you do not mean that the
4Jqhn Locke, An Essay.
5John Locke, An Essay.

. .' Bk. 4,
. .' Bk. 4,

Ch. 17, para. 24.
Ch. 18, para. 2.
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Gospel is not still accompanied with an undoubted testimony,
that miracles were done, by the first publishers of it, which
was as much of miracles as I suppose the greatest part of those
had with whom the Christian religion prevailed, till it was
"supported and encouraged as you tell us, by the laws of the
Empire, which was not till the fourth century, had actually
miracles done before them, to work upon them. And all those,
who were not eye-witnesses of miracles, done in their presence,
tis plain, had no other miracles than we have, that is upon
report; and 'tis probable, not so many, nor so well attested,
as we have.6
In the above quote, Locke demonstrates implicitly his conviction that
faith is based soundly upon historical occurrences which are indisputable.
For him, Christianity is a given religion, but more than that, it is an
historically given religion.

That there is a metaphysical dualism oper-

ating in Locke's works, is clear.

In his works, we are presented with a

picture of the autonomous subject standing before objective reality and
perceiving it directly.

As the implications of rationalism were pressed

farther by later philosophers (Hume, Berkley, Lessing) the problems of
rationalism, (for example its subjectivity) became evident.
Here, the name of David Hume is important.

Hume, like Locke, was

a rationalist and empiricist who was himself much concerned with epistemology.

He went beyond Locke, however, in his more consistent application

of experience as a check on belief.
thereby contrary to reason.

What is contrary to experience? is

On this basis, Hume rejects Locke's cate-

gories of phenomena above, according to, and contrary, to reason.

A

6John Locke,"A Third Letter Concerning Toleration" in The Reasonableness of Christianity. ed. I. T. Ramsey (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford
University Press, 1958), p. 91.
7By experience, Hume doesn't mean only his own experience but
rather human experience collectively as it is judged by reason. Ultimately, Hume's own judgments on what testimony is rationally acceptable and
what is not, leads him to gross subjectivism and in this, although Hume
wasn't particularly aware of it, he provides the greatest critique of
his own system.
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revelation, according to him, which is based on miracles is incredible
and no amount of testimony can establish that the miraculous has occurred.
In fact, any witness who testifies that the miraculous has happened is to

be juiged, ipso facto, as unreliable.

Hume writes;

That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless
the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood. would be
more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish;
and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments
and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that
degree of force, which remains, after deducing the inferior.
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead ma.n restored to life,
I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable,
that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that
the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I
weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the
superiority, which I disqover, I pronounce my decision, and
always. reject the greater.8
Hume goes on to give reasons for his suspicion of accounts of the miraculous.

In the first place, no account of miracle has ever been accom-

pa.nied by the testimony of men, whose repute ma.de it proba.ble.9

Second,

Hume himself had observed that human beings are susceptible to belief in
the wonderful and miraculous because, "the passion of surprise and wonder,
arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion,

giv~s

a sensible

tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it derived. 1110
Third, and finally, Hume argued that the accounts of the miraculous and
wonderful come usually from the credulous and uncivilized nations.11
On the basis of these observations, he rejects any notion of Christianity

Bnavid Hume,An E u
Concernin Human Understandin
The Open Court Publishing Co., 1927 , p. 121.
9navid Hume, An Enquiry ••• , p. 122.
10navid Hume, An Enquiry • • • , p. 122.
11navid Hume, An Enquiry ••• , p. 125.

(Chicago:
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as being a matter of established testimony.

History is not an adequate

foundation on which to place the truth of Christianity, since testimony,
especially that testimony found in the Bible, is most fallible.

Hume

polarizes faith and reason, and consequently faith and history, in his
consideration of the basis of Christianity.

The subjectivity which was

emerging in Locke is explicit in Hume when he distinguishes faith and
reason in the context of discussing the basis for Christianity:
Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and
it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as
it is, by no means, fitted to endure ••• So that, upon the whole,
we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was first
attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed
by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient
to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by faith
to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding,
and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary
to custom and experience.12
Whereas for Locke, faith was based upon the reasonable acceptance of
historic testimony, for Hume, no such acceptance was possible, at least
where the testimony involved miracle.

Faith, for him, was accepting some-

thing as true, which goes utterly contrary to reason, or, simply believing
an assertion one knows (rationally) to be false.

The move of rationalism

towards subjectivity was facilitated by Hume because he tended to deny ..
objectivity to history.

The subject not only stands in judgment of

objectivity, but also determines its bounds, and consequently, the subject is not open to reality at all, but rather, determines it for himself.
Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781) dealt with the same problem of the
relation between faith and history as Hume had, but found his own
solution which was not as rigidly rational as Hume's.
12navid Hume, An Enquiry ••• , p. 137-138.

In fact, Lessing
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is somewhat of a progression beyond Hume in that he distinguishes and
separates faith and history without pronouncing a negative judgment on
either.

This is the locus of his abiding significance, according to

Allison, who claims that with Lessing "for the first time in the eighteenth century the question of the facticity of the Christian revelation
was held to be irrelevant for the truth of the Christian religion ... 13
Lessing held that any written history, sacred or profane, could, at best
provide only probability of the occurrence of events, and therefore, the
truth of Christianity must not rest solely on historical gr:o'linds.
Further, for him, any faith based upon the attestation of a historical
document was more a faith in the credibility of the witness himself
rather than a faith in what he proposed.

Such a method of attestation

had far-reaching consequences, according to Lessing.

The miracles which

were required to support Jesus' message in his own day, were themselves
in need of more miracles to support them, as the message of their occurrence was proclaimed by his disciples later.

Further, the miracles of

the early Church were in need of further miracles to ·aa.d credence to the
accounts of the miraculous in the early church documents.
sion, Lessing termed the "proof of the proof".

This progres-

But, Lessing noted, this

"proof of the proof" had lapsed in his own day, and consequently:
If then this proof of the proof has now entirely lapsed; if
then all historical certainty is much too weak to replace this
apparent proof of the proof which has lapsed: How is it to be
expected of me that the same inconceivable truths which sixteen
to eighteen hundred years ago people believed on the strongest
inducement?14

13Henry E. Allison,Lessing and the Enli~tenment (Ann Arbor,
Mich.:

The University of Chicago Press, 1966 , p.

96.

14cotthold Lessin~ On The Proof Of The Spirit And Of Power trans.
by Henry Chadwick (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1956), p. 53.
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Lessing's comments above indicate that his attack was not on the possibility of miracle nor the reliability of the historical ac.counts of them.
Those things might have been an adequate foundation for Christian.faith
in another age, but they were no longer acceptable in his own.

Regarding

miracles, he wrote, "I deny that they can and should bind me in the least
to a faith in the other teachings of Christ."15 Rather, the acceptance
of Christian teachings, which in a more primitive time, had to be based
on signs, could now be based strictly on rational reflection.

Reason

was now capable, being more highly developed, of understanding the great
truths of Christianity aPa.I)t from its historicity and therefore, for
Lessing, the historical details were not as important as what they contained, i.e. the great moral truths of Christianity.

Although there is

a sense of objectivity, a sense of an abiding truth in Christianity, in
Lessing's ideas, he is still fully within the rationalist position.

The

subject still determines the abiding truths of reality, he is still very
much autonomous.

But Lessing creates a gap between faith and history by

his assertion that the historic testimony and its subject can be separated
like idea and manifestation.

Further, Lessing sees the historic mani-

festation as dispensable whereas the real important and essential truth
remains.

He carried out this distinction between faith and history

because Hume had made Christianity suspect by his critique of the Biblical documents.

In Lessing's work, the question of miracle and histori-

city was irrelevant to Christian truth because Christianity contained
abiding and absolute truths discoverable by reason.

But in doing this,

he effectively polarized idea and manifestation and thus created a chasm
between object and subject.

Kant carried this further.

15cotthold Lessing, On The Proof ••• , p. 53.
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Immanuel Kant (1724-180'-r) is best known for his work, the Critique
of Pure Reason in which he demonstrated the limits of reason and postulated two aspects of reality:

the noumenal and the phenomenal.

Kant

went on later to apply his ideas to Christianity in his Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone, especially in the third book entitled "The
Victory of the Good over the Evil Principle, and the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth."

Here, he distinguished between ecclesiastical

faith (the Christian Church as it has developed historically) and pure
religious faith (which is not to be identified absolutely with ecclesiastical faith even though ecclesiastical faith is its vehicle).

He

writes:
In men's striving towards an ethical commonwealth, ecclesiastical faith thus naturally precedes pure religious faith: temples
(buildings consecrated to the public worship of God) were before
churches (meeting-places for the instruction and quickening of
moral disposition). • • Since, then, it remains true once for
all that a statutory ecc~esiastical faith is associated with
pure religious faith as its vehicle and as the means of public
union of men for its promotion, one must grant that the preservation of pure religious faith unchanged, its propagation in the
same form everywhere, and even a respect for the revelation assumed
therein, can hardly be provided for adequately through tradition,
but only through scripture; which, again, as a revelation to
contemporaries and posterity, must itself be an object of esteem,
for the necessities of men require this
order that they may.
be sure of their duty in divine service.

lg

Ecclesiastical faith is important, as Kant indicates above, yet such faith
is never to be considered as the absolute expression of pure religious
faith.
idea.

That kind of faith can only exist in the realm of spirit or
When ecclesiastical faith considers itself as pure religious faith

absolutely, the result is that "he who refuses to acknowledge its
(peculiar) ecclesiastical faith is called by it an unbeliever and is
16Immanuel Kant,Reli ion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone trans.
by Theodore Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1960), p. 97.
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hated wholeheartedly."17

Thus, according to Kant, the truly important

faith is that which strives

af~r

pure religious faith, arrl the end of

such a faith is the moral betterment of the individual.

On this, Kant

writes:
For the final purpose even of reading these Holy Scriptures,
or of investigating their content, is to make men better; the
historical element, which contributes nothing to this end, is
something which is in itself quite indifferent, and we can do
with it what we like. (Historical faith "is dead being alone",
that is, of itself, regarded as a creed, it contains nothing,
and leads to nothing, which could have any moral value for us.) 18
Not only does Kant subordinate the historic expression of ecclesiastical
religions to pure religious faith, he also declares that they are ultimately fated to pass away as pure religious faith takes its place.

This

exchange was already on its way, according to Kant, because of the moral
disposition which was already emerging in western civilization.

Soon,

he wrote:
Religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining
grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which
through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite
men for the requirements of the gocx:l; and thus at last the pure
religion of reason will rule over all, "so that Gcx:l may be all
in all. 19
11

The above quote indicates the great separation between faith and
history which rationalism prcx:luced.

The process began with the elevation

of reason as the sole criterion of truth and ultimately resulted in the
elevation of idea over manifestation, even to the extent that historical
details were considered as only the dispensable shell of reality.
the meaning of historical events was made independent of its actual
17r. Kant,Religion ••• , p. 98.
18r. Kant, Religion • • • , p. 102.

19r. Kan\ Religion • • . , p. 112.

Thus,

23
historical context.

This was the state of philosophical affairs when

the French Revolution broke out.

The Revolution was, in many ways, the

result of rationalism itself, for the Enlightenment had put a premium on
man's reason and on his ability to rightly order his affairs.

The

Revolution itself proposed initially to be the reordering of society
upon rational grounds.

It was to be the dawning of a new world where

political· freedom would compliment the already growing intellectual
freedom brought about through the Enlightenment.

Because of this

connection, a brief description of the progress of the Revolution,
especially as it affected Germany, is in order here.

THE POLITICAL CATALYST:

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

When the Revolution broke out in France on July 14, 1789, the
Germans responded ambivalently; some enthusiastically welcoming the
Revolution as if it were their own, others watching the event from afar
as intellectual spectators.

I~

general, European intellectuals tended

to view the Revolution positively as the nat.ural outcome of the Enlightenment and the first step towards a truly enlightened world.

It was in

this spirit that Hegel and Schelling, while still students at Tubingen,
planted a tree of liberty in honor of the Revolution.

Yet this enthu-

siasm was not at all a show of pro-French sentiment, but a recognition
and approval of the principles at the base of the Revolution.

German

intellectuals hoped for an application of Enlightenment principles in
their own countries, though not necessarily through the same means.
J. G. Herder remarked:

Thus,

"We can watch the French Revolution as we watch

a shipwreck at sea from the safety of the shore," and historian Johannes

l
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Muller who had hailed the coming of the Revolution in 1789 as "the most
wonderful day since the decline of the Roman Empire" also said, "heaven
forbid that similar revolutions occur in other lands. 11 20

When the

Revolution changed direction in 1792 and began to direct itself outward
militarily, many German intellectuals resisted it vigorously.

Later,

their disappointment turned to disillusionment as Napoleon, taking ad.vantage of the political confusion in France, launched a major campaign for
a

~"'rench ~uropean

empire.

Germany's chief monarchs, Austrian king and Holy Roman Emperor
Leopold II and Frederick William I, king of Prussia
less attitude toward the events in France.

manifested a care-

If they could have seen

ahead, they would have reason for concern, yet from their vantage point
in 1789, they had little to fear.

In the first place, Germany did not

share the same social conditions as France, which might have caused internal problems.

Eighteenth century German society was very rigidly

stratified, and social divisions were generally accepted and observed.
The monarchy held a strong position and wielded absolute authority.
Further, Germany was not at all unified, but was divided up into no less
than 1,789 independent sovereign powers.

The lack of social mobility in

Germany, along with its torn condition (Zerrisenheit) and overall provincialism combined to create a static and strongly conservative attitude
within Germany as a whole.

In addition, the philosophic tradition in

Germany was less mundane than in France, and more concerned with the
internal development of individuals (Bildung) than in the reorganization
2 °Koppel S. Pinson, Modern German : Its Histor and Civilization
2nd ed. (New York: The ¥.iacmillan Company, 1966 , p. 28.
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of the state of society.

German intellectuals were much too dependent

upon court patronage to either want or attempt the destruction of a
social order which benefited them.

Ironically, it was some of these

very factors in German society which now prevented the outbreak of
revolution in Germany, that later mobilized effective German resistance
to French invasion urder Napoleon.
A second reason why the chief monarchs of Germany did not become
concerned with the Revolution, was their own engagement in other political affairs.

When the Revolution came, Leopold II was involved in a

war xith the Turks which was costing him greatly in both men and money.
Although as king of Austria he had an alliance with France, he was, at
the time, much more interested in stimulating the Austrian economy and
thus swelling the Austrian treasury, than in striking out on a political
crusade against a nation which seemed too disorganized either to assist
or injure.

Similarly, Frederick William I was too preoccupied with in-

ternal problems of bankruptcy and administrative chaos in his own kingdom to be concerned about the domestic affairs of France.

In fact,

Frederick may well have felt favorably inclined towards the Revolution
since it could potentially upset the Franco-Austrian alliance and thus
strengthen his position in Germany.21

Not only were Leopold and Frederick

jealously suspicious of one another, but both were anxiously watching
Catherine of Russia lest she attempt to annex all or part of Poland.
In sum, the attitu:ie of Germany to the Freach Revolution was, at
best, passive interest,

The German philosophes, in general, welcomed

the Revolution initially as their own, though they did not wish something
21sydney Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutio
Vol I (Cambridge , Mass , : Harvard Uni vers 1ty Press, 1957
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like it to befall Germany, and the major German monarchs simply watched
and observed, seeing that it was within their interests to stay out of
it.

Had they rightly understocxl the powerful ideological forces behird

the Revolution, they would have had cause for alarm, for the French
Revolution was not simply the end of another dynasty in France, to be
replaced by another, nor was it essentially some visionary grasp at
utopia.

It was the signal for the advent of a new world order in which

privilege and tradition would be destroyed or at least strictly confined.
No area of human concern was to be exempt, kings were executed, churches
were pillaged and abandoned or turned into shrines to Reason.

It spelled

the death of absolute authority and divine-right, and it certainly could
not be confined to the borde~s of France.
The events that brought Prussia and Austria into conflict with the
revolutionary forces are complicated.

No single event can be pointed

to as predominant, neither can France, Prussia, or Austria be held solely
at fault.

From the French revolutionary perspective, it looked as if

Germany was gearing up for a strong anti-revolutionary war which would
re-establish the forces of conservatism.

On the other hand, from the

German perspective, it looked as though the French revolutionaries were
intent on extending the Revolution to Germany itself, especially in
German holdings in the Alsace regions on the Rhine River.
The mutual suspicions of all powers concerned, seemed to be born
out of the increasing French

emigr~

population gathering on German soil.

Since July 14, 1789 and even before, a steady stream of nobles had been
emigrating from France.

Colonne, former Controller General, was driven

from France in 1787 to become the first of many

emigr~s

am Artois,

brother of Louis XVI and arch enemy of the Revolution, was ordered into
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exile shortly after the recall of Necker in July of 1789.

In July and

August of 1789, during the great fear in the countryside, and also later
in 1791 with the failure of the flight to Varennes, the ranks of the
emigr~s

began to swell until there were twenty thousand at Coblenz alone.

It was Coblenz, a Rhenish town, dependent on the Archbishop (elector)
of Trier, that became the chief center of

emigr~

headquarters for Artois and his retinue, but the
with most of the courts of Europe.22

concentration and the
emigr~s

were intriguing

After unsuccessfully trying to stir

up an armed revolt within France in order to restore the Ancien Regime,
the

emigr~s

began to mobilize their forces for an armed invasion of

France.
The fact of a French

emigr~

population mobilizing for an invasion

into France against the Revolution, quite naturally caused the revolutionaries great concern, but concern turned to alarm when it was rumored
that the King and Queen themselves were in communication with the

emigr~

forces and were working hand in hand with them to effect the invasion. 23
As

this rumor spread, the King and Queen were increasingly eyed with sus-

picion.

It was in fear for their lives that they made that desperate

and tragically unsuccessful flight for Varennes on June 20, 1791.
By this time, events were happening in Germany and France which
22 erane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution, p.

57.

2Jrrhis rumor was only half true, for although Louis was in communication with the emigr~ forces, and did make a plea for armed intervention by a congress of European powers, he had clearly refused to countenance the emigr~s plans of invasion on the grounds that it would probably
result in civil war and further endanger his and the queen's safety.
See M. J. Sydenham,The French Revolution (New York: Capricorn Books,
1966), p. 92.
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brought the two powers closer and closer towards conflict.

Shortly

before Varennes, Leopold became genuinely concerned with what was happening in France especially as these events jeopardized the royal family.
In May of 1?91, Leopold met with emigr~ leader Artois and on July 6th
of that year, issued the Padua circular which invited the kings of other
German states to join him ''in vindicating the honor and liberty of Louis
xvI·and his family, and in putting limits upon the perilous extremes to
which the Revolution was tending in France.••

In August of 1791, Leopold

and Frederick William met at Pillnitz to discuss their policy regarding
France and the

emi~s.

which rejected the

The result was the Declaration of Pillnitz

emigr~s

demand for immediate intervention and further

refused their requests to use Germany as an asylum for warlike prepara-"
tions against France, but also stated positively that the position of
the French monarch was a matter of concern to all European sovereigns,
and threatened war if the feulal rights of German princes in the ·Alsace
were not restored.
The Declaration of Pillnitz was ill-timed, if indeed its purpose
was to terrify France by threats, for it had the opposite effect.

The

rumored appeals of the royal family for foreign intervention, the flight
for Varennes, the intrigue of

emigr~s .~and

the protection afforded them

by German princes on the very doorstep of France, all combined with the
Declaration to impress upon the French people the feeling that the
foreigner was awaiting only an opportunity to pounce upon France.

The

prevalence of this feeling in France marked the end of that early idealism of 1790 when the National Assembly had renounced all wars of conquest
and declared that France would never take up arms against the liberty of
any people.

Under the leadership of Brissot, the Revolution took a
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decisive turn towards a more aggressive foreign policy.

War was looked

upon as beneficial and necessary to the Revolution by Brissot and his
supporters.24
Events progressed quickly in France during the latter part of 1791
to bring the conflict ever closer until finally on January 24, 1792, the
Legislative Assembly issued an ultimatum to Kmperor Leopold, giving him
until March 1st to renounce all agreements directed against French sovereignty, independence, and security.

At this point, a clash was in-

evitable, and Austria and Prussia drew close together in preparation for
l

joint action against France.

On February 7, 1792, they signed an alliance

of friendship and defense which provided for reciprocal aid in defense
against attack from whatever quarter (perhaps from Russia) it might
come, and the grant of 20,000 men upon demand.

In the midst of the

worsening situation, Leopold died and was succeeded by the more bellicose
F.rancis II, while in France, DeLessart was dismissed by the National
Assembly ard replaced by the girondist sympathizer Dumouriez.

Finally,

on April 20th, Dumouriez stood before the Legislative Assembly and called
for war on Austria.

After deliberating for some time over Dumouriez'

proposal, the Assembly voted on war and sent a deputation to get the
king's signature on the formal declaration.

Germany was now formally

at war with the Revolutionary forces in France,
With the outbreak of the War of the First Coalition, we come to a
break point in the history of this period.

By 1792, the French Revolu-

ti on, as it had originally been conceived, was passing away • Whatever
cosmopolitan ideas had been present at its inception

weire·.~!a.).y

24M, J, Sydenham.,The French Revolution, p. 91-92.
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becoming submerged to French nationalistic aims which later, under
Napoleon, became imperialistic and dynastic aims.

The effects of this

eclipse of Enlightenment ideals were to have profound repercussions in
Germany in the realms of politics and culture.
The German struggle against France helped to engender the nationalistic sentiments of Germans, but it also succeeded in demonstrating
the basic weakness of Germany and of its divided condition.

Prussia

joined the first coalition against France in 1792, and had fought alongside Austria but after suffering defeats at Valmy and Jema.ppes, she
concluded a separate peace settlement with France in 1795 and then concerned herself with the east.

Austria continued to struggle against

France until 1797 when she came to terms in the treaty of Campo Formio.
Under the terms of this treaty the entire left bank of the Rhine was
ceded to France.
Napoleon's strategy in Germany consisted in playing off Austria
against Prussia and in encouragi_ng the smaller German principalities
against both kingdoms.

The jealously between the various kingdoms and

principalities of Germany allowed him to do this with great success.
Napoleon also eliminated many of the smaller principalities and raised
some states to the status of kingdoms.

Ironically, it was through his

efforts that Germany was to take !ts first step towards unification •.

On July 17, 18o6 he created the Confederation on the Rhine, a virtual
''third Germany", which was made up of Bavaria, Wlirttemberg, Baden, HesseDarmstadt (and later Saxony), and twelve smaller states.

As Napoleon

pushed into Germany, Prussia once again entered the war against France
but was terribly beaten by Napoleon's forces at Jena on October 14, 18o6.
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From the defeat at Jena in 1806 until Napoleon's defeat in 1814,
Prussia began to reorganize and rebuild for the future.

The dynamic

of the reforms, which were social, economic• administrative and municiple,
was provided by a growing sense of individuality and uniqueness among
Germans, especially Prussians.

It was the disillusionment of the early

Revolution, combined with the humiliation of the Napoleonic period
which generated the cultural forces of the nineteenth century.
THE CULTURAL RESPONSEi
ROMANTICISM AND HISTORICISM
Although, at the time, the Napoleonic invasions into Germany were
difficult and humiliating, it was out of this humiliation that Germany
emerged as a nation.

In fact, Germany derived great benefit from the

French Revolution and Napoleonic invasions.

First, on the.practical

level, the Napoleonic invasions and consolidations in the Rhineland marked
the first step toward,•Germa.n unity.

After the Congress of Vienna, in

1815, the territory of what had been the Holy Roman Empire remained
almost the same, but now instead of a vast number of small and petty
principalities, there was a confederation of thirty-nine states under as
many monarchs.

Although Germany was still far from being a unified

nation, this reorganization greatly facilitated later unification.
Second, the French Revolution convinced many German statesmen and intellectua.ls that if there was not to be a repeat of foreign incursions into
German territory then unification must take place to present a unified
policy and resistance.

In addition, it was felt that the German states

should apply more democratic principles within their governments and not
simply return to eighteenth century autocracy.

This latter point was of
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of extreme importance (and a later frustration) to German intellectuals.
Heine, for example, mocked the tendency of restoration German monarchs
to fall back into the eighteenth century mode of rule.

He wrotes

When I was at the top of the St. Gotthard Pass, I heard Germany
snoring ••• She slept peacefully, under the protection of her
thirty-six monarchs. In those days, crowns sat firmly on the
prince's heads, and at night they just drew their night caps over
them, while the people slept peacefully at their feet.25
These factors combined to radically change German culture and society in
the nineteenth century.

Although these changes can be seen in many as-

pects of German society (i.e. political, artistic, literary) the present
1

discussion will focus on tw 0 general cultural movements which were intimately related:

Romanticism and Historicism.

Romanticism
As earlier indicated, the outbreak of the French Revolution was
looked upon favorably by intellectuals all over Europe.

The reason for

this early favorable reaction was the sense of community that European
intellectuals shared during the Enlightenment period.

The Enlightenment

had looked forward to a progressively better world for mankind, indeed,a
cosmopolis, where the divisions and differenees of nations would be
solved by Reason.

re~o

This general expectation was founded upon the belief

in a natural law common to all men regardless of national or cultural
origin.

According to Brinton, "The Enlightenment promised heaven on

earth, soon, and by a process that meant for the individual, a "natural"
release of expansion, appetitive forces within himself, not self-denial
25Frederick B. Artz Reaction and Revolution (New York:
and Brothers Publishers, ~934), p. 137.
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and inner discipline."26

Although Brinton's characterization of the

Enlightenment may only apply to its extreme form, nevertheless, it does
embody the essential message of the Enlightenments
is on its way up and Reason shall lead the way.

that western culture

It was in such a belief

that Condorcet wrote these lines during the early phase of the Revolution:
Everything tells us that we have come to one of the great
revolutions of the human race. What is more suitable for
enlightening us as to what we should expect from that revolution, for providing us with a sure guide in the midst of these
movements, than an account of revolutions which proceeded and
prepared this one? The actual state of human enlightenment
guarantees to us that this revolution will be a happy one.27
But as has been indicated above, something went wrong, and the euphoric
atmosphere of the early revolution turned into the nightmare of the
Reign of Terror, Napoleon and bitter ard bloody wars.

It seemed as if

the Enlightenment dream was shattered, the hope of a great European
cosmopolis dead.

After the failure of the revolution, there were degrees

of reaction to Enlightenment ideas.

In Germany, the catalyst for the

anti-Enlightenment reaction was the loss of the cosmopolitan character
and the early politicization of the French Revolution.
The first stirrings of the Romantic Revolt against the Enlightenment in Germany, came in liturature and generally from authors and poets
who had, before the Revolution, been committed to its principles.

The

conversion from rational to romantic sentiments came via the later
Revolution; as Artz writesa
The precursors of German romanticism had been prophets of an
ideal of boundless liberty. No rules •hould bind the genius
26erane Brinton, The Shaping of Modern Thought (Englewood& Cliffs,
New Jerseys Prentice Hall Inc., 1963), p. 138.
27Quoted in Brinton, The Shaping of Modern Thought, p. 139.
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because the divine spirit spoke in him. But before the end of
the Napoleonic wars, nearly all the chief poets, critics, and
novelists of ~ge movement had passed into a aood of the blackest reaction.
Novalis, the reputed founder of German romanticism, had been an ardent
revolutionary and had once expressed his longing for a "new massacre of
St. Bartholomew, a wholesale destruction of despotism and prisons. 0 29
The transition from rationalism to romanticism in Germany is nowhere
seen so dramatically as it is in Novalis.

By 1?99, particularly in his

Christenheit oder Europa, he was not only proclaiming the Prussian king
to be God's gift to humanity but also defending the temporal power of
the

~apa.cy.

In this work, according to Artz, Novaliss

attacked the Enlightenment for its mechanistic and utilitarian
view of the state and its ideals of natural rights, social equality,
and political democracy. In the course of the argument, he
extolled the spirit of Jesuitism and declared it a misfortune
that the Papacy no longer had the power to stop such dangerous
theories as those of Copernicus.JO
Novalis can serve as the paradigmatic model for a general movement which
swept over Europe, ar:d especially Germany, in the post-Napoleonic period.
The same pattern is seen in other German literary figures such as
Schlegel, an early rationalist, cosmopolitan, and classicist, who "under
the influence of Ficte and Schleierma.cher, and under the impressions of
the French Revolution. • .took a deep bath of romanticism wherein he rid
himself of all taint of Jacobinism."3 1
Although the Romantic Revolt 1n Germany first expressed itself in
28F.rederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, pp.

57-58.

29Frederick B. Artz,Reaction and Revolution, p. 59.
JOF.rederick B. Artz,Reaction and Revolution, p. 58.
31Frederick B. Artz,Reaction and Revolution, p. 59.
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literature and poetry, events within Germany soon combined to produce a
particular brand of romanticism not manifested in any other country.
These events were all tied to the German problem of disunity and thus,
while literary romanticism longed to find the German soul, a special
brard of political romanticism quested for a unified German nation.
Both of these factors combined to produce the revolutionary political
and cultural forces in nineteenth century Germany, as Iggers has inclieated:
The literary revival in Germany in the late eighteenth century
involved the attempt to free national literature from the influence
of French nee-classic patterns, and was far more conscious than
the romantic stirrings elsewhere. But, aost important, German
political nationalism arose in the struggle against the ·French
lomination of Germany in the aftermath of the French Revolution
and the Napoleonic victories, a struggle which intensified the
anti-Enlightenment bias of German political thought.32
It was this combination of strong German cultural awareness mingled with
the humiliation of the Napoleonic wars that made the anti-Enlightenment
reaction in Germany so unique.
German romanticism tends to :e.lude.. description because 1 t was not
so much a system. as a state of mind or a new Weltanschauung.

Altholz'

claim that ''it is as impossible to define romanticism as it. is to ignore
it".33 is probably correct for it was the very essence of romanticism to
consider all of life in all its variety, to merely take the given as
such and to embrace it as the fullness of life.

Welch gives the follow-

ing historical definition of romanticismi
32ceorge Igger, The German Conception of History (Connecticut&
Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 7.
33Josef L. Altholz The Churches in the Nineteenth Century
(New York: The Bobbs-Me~ill Company, Inc., 1967), p. 49.
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Here we mean above all the movement beginning in Germany in
the 1790's which gave itself this name. Some of the ideas of
this movement had been announced in Rousseau and Lessing; for
its nurture Herder and Schiller, along with the Sturm and Drang
movement, were of special importance; it came to full flower in
liturature and as a Weltanschauung in Novalis and the Schlegels
(especially Fried.rich Schlegel), Schleiermacher, and Fichte,
Gorres and Adam Miil.ler, Tieck and Wachen:rod.er. Schleierma.cher's
Speeches and Soliloquies have been called its two chief mani-festos in the realm of religion, but this romanticism ••• was
also of importance for theology in Hegel and Schelling.34
Because Romanticism is so systematically amorphous and covers such a
long and diverse historical duration, the best approach is to give
general characteristics of this movement.
-'

Paul Tillich, in a lecture series delivered at the Divinity School

of the University of Chicago, has given some general characteristics of

the Romantic Revolt which are not only intellectually penetrating, but
also highly appropriate to this discussion, therefore, the following
treatment of German Boma.nticism will follow his categories.JS The first
characteristic of Romanticism, according to Tillich, has to do with the
relationship between the Infinite and finite which is actually the question
of the relation between Absolutes and particulars or ideas and history.
Here, Romanticism is presented as a movement aiming at a balance between
the Infinite and finite.

Romanticism is a reaction against the Enlighten-

ment tendency to secularize human affairs, against the tendency to see
reality ·as operating mechanistically, but it is an over-reaction because
it ultimately breaks the balance it alas at.

Thus, Tillich saysa

34c1au1.e Welch, Protestant Thou ht in the Nineteenth Centur
1799-1870 (New Havens Yale University Press, 972 , p. 52.

Vol. 1,

, , J?Paul Tillich, Pers ctives on 1 h and 20th Cent
Protestant
Theology ed., Carl E. Braaten New Yorks Harper and Row Publishers,
1967), pp. ?6-90.
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We have here then the breaking through of the infinite against
the balance it had in the classical criticism or negation of the
Enlightenment, the romantic breakthrough of the balance into the
horizontal line.36
Just what Tillich means here by "the romantic breakthrough of the balance
into the horizontal line," is helpful in understanding German history
subsequent to the Romantic Revolt.

It is when the particular romantic

conception of the balance, which is characterized as ironic, is applied
to the individual form of culture that the problems arise.

Irony, within

the context of the romantic balance, means,
that the Infinite is superior to any finite concretion and
drives beyond to another finite concretion. The ego of the
romanticist ••• is free from bondage to the concrete situation.
A concrete situation means both the spiritual situation, a
concrete form of faith, and the situation in relation to human
beings ••• romanticism drives beyond any ~ticular actualization of the Infinite in a finite situation.37
It was the irony within the romantic balance of the Infinite and finite
which set the stage for the break between right and left-wing Hegelians
later.

There are two possible responses to the notion that form is

unimportant • Either one seeks meaning in the vague realm of the completely
transcendent, thus ignoring form and succumbing to acosmism; or one accepts.
the relativity of form and attempts to live within it, thus giving up the
possibility of absolute knowledge and at worst succumbing to atheism.
Romanticism carried within it this potential gulf between form and content
which has since remained a problem for theological science even unto the
present.

In nineteenth century Germany, this chasm had a sociological,

as well as an intellectual, effect.

36Paul Tillich, Perspectives.

' on to saya
Tillich goes

. .'

P• ~.

37Paul Tillich, Perspectives. • • • P• 89.
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Now this romantic irony breaks through the sociological forms,
for instance, the traditional Lutheran paternalism, the idea of
the family, the relation of pa.rents to children, the political
stability, etc. All these forms now became questionable. Every
special content in the traditions of the El.n"opean countries became a matter of "yes" and .. no." Irony does not mean simply an
attacks there is a "yes" in it, but the "no" is predominant. It
always says "no" as well to a concrete solution to life's
problems.JS
As the tension between form and content became increasingly difficult
for ea.rly romantic thinkers, many began to turn to the authority of the
State and the Church, to provide some sort of absolute direction.

It is

within this context that the growth of the German nation (and the resurgence of ultramontanism) in the nineteenth century is to be understood.
The State increasingly took over the functions which the sense of God had
previously fulfilled until the.State became everything in Marxist theory.
Secularism received, in the nineteenth century, its most powerful impulse.
Those who had relinquished the hope of transcendent meaning looked to
the State to provide that meaning.

In the same way, those who despaired

of finding any content within the form of history, but who were unwilling
to accept the full consequences, found their transcendent meaning within
the dogma ef the Catholic Church and the Pope.

Important here is the

work Du Pape (1819) by Joseph de Ma.istre in which the Church was presented as the only uni versa! hope for man.

Both Novalis and Schlegel

resorted to the Catholic Church and early became converts.

Zacharias

Werner, whom Artz calls "the most extreme and fantastic of the German
romantics," and who was a great devotee of Jean Jacques Rousseau, not
only became a Catholic convert but later entered the priesthood.39 The
Lutheran church also experienced a very conservative revival which was
J8Paul Tillich, Perspectives ••• , p. 89 •
.39F.rederick B. Artz, Reaction am Revolution, p. 60.
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extremely confessional and emphasized discipline, sacraments and doctrine.
The most famous of these confessional groups was centered at Erlangen and
became known as the Erlangen school.

This school, while definitely

conservative, was still responsive to critical scholarship and sought
to come to grips with the problem of the relation between the finite and
infinite in the person of Jesus, and thus it advanced the kenotic theory
of Jesus' person to explain both his humanity and divinity.

In general,

the political reaction was the result of over-all conservative mood in
Europe, as was the religious reaction.

In fact, these two areas worked

together to promote the Romantic Revolt as Altholz remarks,
The conservative Lutheran revival, though not of Pietist origin,
drew strength from movements of religious awakening among the
people. On the other hand, conservative Luthernism was linked to
the court-centered reaction after 1848 by the jurist F. J. Stahl,
a convert from Judaism. With its emphasis on authority and
church order, the Lutheran revival. showed marked affinities with
both Roman Catholicism and High Church Anglicanism.40
In sum, the first, and probably the most important characteristic
of Romanticism was its tension-filled balance between the infinite and
finite which increasingly tended towards the infinite and was, thus,
always in danger of sacrificing form to content.
synthesis pulled apart, there was a

mad

When the romantic

scramble for universal certainty,

which some found in the State while others in the Church.
perspective, the romantic synthesis

am

Seen in this

its failure gave birth to nine-

teenth century German movements such as nationalism, historicism, secularism, and materialism, as well as an over-all fragmentation

withi~

German society,
A second characteristic of German Romanticism which Tillich notes
40Josef L. Altholz,The Churches in the Nineteenth Century, p. 10(.
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is that aspect of Romanticism which is most readily associated with it,
i.e. the emotional am aesthetic element.
is not to be identified so much with the

The emotionalism of Romanticism
~ctua.l

expression of human

emo~

tions as it is with the intuitive awareness of the infinite within the
finite.

Thus, this characteristic is closely tied up with the romantic

balance between the infinite am finite.
standing life in a wholistic way.

Romanticism aimed at under-

It did not seek to debase the moral

imperative in man nor, on the other hand, the scientific consideration
in nature but rather in considering both these things asked the question:
"Is there something in nature which, so to speak, fulfills the commands
of the moral imperative and.' transcends the mere scientific analysis of
na.ture?"41

This particular characteristic of Romanticism is probably

the most visible of any, it is this characteristic of the romantic
Weltanschauung which breaks through in almost every aspect of life, for
example in art and music.

In art, the epitomic neo-classical works of

David give way to the romantic works of Gericault and Delairoix, while
in music, the balanced resolute structure of Haydn '·s chamber music gives
way to the increasing open style of Beethoven.

Within each of these

examples is an underlying thirst for life. an overall desire for total
immersion in life which leads to the awareness of awe before the universe.
Novalis wrote, "The romantic sttdies life as the painter, the musician and
engineer sta:ly colour, sound and power.

It is a careful st my of life

which is the ma.king of the romantic. "42

The Bou.ntic Bevolt;;alsf;;.. had

a··1pz-ofi>und.··.1mp8.ctr:- on theology as can be seen in the works of Schelling,
41 Paul Tillich, Perspectives ••• , p. 8J.

42 Ka.rl Barth, Nineteenth Century Theology, p.

349.
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Schleierma.cher, am also Hegel, but this point will be taken up in
considering their impact on Baur's theological development.
The third and final characteristic of Romanticism to be considered

here, has to do with the romantic conception of the past and its considered valuation of tradition.

According to Tillich "here the conflict

with Enlightenment was especially great • ..43 The Enlightenment attitude
towards history was not particularly negative, but it did not highly
value the past.
the present.

The past was always seen ard evaluated in reference to

A good example of this attitude is G. E. Leasing's

Education of the Human Race, which portrayed world history as the gradual
awakening or enlightenment of mankind.

The pa.st was not valued at all

on its own terms or for its own sake, rather it was considered disposable,
an archaic stage in ma.n's development which he had outgrown.

The Enlight-

enment concept of history was a naive mechanistic view which pictured man
as almost outside of history by virtue of his reason.

Thus, he could

evaluate history from a superior vantage point and pass judgment on it
by virtue of his more absolute understanding.
Romanticism utterly demolished this naive conception of history
and ultimately succeeded in placing man back into the historic process.
t.rhe realiza. ti on of the in:finite within the. :fln:i tei, 1noted·, ,ab'Ove ;·· C&\2Sed ·.
the romantic to look for the infinite within past historical individuals,
and thus to understand historical epochs on their own terms.
was considered to have revelatory significance itself.

The past

The Enlightenment

mechanistic conception of history began to give way to a new organic
concept which fully appreciated and revelled in the complete variety' in
4JPaul Tillich, Perspectives ••• , p. BJ.
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history.

For Novalis, the theme of history was "process and ever-

increasing unfoldings,"44 and no aspect of this unfolding was entirely
separate from the whole.

History was conceived of as a great organism

or plant which grew and developed through different stages, but was
always straining toward the complete realization of its original idea.
But Romanticism did not maintain the same sense of cosmopolitanism that
had characterized the Enlightenment, for different nations were like
separate plants growing and realizing distinct ideas.

In this regard,

the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars were a great check on a cosmopolitanism which might have produced a sense of universal history.

In-

stead, what increasingly emerged in nineteenth century historiography
were national histories developed around an idea which was considered
the original idea of that nation.

Janosi writes:

The romantics believed that each organism had its own life,
distinct from that of its parts; that it developed and at times
changed unconsciously; that it underwent influences and exerted
its own influence, thougl:l the active aspects were less stressed
by the romantics in accordance with the Goethian parallel of
plant life.45
Historicism
The romantic conception

of history had profound implications for

historiography and the growth of the Historicist Movement in Germany.
In this regard, the name Johann Gottfried von Herder is particularly
important for it was he who first laid down many of the theoretical conceptions of Historicism.

Herder is a transitionary figure who bridges

44?!-iedrich Engel Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism in John's
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series
62, 1944, p. 39,

45Friedrich Engel Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism, p. 40.
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the Enlightenment and Romantic periods for although he adheres to the
concept of individuality among all historical phenomena, although he
rejoices in the variety and plurality of history, he maintains connections

with the Enlightenment in his belief that man is still capable of grasping
the essence of this historical variety.46

Thus, for Herder, the historian

still stands somewhat outside of history, he still remains the subjective
observer.

As Romanticism progressed. less and less confidence was placed

in ma.n's subjective point of reference, as the idea of the historicity

of all existence gradually dawned on historians.
Even in some of Herder's earliest work, he established his concept
of the Humanitatsideal, an idea which, according to Igger, stressed that
"every age must be viewed in terms of its own immediate values1 that there
is no progress or decline in history, only virtue filled diversity.•.47
Herder's Enlightenment roots are evident in his interest in universal
history and in his cosmopolitan conception of all cultures even though
outwardly diverse.

For Herder there is, within the diversity, a meaning-

ful process which is guided by the sovereign God.

Igger says of him:

The Historicism of Herder rests upon the firm belief that there
is a Divine purpose in history, that "Providence guides the pa.th
of development onward". All of nature and of history reflect
God. Herder compares history to a stream rushing to the ocean
or to a growing tree. History is indeed meaningful, the scene
of a guiding intention on earth, although we do not perceive
this ultimate purpose at once. Basically, mankind is still
one, according to Herder, however the meaning of history is not
found in the direction of events toward a rational end but in
the multiplicity of ways in which the human mind expresses
itself in- the diversity of nations.48
46Friedrich Engel Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism, p. 42.
4
7George Igger, The German Conception of History, p. JO.
4Bceorge Igger,The German Co~ception of History, p. 37.
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Thus, Herder's work is an important first step towards a new conception
of history but falls short of the true romantic conception of history
which was even more individualistic.

It was Herder's ideas through the

crucible of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars which produced the
historicist tradition in Germany in the nineteenth century.

As Lord

Acton once wrote, ''Historical writing was old, but historical thinking
was new in Germany when 1t sprang from the shock of the French Revolution ...49
George Igger has provided a convenient summary of the effects of the
Revolution on German society, an4 e>n German historical thinking.

His

three points follow the chronological stages of the development of German
Historicism.
1. The Enlightenment faith in universally applicable ethical
and political values, which had been already challenged before
the Revolution, was now completely shattered ••• German educated
opinion now agreed that all values and rights were of historic
and national origin and that alien institutions could not be
transplanted to German soil.
2. The concept of the nation had changed fundamentally. (States
and cultures were no longer viewed as all contributing equally
to a world garden). Nationalism no longer united, .it· divided. 3. Finally, the State occupies a very different role. Fichte,
who had written in 1?<j.f., that "the aim of all government" is
"to make government superfluous'', wrote in 1807 that ''there
is neither law nor right except the law of the stronger".50
The Romantic Movement reacted against the extreme rationalism of the
Enlightenment and sought to strike a balance between the infinite and
finite within human history.

Herder appears to have attempted just this,

to retain a sense of cosmopolitanism while at the same time giving
serious consideration to the tremendous individuality of history.

This

could only be done as long as an adequate synthetic model existed to
49Quoted in Janos~The Growth of German Historicism, p. 39.
50Gem:ge Igge:t; The German Conception of Histcgy, pp. 40-43.
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deal with the tension.

But as Tillich has indicated, the ironic nature

of the romantic synthesis was not adequate to hold the two elements
together.

Although initially Romanticism said both "yes" and "no" to

historical situations, the "no" became increasingly predominant.

With

the breakdown of the romantic synthesis, came the utter relativiza.tion
of the form of culture ard consequently the utter transcendentaliza.tion
of its content into the mystical unconsciousness.

The form of history

increasingly became the only concern of historiography, while speculation
as to its meaning was avoided or relegated to philosophy or theology.
was out of these events

th~t

It

the mcxlern discipline of history emerged.

No one is more important in this regard than Leopold von Ranke
whom Fritz Stern has called "the father as well as the master of modern
historical scholarship."51

Ranke was not at all concerned with jtriging

the pa.st, 'Dr-: instructing·i the. ·present, but rather with history itself.
His concern for the form of history did not arise out of a belief that
history was meaningless, and that, therefore, all that remains for the
historian are particulars • Ranke believed that there was a meaning to
history.

But what Ranke objected to was the method of imposing upon

history some speculative scheme which only succeeded in distorting
historical facts and preventing a true understanding of historical
epochs.

His method of writing history consisted of a twofold approach;

first, gather, establish and analyze the facts, am second, search among
the facts for trends to uncover the unity of the historical epoch and
bring the facts together into a synthesis.

The aim of his method was

51Fritz Stern ed., The Varieties of History (1st Vantage Books
Edition; New Yorks Rardom House, 1973), p. ,54.
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simply to write history as it had actually happened.

If the historian

does his work well, according to Ranke, "while he reflects on the partieular, the development of the world in general will become apparent to

him."52 Thus, what was unique in Ranke was his resolution to start with
the facts of history rather than with a speculative mod.el.

Whatever the

meaning of history might be, it was ultimately to be found in the facts
themselves arxl not in speculative concepts.

Ranke carried his rejection

of speculation in historiography one step further by not only rejecting
the application of human speculative systems upon historical events but
also rejecting any notion of a divine guiding hand behind the events of
history, i.e. determinism.

For him, history was the realm of becoming,

produced out of the free interchange of historical individuals in proximity with one another.

Thus, history (i.e. the facts) is sufficient to

explain history {1.e. the meaning).

He wrote:

We must concede that history can never possess the unity of
a philosophical system, but it does have and inner connection
of its own. We see before us a series of events which follow one
another. If I s~y "conditioned", I certainly do not mean conditioned through absolute necessity. The important point is rather
that human freedom makes its appearance everywhere, and the
greatest attraction of history lies in the fact that it deals
with the scenes of this freedom.53
Ranke himself can be characterized as a transitionary figure because
he still holds onto the Enlightenment confidence in man's ability to know
the pa.st as it actually happened.

In later historicism not only is his-

tory sufficient to explain history; history is now sufficient to explain
.52Fritz Stern ed., The Varieties of History, p. 59.
53Fritz Stern ed., The Varieties of History, p. 60.
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the historian •.54
SUMMARY

The nineteenth century in Germany was a complicated time of upheaval which marks the birth of modern Germany.

The French Revolution

was the catalyst whereby a growing German cultural consciousness, was
transformed into an intense German national consciousness.
The philosophical preparation for the Romantic

Rev~lt

had been

prepared earlier by Kant in his separation of faith and history into the
realms of the noumenal and phenomenal.
suffered, as discussed earlier.

Here, the particulars of history

The Napoleonic wars also helped to give

birth to the Romantic Revolt in Germany by disillusioning many German
intellectuals concerning the viability of such Enlightenment ideas as
.54Later historicism, reacting against the positivistic theories
of August Comte and J. S. Mill, insisted on an even more radical conception of the historicity of man. The name of Wilhelm Dilthey is here
important. For him, history demands its own methods of conduct since
historical knowledge differs in essence from scientific knowledge.
He writes: All knowledge is knowledge of experience; but the original
unity of all experience and its resulting validity a.re conditioned by
the factors which mold the consciousness within which it arises, i.e.
by the whole of our nature. This standpoint, which consistently realizes
the impossibility of going behind these conditions, of seeing as it were
without an eye or directing the gaze of knowledge behind the eye itself,
I call the epistemological standpoint; modern knowledge can recognize
no other. Quoted in C. G. Rand, "Two Meanings of Historicism in the
Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch, and Meinecke", Journal of the History
of Ideas, 25 (Oct.-Dec., 1964), p. 507. This was a later development in
historicism and was not a consuming problem for Baur, yet it does raise
problems for his proposed evaluation of the historical Jesus as well as
the Church. Baur's treatment of the N. T. documents, for example, indicates that he believed in the possibility of writing history as it actually happened, in the same way that Ranke did, thus he does treat these
sources naively. The more difficult theological problems raised by
Dilthey provided the grist for the work of Ernst Troeltsch, in his
The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions trans.
David Reid, Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1971.
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natural law and a cosmopolitan European culture.

As the earlier quoted

remark of Iggers indicates, "German educated opinion now agreed that all
values and rights were of historic and national origin and that alien
institutions could not be transplanted to German soil." Romanticism had
an almost unfathomable impact on German society.

First, in its attempt

to balance the infinite and finite in human experience and history, it
ironically set the stage for their complete separation and consequently
gave a powerful impulse to secularization and the rise of the authoritarian state.

Second, its overemphasis on the emotional and aesthetic

aspects of life produced in philosophy and theology a preoccupation with
unconscious awareness which became polarized over against reason, and
thus furthered the bifurcation of the finite/infinite synthesis.

Third,

Romanticism, in its appreciation of ind.ividuality, produced a great
awareness and appreciation for history but because it increasingly tended
to emphasize the infinite it aided in the separation of form and content
in history which caused a chasm to grow between historiography and theology.

From the historian's point of view, the actual meaning of history

did not belong to the historian's field of interest but only to the philosopher or theologian.55
This was the cultural and philosophical environment into which
Baur was born.

The political and cultural aspects of nineteenth century

Germany had more of an imirect influence on him.

The philosophical

aspect, in contrast, had a great bearing on his life and scholarly works.
It was through theology and philosophy that Baur was most deeply touched
by the Romantic Revolt; a fact demonstrated by a consideration of his
55La.ter theologians, notably Karl Barth, reciprocated by declaring
that the actual facts of history had nothing to do with theology but only
with the discipline of history.

CHAPTER III
F. C. BAUR 'S LIFE, WORKS, INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THEOLOGICAL POSITION
LIFE
Ferdinand Christian Baur was born on June 21, 1792 just two months
after France declared war on Austria in the village of Schmiden near
Stuttgart.

Although young Ferdinand grew up in the era of the French

Revolution and Napoleonic wars, we have no record of how he or his family
reacted to them.1

It is po~sible that Ferdinand's parents, though fully

aware of the French threat so close to their Rhineland home, sought to
maintain a peaceful homelife in spite of it.

F. C. Baur grew up in a

strongly pietistic environment which succeeded in molding him into the
serious and reverent Christian scholar that he was later to become.

His

father was Jakob Christian Baur (1755-1817) a Protestant preacher at
Schmiden whom Eduard Zeller, F. C. Baur's son-in-law described as "einem
sehr fleiBigen und Pflichttrenen Manne".2

Later in 1800, Baur's father

became a deacon at Blaubeuren, a village about two miles from Ulm, at
1The sources of information on Baur's early life a.re very sparse.
The best sources come from his son-in-law, Eduard Zeller, who published
biographical essays on Baur in Vortra e und Abhandlun en eschichtlichen
Inhalts (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1865 , p. 357; and in Allgemeine
Deutsche Biographie, vol. II (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1875),
p. 172. Peter C. Hodgson has characterized these sources as "generally
excellent" but warns that Zeller's comments on Baur's works are not
always objective.
2zeller, All. Deut. Bio., p. 172.

j9

.._..,+.,.<f"-

-t-

......... -ZOl--T"JrftO\-... f l

51
at the base of the Swabian foothills.

He died in 1817, the same year in

which Ferdinand received his first professorial position at Blaubeuren.
Ferdinand's mother was Eberhardine Regine Gross who, "was, like her husband, an industrious, pious, hard-working, serious-minded person, marked
by a touch of melancholy."3 The effect of his homelife was that:
The young Baur was shaped in the virtues his pa.rents thought
appropriate and developed as a serious lad, havang little need
for companionship and possessed of a natural shyness or reserve
which never left him even when he had achieved a position of
importance and controversy.4
Until Ferdinand's fourteenth year, all of his education was undertaken by his father, but in the fall of 1805, he entered the lower seminary at Blaubeuren where he s}>ent two years.5
Kloster Maulbronn, another lower seminary.

In 1807, he entered the

In both of these schools

there was a heavy emphasis on both Greek and Latin along with a little
Hebrew.

The firm grounding Baur received during these years in the

classical languages pa.id off later, not only in his classical and philological stl.dies, but also as tools for historical an:l theological research.

Finally, in 1809, Baur entered the evangelical theological semi-

nary of the University of Tubingen where he was to remain a student of

philosophical and theological stuiies for five years.

When Baur arrived

at Tubingen, the intellectual environment was almost in a reactionary
state against any speculative theology.

The conservative pace had been

set earlier by the reputed leader of the old Tuoingen school, Gottlob
3Peter

c.

Hodgson,Form of Hist. Theo., p. 8.

4Peter C• HOd.gson, Form of Hist. Theo. , p. 8.
5An article by Karl Baur entitled "Zur Jegendgeschichte von
Ferdinand Christian Baur {1805-180?)", {Theologishe Studien und Kritiken,
XCV: 3/4 (1923/24), pp. 303-313). deals more deeply with Ba.ur's experiences at the lower seminary at Blaubeuren.
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Christian Storr, who had died just four years prior to Baur's coming,
but whose influence was still largely dominant in the Tubingen theological
faculty.

According to Hodgson, the faculty had "adopted an unproductive

and negative attitllie toward the theological problems stirred up by the
impact of rationalism, and later dismissed Schleierma.cher's Glaubenslehre
as pantheistic when it appeared in 1821."6 Thus, Baur, although he was,
as Tetz describes him, the "begabtester und f&:higster Stl.dent seines
Jahrgangs", .foum very little to stimulate him at Tu'bingen.

One excep-

tion, however, was Ernst Gottlieb Bengel, professor of historical theology, whom Zeller describes as "einer der freisinnigsten, von der kantischen Philosophie und der rationalistischen kritik am starksten berllhrten
von den Supranaturalisten aus Storr's Schule."7

It was Bengal's open-

minded willingness to give consideration to speculative theological
thought in his treatment of historical theology that first stimulated
Ba.ur's interest in philosophical theology, arxi although Bengal's lectures
were not steeped in eruiition, nevertheless, their suggestiveness, sensibility and tastefulness worked in Baur's mind to create a keen interest
in historical theology and its problems.
It was probably during his student years at Tu'bingen that Baur
first came into contact with the ideas of Friedrick von Schelling.

The

first hint that this was the case comes from a letter from Ferdinand's
6Peter C. H~gson,Form. of Hist. Theo. p. 9. The conservative
reaction o.f the Tubingen theological .faculty was actually opposed to
the same rationalistic forces as Schleiermacher but their respective
reactions were obverse. Whereas the Tubingen reaction was toward a
supernaturalistic confessionalism, Schleiermacher's was towards a freer
speculative approach to Christian theology.
7zeller,

A·n.

Deut. Bio. , p. 172.
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brother Fried.rick August Baur written to

F,cluard ~eller

which suggests

that Baur stl.died. both Fichte and especially Schelling while still a
student at Tubingen.

Although Baur himself has left no indication that

he studied Schelling at so early a time, there is external evidence to
at least make this plausible.

This evidence is primarily based on the ..

fact that a new professor joined the Tubingen theological faculty in
1811, A. K. A. Eschenmayer, whom Zeller describes as a "freund der
schellingischen Naturphilosophie".

It is Zeller"s contention that Baur

would naturally have had at least some exposure to Schelling's philosophy through him.8 But as both Zeller and Hodgson are aware of, when
Eschenmayer began lecturing in the summer of 1812, Baur had already completed the requisite two-year philosophical course and would not, therefore, have heard him in the course of his normal stu:lies.9 There is
therefore no hard evidence, to suppose that Baur was already moving out
of his supernaturalistic theological stance through the influence of
Fichte and Schelling while at Tubingen.

Later, of course, Schelling had

a great impact on Baur's thought as is clearly evident in his writings.
Baur left Tubingen in 1814 to become a "Vikar auf ciem Lande",
serving the two parishes of Ro&raag and MUhlhausen, and later "Hilfslehre"
at the lower theological seminary at Schonthal.

In 1816, he returned to

8Zeller All. Deut. Bio., p. 173 •

•

.

9Peter C. Hodgson The Formation of Historical Theology, pp. 9-10 •
Hodgson suggests that Baur may have been exposed to Schelling's ideas
through his good friend Lu:lwig Friedrich Heyd who entered the evangelical
theological seminary at Tubingen one year after Baur (1810) and was
definitely under Eschenmayer's teaching. That Heyd was impressed by
Schelling is born out by the fact that Heyd made two visits to Schelling
in 1816, arxl it is probably true that Heyd had discussed Schelling with
Baur. Thus, if Baur had not actually stmied Schelling himself, he at
least had a familiarity with his ideas.
~~~..;.;;.....---~~~~..-.;;.--....;.~_..;.---.-....-~-
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"
Tubingen
to serve as Repetent at the seminary, and in 181? received and

accepted his first professorial call to the lower theological seminary at
Blaubeuren, a position he retained until 1826. The years at Blaubeuren
were some of the most productive am fruitful for Baur and it was during
this time tha.t he became fully mature as a scholar in his own right.
Hodgson writes:
This was a pericxl for intensive reading and sttdy, liberated
"
from the rather narrow perspective of the old Tubingen
theology.
A collection of reading notes from this period shows that Baur
became familiar with many contemporary works in ancient history,
classical philosophy, mythology, linguistics, and history of
religions, by such authors as Heitmann, Schleiermacher, Schlegel,
Osiander, Creuzer, Hug, and Wolf. 0
Baur lectured on a variety of subjects but all of them were related to
the ancient world.

He taught classical languages, Greek and Roman prose,

including classical historians such as Livy, Tacitus, Herodotus, and
Thucydides11, and also ancient history, mythology and Platonic philosophy.
During this time, Baur was particularly impressed by B. G. Niebuhr's
work Romische Geschichte.

Baur threw himself into his teaching and re-

search with tremendous energy and resolve and was a model scholar.
Zeller characterizea him at Blaubeuren as,
1%odgson, Form. of Hist. Theo., p. 13. It is important to note
here that even though Baur was moving away from his supernaturalistic
standpoint he never violently attacked the position as Strauss did in
his Life of Jesus. Baur's historical-critical approach was always
positive in character. And, further, Baur retained a legacy from his
association with the old Tubingen school, i.e., "a life-long interest
in an objective theological truth." (Karl Barth, Protestant Theology
in the Nineteenth Century, p. 501).

11:aa.ur actually began am finished a scholarly translation of
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War during this time for
publication, but it was turned down by the publisher as too literal.
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Ein Mann, der allen als Vorbild eineswissenschaftlichen
Charakters, eines idealen, fUr alles Ed.le und. Grofe emfanglichen sinnes, einer seltenen Gewissenhaftigkeit und Arbeits"
luft voranleuchtete, und der immer an sich selbst noch hohere
Anforderungen stellte, als an and.ere.12
It was while at Blaubeuren that Baur undertook a systematic study
of Schelling, especially his work entitled System des Transzendentalen
Idealismus (1800).

The combination of Baur's early training in classical

languages and Biblical studies, his association with Bengel's openmind.ed
attituie for speculative theology along with his historical studies and
exposure to the idealism of Schelling all came together in Baur's mind
to cause him to question the old-Tubingen supernatural approach to
Biblical studies and theology.

Yet characteristically, Baur was not

quick to act on his feelings until he had fully worked through the attendent problems of the idealistic approach.

This was born out in 1818,

when Baur wrote a critical review for the Archive fin: die Theologie on
G. P. C. Kaiser's Die biblische Theologie, oder Juiaismus und Christianismus nach der grammatisch-historischen Interpretations-Methode.

Hodgson

summarizes the article thus:
He argued that the connection between Judaism and Christianity
must be treated in an historically comprehensive way, that revealed religion must be treated under catagories drawn from
stuiies in philosophy of religion and history of religions; and
he gave evidence of having already done considerable stuiy in
history of religions and undertaken philosophical analyses of the
essence and ~jor forms of religion. But he still held out for
a supernaturally inspired, supra-historically mediated revelation
of unique religious truth, and thus drew back from treating
Christianity in a fully "historical-critical" mode.13
It is clear from Baur's review of 1818 that he was moving towards his
complete historical-critical position, yet he was still reluctant to
12Zeller, All. Deut. Bio., p. 173.
13Hodgson,Form. of Hist. Theo., p. 10.
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embrace a speculative methodology in theological and religious studies.
It wasri't until the end of his career that Baur would finally come out
in favor of a speculative methodology in theology.
Another major influence on Baur during this time was Schleierma.cher 's Glaubenslehre which appeared in 1821/22 and which Baur described
as having a liberating influence on him.

Although Baur was enthusiastic

about Schleiermacher's work, he did not unreservedly endorse his results
nor embrace his methodology.

At this time Baur was still groping for his

own position regarding methodology and could not see how Schleierma.cher
could retain the importance of the historical appearance of Jesus with
his conception of religion as the subjective feeling of absolute depend-.
ence.

As will be shown later, it was on this very question that Baur

disagreed most with Schleierma.cher, yet the Glaubenslehre exerted a
tremendous impact on Baur which was to be unexcelled by any other including Hegel.

Zeller notes, that if Baur was to be considered as the dis-

ciple of any theologian it would have to be Schleiermacher for Schleiermacher's thought presented itself to Baur when he was still in his formati ve state.

Comparing the influence of Hegel am Schleierma.cher on

Baur, Zeller writess
Hegel's influence did not have as great or as lengthy an effect
as that of Schleiermacher's system. Schleiermacher's thought
encountered him before he had reached the crucial point of his
own striving. Hegel's furnished the mature man, who had already
sought his own way autonomously, something more in the way of
that which he already possessed substantively.14
It was the Glaubenslehre
naturalism.

~hich

finally liberated Baur :f'rom his super-

Baur's first major work, S_ymbolik und Mythologie oder die

14Quoted in Hodgson p. 14.
pp. )61, 164-365.

See Zeller, Vortrage und Abhandlungen
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Naturreligion des Altertums (1824-25), marks his formal break with the
theological method of the old-Tubingen school and demonstrated the depth
of Schleiermacher's influence upon him.

.

Indeed, M. Tetz has characterized

the work as ''im Religionsverstandnis und in der Anlage des Werkes ein
abhangiges Gegenstuck zu Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre ... 15

It was the

Symbolik und Mythologie which earned for Baur a position in the theological faculty at Tubingen where he was called in 1826 upon the death of
his former teacher and :friend Bengel.
Baur's appointment at Tu'bingen was to teach all the historical
disciplines other than the 0ld Testament; a task for which he was well
1

prepared.

Still, the broadness of his teaching area demanded of him much

energy and stamina.

He was assigned to teach all Church history and

historical theology, New Testament theology and New Testament introduction, exegesis, symbolics, ethics and Protestant Church law.

In

addition to his teaching responsibilities at Tubingen, Baur was assigned
the job of ":frUhprediger" for the university Church, to serve on Sundays
and festival days.

He was one of three such preachers at the university

who were ranked according to seniority, and in 1842, Baur became "erste
fruhprediger".

Hodgson, who has st\Xlied Baur's sermons from this time,

has characterized them ass
Christocentric in focusc almost always they started with an
exposition of the meaning of Jesus' teaching ministry or reconc~ling work as described in the Gospel text designated by the
Wurttemberg lectionary1 and then they moved to a personal or
contemporary application of this meaning or ~rhaps a description
of the Christian life as it is shaped by it.16
151"1. Tetz, "F. C. Baur," in Neue Deutsche Biog:raphie vol. I,
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1953), p. 936.

16Hodgson, ·The '.F'or..mation ••• , pp. 19-20.
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Although some objected to a "speculative theologian" functioning in the
capacity of a pulpit minister, Baur vigorously defended the combination
claiming to be as much a preacher as a theologian.

In practice, he kept

the two capacities apart, rarely bringing his scholarly researches to
bear on his preaching.

Over all, Baur was happy at TUbingen, although

he once expressed his dissatisfaction with the general lack of interest
in matters of historical criticism, and remained there until his death
in 1860.

It was here also, that Baur embraced the general task which

would occupy him the rest of his life.

It was, according to Hirschs

Die weltgeschichtliche Erscheinung des Christentums als einer
von allen andern unterschiedenen sittlich-religiosen Gestaltung
"
des menschlichen Lebens nach ihrem eigent\lmlichen
Geiste so zu
begreifen, daB alle wesentlichen Bewegungen und Formen christlichen Denkens und Lebens durch die Jahrhund.erte hindurch nach
ihrem Ursprung und. Verhaltnis zum christlichen Prinzip sichtba.r
und damit als Glieder eines grot3en Zusammenhangs geschichtlich
erfal3t und. auf das Gesamtbewul3tsein der geschichtlichen Menschheit bezogen wUrd.en.1?
Baur's biography, from his coming to TUbingen till his death, can best
be understood through an account of his written works; therefore the

discussion will now turn to these.
But before moving on, it is important to emphasize that in all
Baur's works the task mentioned by Hirsch above is involved to some degree.
Baur believed that there was teleological meaning in the whole process of
history and further that this meaning could be discovered at least partly
through an examination of the historical facts.

The life of Jesus was

especially important in this regard, for in it, Baur believed, the
meaning of history is explicitly discovered.

History and historical

research are, therefore, extremely important for Baur's thought, but
l?Hirsch,Geschichte der nevern Evangelischen Theologie vol. IV,
p. 520.
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not just history alone.

Baur recognized also that history would be

teleologically incomprehensible to man had it not been for Jesus.

Thus,

he starts with the revelation of God in Christ and reads all of history
through this event.

Baur's understanding of history as informed by his

Christology will be dealt with later in this chapter.
WORKS

Although Baur's works are numerous and cover diverse fields, they
can all be related to his general task of discerning God's purpose through
the historical process.

It is only when Baur's works are read in the

light of this task that the essential positive nature of them is properly
understood.

His task was not to destroy but to build up.

Baur saw

clearly that the questions raised by Rationalism would have to be addressed and answered if the Christian faith was to remain meaningful in his
day.

~

For him, the supernatural position of the old-Tubingen school was

impotent to answer the question of Rationalism or even to dialogue with
it in its confessionalist reaction.

Although he widerstood his debt to

his essentially pietistic upbringing and education, he could only look
with sadness upon his colleagues who became increasingly defensive and
personally vindictive in their reaction to speculative theologians such
as Schleierma.cher and Hegel.

'fhus, 1t was in an at ti tuie of sincerity,

almost of piety, that Baur abandoned his supernatural presuppositione,
in order to explore new conceptions of Christianity.
But, while Baur abandoned his supernaturalism, he did not wholeheartedly embrace the speculative theology produced by Romanticism.

He

constantly demonstrated his commitment to the truth of the matter alone,
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in contrast to a commitment to a particular school, by always maintaining
his scholarly distance.

He knew he could learn from such men as Schelling,

Schleierma.cher, and Hegel, but he never read them uncritically and always
expi;"essed his commitment to the facts first.

Nowhere is this more

clearly spelled out than in an article entitled "Abgenothigte Erklarung
gegen einen Artikel der evangelischen Kirchenzeitung herausgegeben von
D. E.

w.

Hengstenberg ...... 19

In this article, Baur defended himself

against the charge that he was more committed to an

~

priori speculative

position than to the facts in his New Testament exegesis, particularly
his work on the pastoral epistles which appeared in 1835.

Baur challenges

his critics:
Nun frage ich aber: Wo stuBt sich denn meine Kri tik auch nur
an Einer Stelle meiner Schrift auf die mytische Ansicht? Wo
verwerfe ich auch nur Ein historisches Factum, das fiir das
kritische Urtheil uber diese Briefe von Wichtigkeit 1st, einzig
nur aus dem Grunde, weil es ein Wunder 1st, oder wo argumentiere
ich einzig und allein aus dem innern Widersprnch des Inhalts?
••
Uberall
gehe ich von bestimmten geschichtlich erhobenen Thats~chen aus, und suche auf dieser Grundlage erst die verschiedenen
Fad.en meiner kritischen Combinationen zu Einem Ga.nzen zusamm.enzuziehen. Dieses Festhalten am geschichtlich Gegebenen ist
das EigenthUmliche meiner Kritik. 19
Baur has often been dispatched in works on nineteenth century theology with a few lines to the effect that he applied Hegelian concepts to
New Testament studies and is now insignificant for theology today.

This

18quoted in F. c. Baur, Ausgewahlte Werke in Einzelausga.ben band I,
herausgegeben von Klaus Scholder (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Friedrich
Fromma.nn Verlag, 1963), pp. 26?-268. Hengstenberg was a leading
figure in the confessionalist revival of the Luthern Church in Prussia
and one of its most vociferous spokesman, As an Old Testament scholar,
he vigorously defended the orthodox view of the inspiration of the scriptures while, -i just as vigorously, opposing liberal tendencies in theology.
(see Josef L. Altholz,'lifte Churches in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 106-10?.)
1~
7,11·

,c.

Baur, Ausgewahl te Werke , • • ,
ff

ba.m

~L
I, p, 27"'.
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is too facile a ju:lgment to be passed on such an objective and committed
scholar as Baur.

In surveying his scholarly production, while it must

be granted that he intensely stuiied and utilized the insights of the

romantic theologians. Baur must

be

allowed the integrity he deserves and

be stmied in his own right as a mature scholar committed to truth.

Only

then can his thought and significance be rightly apprehended.
Baur's writings can be considered in three major stages, each with
its own particular subject ma.tter.20

The first stage of Bau:r's literary

output begins with his publication of Symbolik und Mythologie ••• , and
ends with the publication of Die Ohristliche Gnosis, oder die Christliche
Religions-Philosophie in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung. (Tubingen:
C. F. Osiander, 1835), when, for the first time, Baur began to make explicit use of Hegelian catagories in his work.

This might be called the

period of Dogmatic Development in that much of Baur's work had to do with
the development of Christian dogma within the Hellenistic/Roman cultural
environment •
Following the Symbolik und Mythologie ••• , which has already been
mentioned, Baur's next important work was his inaugural dissertation at

..

Tubingen entitled "Prima.e Rationalism! et Supranaturalismi Historiae
Capita Potiora'' which he delivered in three parts respectively on January
182?, Easter 182?, and Pentecost 1828.

This work, which Hodgson

20It is not my purpose here to give a complete and comprehensive
catalogue of Baur's works nor to analyze them in depth. I only hope to
provide a general picture of Baur's development as a scholar and the
flow of his thought. Therefore, except for Baur's works on Church History, which will be examined in more detail later, I will limit myself
to brief comments on selected works in each period, For a more complete
consideration of Baur's works see Zeller's article on Ferdinand Christian
Baur in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, or G. F.raedrich's Ferdinand
Christian Baur. , ., which has an almost complete account of Baur's
literary production.
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considers one of Baur's most 1mportant21, dealt first of all with Gnasticism, then presented Schleiermacher's thought as essentially a new form
of Gnosticism.

Here, Baur outlined his major dissatisfaction with

Schleierma.cher's system,

s~ecifically

that Schleiermacher had failed to

relate the ideal Christ-event with the historical Jesus.

In the period between 1826 and 1835, Baur produced many significant
monographs and journal articles.

In 1831 appeared a work entitled Das

Manichaische Religions-System nach dem Quellen Neu Untersucht und
Entwickelt, in which Baur attempted to provide an explication of Manichaean religious thought through an inductive historical study of surviving documents.

This work was so well done that, as Hirsch testifies,

it "noch heute, obwohl wir uber weit reichere Quellen verfligen, manchen
Kennern als das beste uber den Manichaismus Vorhandne gilt."22

In the

same year appeared perhaps Baur's most famous work, Die Christuspartei
in der

korinthische~

Gemeinde, der Gegensatz des petrinischen und pauli-

nischen Christenthums in der altesten Kirche, der Apostle Petrus in Rom,
which Haussleiter credits with opening up "the vista of more far-reaching
historico-critical investigation into the controversies of the Apostolic
Age."23

Baur challenged the 1800 year old assumption that the Corinthian

congregation was monolithic in its beliefs.

Rather, from I Cor. 1:12,

he claimed to discern several parties within the Church which represented
several different theological leanings.

Although Baur isolated four such

parties, under the titular heads of Peter, Paul, Apollos, and Christ,
21Hodgson,Form. of Hist. Theo., p. 17.
22Hirsch, Geschichte. • • , Vol. V., p. 520.
23J, Haussleiter, "Ferdinand Christian Baur", The New Schaff-Herzog
Religious Encyclopedia, II (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1958), p. 8.
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he discerned two basic poles, the Ju:la.ic (Peterine) and Hellenistic
(Pauline), which came into conflict.

Baur proposed that the Church of

the second century was born out of the struggle between the J\¥iaic and
Hellenistic elements which found their synthesis in the fourth gospel.
Baur held on to this conception of the rise of the early Church for the
rest of his life, something which had effects on all of his further
Biblical stu:lies as K&sema.nn indicates:
War die :frUhkatholische Kirche aus einer Antithese und, rad.ikal
gesehen, aus den beiden verschiedenen Ursprtingen des Ju:lenchristentums und. des Paulinismus erwaohsen, so solgte Daraus unvermeid
bar ein dogmengeschichtliches P:rogramm, welches die GrQnzen des
Neuen Testamentes weit ubergreifen muBte. Zugleich war fUr die
neutestamentlichen Schriften ein hermene1il!:.ischer Schlussel gefunden, welcher erlaubte, sie in hochst differenzierter Weise
und unte~scheidlicher .Anna.nerung auf die beiden Pole hin auszurichten. 2
Before proceeding with this survey of Baur's works, it might be
helpful.to make here some comments about his association with Hegel's
philosophy.

Because Baur was definitely influenced by Hegel in his

later works, and because the Die Christuspartei ••• contains a Hegelianlike dialectic in its main thesis, the tendency of scholars has been to
consider it as the first instance of explicit Hegelian influence on Baur.
But, as Hodgson has clearly shown in his book The Formation of Historical
Theology, Baur probably did not extensively sttdy Hegel until 1834-35, -·
after he had produced his work on the Corinthian party and established
his views on the dialectical production of the early Church.

Hodgson

provides evidence from Baur's letters that the Hegelian influence came
24Ernst K&semann in the introd. uction to F. C. Baur, Ausgewahl te
Werke Bard I., p. xi.
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while he was engaged in another work which was published in 1835 under
the titles

Die Christliche Gnosis, oder die Christliche Religions-

Phil~ophie

in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung.

He writes:

In a letter written in February 1835 Baur indicated that, in
connection with his work on Die Christliche Gnosis, which by
then had continued 11 for more than a year", Hegel's ·Religionsphilosophie has especially occupied me this winter (1834-35)
a?Xi in many respects attracts me. Thus, I am likely to come up
against the fact that I am not able to firn in it the atrocities
customarily attributed to it.25
Hodgson goes on to cite another letter in which Baur explicitly states
that it was in connection with Die Christliche Gnosis that he first fully
considered Hegel's philosophy and was influenced by it.26

Th~, Baur's

New Testament sttdies, although influenced by Hegel, are not simply
direct application of Hegel's ideas to scripture.

In fact, the whole

idea of Hegelian influence on Baur, while granted, must be qualified for
several reasons.

In the first place, as was indicated above in his res-

ponse to Hengstenburg's criticisms, Baur upheld his objectivity against
the charge of letting personal bias color the results of his work.
was particularly insistent about this point.

He

Still, he was willing to

listen to and embrace another's position if it showed the possibility of
bearing scholarly fruit.

This was his at tit u:ie toward Hegel's philosophy.

He wrotes
Ich bin kein Anhanger ir~end eines philosophischen Systems,
weil ich wohl weiB, wie truglich es ist sich von Menschenauktori tat abhagig zu ma.chen, aber gleichwohl habe ich die Ueberzemgung, daB sich auch von Hegel gar ma.nches fiir die Theologielernen i&Bt, und glaube, daB auch Manche von denen, welche so
schnell Beriet sind, Uber ihn abzusprechen, anders urtheilen
wurden, wenn sie sich entschliesen konnten, seine Schriften

..

.

25Hodgson,Form. of Hist. Theo., p. 23.
26Hodgson,Ea.rm. of Hist. Theo., p. 23-24.
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zuvor naher kennen zu lernen.27
In the second place, Baur evidences in his work a greater appreciation
for the particulars of history than does Hegel.

In Hodgson's words,

he wishes to "elicit meaning and rationality from history rather than to
impose it on history."28 Although Hegel attempted to synthesize the
absolute and particulars of history, his tendency was to increasingly
emphasize the absolute meaning of history and to show distain for the
facts.

This was a general problem with many of the Romantic syntheses.

Baur, on the other hand, insisted that both be considered, but also,
that both be balanced.

Hodgson finds this insistence most fully develop-

ed in his works on Church history, writings
He insisted that historical stu:ly of the Church is at once
a speculative (philosophical-theological) and an empirical
(objective, critical) procedure, that these are two components
in the same process of understanding, that methodological priority
can be given to neither, and that neither may be sacrificed to
the other.29
The main point of this orbita dicta is, above all, to say that "Hegelian"
is too scant a label to cover the uniqueness of Baur.

While he benefited

from Hegel, he did not merely assume his ideological Weltanschauung and
apply it to his own work.

\

·,-

In other works from this period, Baur showed himself intent on
pursuing the methodology established in Die Christ us Partei. • • • For
example, in Apollonius von Tyana und Christus, oder das Verhaitniss des
fythagoraismus zum Christenthum (1832) Baur again sought to show the
27F.

c.

Baur, Ausgew8:hlte Werke ••• Band I., p. 313, in the footnote.

28Hodgson,Form. of Hist. Theo., p. 4.
29Jiodgson, Form. of Hist • Theo. , p. 4.

66
impact of the Hellenistic environment on Christianity.

Particularly,

in this work, according to Zeller, "zeigte er bier in der Biographie des
Philostratus einen neupythagoreischen Tendenzroman auf, und wenn er varher die Ebioniten von den Essenern hergeleitet hatte, verfolgte er je.Bt
den Ursprung der leateren weiter hinauf zu den Neupythagoreern."JO

Baur

applied his historical method to Judaism in Uber die Ursprung1iche Bedeutwy; des Passahfestes und des Beschneidungsritus which also appeared in
1832.
In the following year, Baur felt compelled to take time away from
his historical stuiies to r~spond to a book by Johann Adam Mohler entitled
eYmbolik oder Darstellung der Dogma.tischen Gegensatze der Katholiken un~
Protestanten (1832) which attacked Protestant speculative theology as
hopelessly speculative and out of line with the Protestant tradition.
According to Zeller,
Die Angrisse, welche dieser gelehrte uni geistvolle Restaurator
des modernen Ka.tholicismus in seiner "Symbolik.. auf die protestantische Kirche, ihre Lehre und ihrer Stifter gemacht, die Geschichtsentstellungen, die er sich erlaubt hatte, forderten den protestantischen Symboliker zur Abwehr heraus.31
In his response to Monler entitled Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und
Protestantismus •• __ ., he examined the differences between the two theological systems based on the major dogmatic

expres~ions

of both.

He

argued that Protestant idealism did represent a direct continuation of
the Protestant spirit but that it also had marked similarities with
ancient Christian Gnosticism.

On the other hand, he considered Catholi-

cism to be a continuation of the early Jewish character of the Church
30zeller, All. Deut. Bio., p. 175.

______

Jlzeller,__..;;;.;
All. Deut. Bio., p. 175.
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with its emphasis on law and structure.

Baur recognized defects in both

systems and suggested that some sort of synthesis was necessary between
both these positions.

It was at this point that the name of Hegel first

appeared in Baur's xritings.
The second major period of Baur's literary career, which might be
called the Biblical critical period, falls roughly between 1835 and 1847,
from the time when he began to utilize Hegelian categories in his work,
until the publication of Uber Prinzip und Charakter des Lehrbegriffs der
Reformierten Kirche, in seinem Unterschied von der Lutherischen, in which
Baur first evidenced more interest in the moral cultic aspects of religion
as opposed to the theological or dogma.tic, arrl also began to emphasize
a subjective human freedom over against divine determinism worked out
through inexorable laws of historical development.
It was during this period that'the so-called Tubingen school grew
up around Baur at the university.

Its allies were not those holding

theological chairs in Germany, but rather, young, enthusiastic and, sometimes rash disciples such as Eduard Zeller, who later became Baur's sonin-law, Schwegler, Kostlin and Planck, Ritschl, and Higenfeld.

Their

program was, in essence, to understand Christianity in its complete historicity, rather than, as the old Tubingen school held, a supernatural
and suprahistorical enclave in the world, and they did not hesitate to
apply their religionsgeschichtliche methods to the scriptures as well.
As Baur himself wrote:
Das Christentum 1st und bleibt eine geschichtliche gegebene
Religion. • .Es 1st zu einer bestimmten Zeit in den allgemeinen
Zuza.mmenhang der geschichtlichen Ereignisse eingetreten und kann
nur aus bestimmten schriften, als den urkundlichen Zeugen seines
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Ursprungs erkannt werden ••• 32
Contrary to what this statement may imply, the historical method of the
Tubingen school was essentially positi~e since its adherents believed
that in the historical events, or more specifically in the dialectical
confrontation of antithetical ideas and doctrines, could be seen the
spirit of God making itself known through reconciliation.

Therefore,

they had nothing to fear from critical historiographic methods.

On the

contrary, the more radically this method was applied, the better, since
it could only reveal more clearly the message of God's reconciliation.
But to those who did not understand this underlying assumption or who
did understand it but disagreed with it, the historico-critical method
of Biblical studies appeared'as the most pernicious of evils.

This was

one of the most disheartening and stormy periods of Baur's life, a fact
which is indicated in a letter to his son F. A. Baur dated 29 July 18)6,
when he wrote&

.. From day to day it becomes less healthy in science and

in life, and one has to proceed so as not to lose courage entirely." 33
During this period, Baur produced many monographs dealing with the
gospels and epistles, applying the same methodology he had earlier applied
in his work on the Corinthian congregation.

In 1835, appeared Die

Sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Apostles Paulus au:fs Neue Kritisch Untersucht in which Baur rejected Pauline authorship of the epistles because,
he held, the heretics addressed therein were Gnostics, a post-Pauline
movement of around the mid-second century A. D..

1836 saw the publication

32Quoted by Klaus Sc~older in the forward of F. C. Baur's Ausgewa.9hlte
Werke Vol. I, p. vi.
33Quoted in Hodgson, Farm. of Hist. Theo., p. 17 in footnote #70.
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of Uber Zweck und. Veranlassung des Romerbriefs, an examination of the
Epistle to the Romans to determine its.addressees.

Thus, Hodgson char-

acterized it a
Just as the key to Corinthians (and thus to the whole history
of primitive Christianity) was provided by the description of
opposition between those who claimed to belong to Paul, to
Appollos, to Cephas, and "to Christ" in I Cor. 1a12, so likewise the clue to Romans is chapters 9-11, where Paul addresses
himself to his "kinsmen by race" and raises the fundamental
question of the relation of Judaism to the Gospel.34
In 1845, these and other monographs on the Pauline epistles were
drawn together into a book on Paul himself entitled Paulus, der Apostle
Jesu Christi, which Hcxlgson claims is the "most important contribution to
Pauline stuiies of the nineteenth century. 11 35

In this culminating work,

according to Haussleiter, was "the denial of the authenticity of all the
letters passing under the apostle's name, except Galations, I and II,
Corinthians, and Romans, the last two chapters of which were of questionable authenticity."36

34p. c. Hodgson,"Rediscovery of F. C. Baur" in Church History
Vol. xxxiii June, 1964, p. 207.
35P. c. Hodgson,Form, of Hist. Theo., p. 27.
36Haussleiter, New Schaff-Herzog, p. 9. It is interesting to note
here that Baur was preparing a new edition of Paulus ••• towards the
end of his life, which, unfortunately was cut short by his death in
1860. However, in the posthumously published :'Varlesungen uber
Neutestamentliche Theologie, A. Schweitzer noted that "The chapter on
Paulinism is very striking in its brevity and clearness, and shows a
great advance on the work of 1845. At that time Baur had examined and
interpreted Paul's teaching by the light of the Hegelian Intellectualism.
Now, he tries to grasp his ideas historically a:rn empirically, and to
describe them accordingly." (A. Schweitzer, Paul and His Interpreters
trans. W. Montgomery, (Londona Ad.am and Charles Black,.1912), pp. 20-21)
Not only does this illiicate Baur's constant criticism of his own work,
but also his general drift towards a more radical application of the
historical method to New Testament history.

?O
Baur also applied his historico-critical method to the gospels and
thus, indirectly to the life of Jesus, but his major concern is the documents of the New Testament gospels.
Strauss' method is seen in Baur.

Here, a basic differentiation from

Although,he was accused of taking the

suggestions of Strauss and working them out,37 still, as Schweitzer has
correctly observed, "in the end he had only given a criticism

o~

the

gospels, not of the gospel history."38 The liturature Baur produced on
the gospels is vast yet the same theme of the dialectical struggle in
the early Church, between Jewish and Hellenistic parties is featured in
them all.

In fact, as KB:semann indicates, it was within the thesis of

the dialectical struggle that "Zugleich war riir die neutestamentlichen
Schriften ein hermeneutischer Schli.issel gefunden."39

But, lest he be

accused of arbitrarily applying a theory of dialectical development to
the New Testament documents, it must

~e

remembered that Baur's theories

developed out of his own researches; particularly in his stl.dy of the
Christ party within the Corinthian congregation.

Later, Baur utilized

Hegel, not uncritically, but only where he discovered evidence for a
dialectical confrontation.

Some of the major titles from this period are:

Uber die Composition und den Cha:rakter des johannefschen Evangeliums, (1844)
3?see in "Abgenothigte Erklarung •.•. ·." where Baur ~.uotes Hengstenberg as saying "Wir wollen aber absichtlich nur zweier Manner ~denken,
welche bisher ihren Kenntnissen wie Bestrebungen nach zu den Tuchtigeren
gezahlt wurden, solcher, von denen grade Besseres zu erwarten gewesen
ware, und welche erst nach StrauB und unter dem Einflusse desselben mit
ihren Ansichten hervorgetreten sind Professor WeiBe in Leipzig und Baur
in Tuoingen." (In Ausgewahlte Werke Vol. I, p. 269).
38Albert Schweitzer The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W.
Montgomery, (London: Ada.'m·and Charles Black, 1910), p. 195.

39E. K&semann, introduction to Ausgewahlte Werke Band

I., p. xi.
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in which he first attacked the authenticity of the fourth gospel; Der
Ursprung und Charakter des Lukas evangeliwns (1846), in which he claimed
that Luke was a Pauline-inspired gospel which had later been revised; and
the Kritischen Untersuchungen uber die kangnischen Evangelien (1847),
which was a comprehensive summary of his work and a reconstruction of
the environment which produced the New Testament gospels and epistles.
Regarding the gospels, Baur held that the order of the canon represented
their order of composition even though he revised their respective dates
of composition.

Matthew was considered the earliest gospel because of

its distinctly Judaic flavor; Mark was considered after Matthew because
the Judaic tendencies were not as strong; Luke came next because of its
distinctly Pauline flavor,and John came last.

Baur considered the fourth

gospel to have been written in the mid-second century A. D. because it
seemed to synthesize the Judaic and Pauline "tendencies" into a higher
unity, and to argue against heretical Christian movements of that time
period, notably Gnosticism and Montanism.

Regarding the environment

which produced both the gospels and epistles, Zeller provides an excellent
summary:
Es habe auch schon in der apostolischen Kirche und unter den
Hauptern derselben nicht die Uebereinstimmung der Ansichten geherr•scht, die man gewohnlich varausseBt; das alteste Christenthum,
das der jernsalemitischen Gemeind.e und ihrer Apostel, habe dem
JlXlenthum noch sehr nahe gestanden; erst Paulus habe die christliche
Religion von dieser Beschranktheit befreit, aber die groBe Mehrzahl der JlXlen christen und die Urapostel selbst haben sich mit
seinem Universalismus nicht zu befreunden gewuBt und seien
demselben bald mit grot3erer bald mit geringerer Entscheidenhei t, theilweise mit leidenschaftlicher Feindseligkeit entgegengetreten; in diesem Parteikampf habe die judenchristliche oder
ebionitische Partei langere Zeit das Uebergewicht behaupt, und
erst lange nach dem Tode des Paulus, und 1m wesentlichen erst
unter dem EinfluB der durch die Gnosis hervorgerufenen Bewegung,
um die Mitte und nach der Mette des zweiten Jahrhunderts, haben
sich dei streitenden Parteien, na.ch ma.ncherlei unvollkommeneren
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Vermittlungsversuchen, durch die Dogmatik des vierten Evangeliums
und die bischofliche Verfassung zur allgemeinen oder katholischen
Kirche vereinigt.40
Although Baur's interests shifted towards historical theology and Chtn"ch
history in the later years of his life, he continued to produce periodical literature on the biblical documents until the end of his life.
1848 came both "Die johanne!schen Evangelium und die·

J>as~eier·

In

des ·

i •

zweiten Jahrhenderts" and "Die johanne!schen Breife;" in 1851 and 1853
appeared respectively, "Das Marcusevangelium nach seinem Ursprung und
Cha.rakter" and Ruckblick auf die neuesten Untersuchungen uber das
Ma.rcusevangeli um;" and in 18.54 and 1857 came "Die johannefsche Frage
und ihre neuesten Beantwortungen," and "Das Verhaltni:B des ersten
johannefschen Briefes zum johanne!schen Evangelium."
Before turning from Batn"'s Biblical stuiies to the last literary
period of his life, something should be said about the ongoing importance
of his work in this area.
the~logians

Karl Barth, who seems to be one of the few

willing to give Baur the credit he deserves, argues that

simply because the school no longer exists, "does not tell the least
against 1ts significance,•• and goes to say:
Although the particular historical form of its method, together
with its most important results, may have vanished, one might say
that like an association which has fulfilled the purpose for which
it was founded, it might finally dissolve with all honor because
the substance of its concern, which in the last resort was not
bound up with its method, found a home even among its oppor.e.nts,
because this substance of their concern has become and remained
until now the common property of all modern theology.41
Barth goes on to claim that without the questions which Baur formulated

4~. Zeller' All.
Deut. Bio., p. 177-?B.
---~-__;.----41K.Barth,19th Cen. Theo., p. 500.
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"a Christian theology which to some extent urderstands and grasps its
theme is quite inconceivable," and concluies that any dismissal of Baur
as "obsolete" is at best prematu:re.42

Ernst K&sema.nn, in his introduc-

tion to a recent edition of Bau:r 1 s works on Biblical criticism, concurs
with Barth on Baur's importance in general, but criticizes his conclusions
especially in Die Christus Partei.

He writes:

Diese Deutung Baurs, die sich fast nur auf eine fragwUrdige
Auslegung von 2 K•. 10-13 stut?ien ka.nn, ist unhal tbar. Nicht die
Petriner, die wohl nur eine kleine und herseitsterrorisierte
Minoritat in Korinth bildeten, sondern die radikalem Enthusiasmus
verfallen ea Anhanger dei Apollos bildeten die wirkuchen Gegner
des Paulus. 3
Kasema.nn is undoubtedly correct in his assessment here of Baur's results
in Die Christus Partei •••

but, as Hodgson questions, is this really a

rejection of Batir's basic contention, that the Church developed out of
a

dialecti~l

struggle between opposing ideas? Hodgson answers:

"Not

at all", and writes of Kasemann's evaluations
Rather, it suggests that the oppositions were different and
more complex than Baur had recognized: there was not simply a
Jewish-Pauline struggle in the first century; there were Hellenistic spiritualists and Gnostics as well ••• Baur's basic point
would seem to be strengthened rather than diminished by the
recognition of greater complexity in this internal development,
and Baur would have been the first to acknowledge that his reconstruction could be rendered "too simple" by the discovery of
fresh data.44
In sum then, Baur's work on New Testament introduction and history is
still valuable today, not so much in its results and conclusions, as in
its .foundational statement of problems of New Testament
which remain today important as they were in Baur' s day •

introduetioni.~.

Baur certainly

42K. Barth, 19th Cent. Theo., p. 500.

4JE. Kasemann, introduction to Ausgewahlte Werke Band I, p. x.
44p.

c.

·

}iodgson,'i'he Re~iscpve~ of__F. C. Ba~."p. 208.
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did not have the last word on these questions, and he would have been
the first to admit this.

It is, rather, because Baur had the first word

on many of these issues that he is important as Scholder states:

Ferdinand Christian Baurs ..Werk stell t sich uns heute als die
reinste Auspragung des noch ungebrochenen historischen Denkens
in der neuren Theologiegeschichte dar. Wer immer sich mit dieser
Frage beschaftigtt wird also auf ihn zuruckgreifen mll.ssen.45
The last stage of Baur's literary career was dominated by works on
Church history and historical theology and might properly be called the
period of Church history.

The period can be considered as beginning in

1847 with the publication of Uber Prinzip und Charakter des Lehrbegriffs.
when, as indicated earlier,

~ur

showed more of an interest in the insti-

tutional aspects of the Church (i.e., moral and cultic) than in theological or dogmatic aspects, but there were external factors which tended to
perhaps change Baur's focus slightly.

The revolutionary political move-

ments in German;w in 1848 and their ignominius outcome had an indirect
adverse effect on the school.

While the school had benefited from the

early revolutionary impulse and had thllS loosely tied itself to it, the
subsequent failure of the Revolution of 1848 and the consequent success
of the counter-revolution of the "revolution from above" put the adherents
of the school in a bad light.

The question arose as to whether or not the

followers of the Tubingen school ought to be, or even could possibly be,
involved in ecclesiastical affairs.

This question, Haussleiter writes:

was answered in the negative not only be opponents; some of
Baur's own disciples felt that they must either modify the
scientific conclusions they had learned f'rom him, or seek a
secular calling ••• It was not surprising, then, that the German
governments thought twice before appointing to academic positions
men whose influence was so disturbing, and that the younger
generation hesitated to follow Baur further, after his most
45K. Scholder in the Forward to F.
Band. I, p. vi.

c.
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important disciple, Zeller, was obliged in 1849 to exchange a
theological chair for that of philosophy at Marbu:rg. Ba.~ felt
the isolation in which he thus began to find himself ••• 6
Perhaps it was Bau:r's frustration over the generally negative reception
his theological ideas had received, combined with this most recent set
back which compelled him to strike out in search of a more comprehensive
understanding of the relation between Christianity and culture and a
more adequate model in which to understand the historical development of
theology and the Church.

Whatever the case, this change in emphasis was

not at all a divergence from his original intent, which was to understand
Christianity as the product of historical factors.

In the first stage,

he had examined the development of Christian dogma in the light of its
Greco-Roman milieu.

In the second stage, he had applied these same

methods to the New Testament epistles and gospels.

Now, in the final

stage, Baur wished to comprehend the whole of Church history both institutionally and theologically.

But throughout these three periods, Baur's

fundamental viewpoint remained unchanged, although, as Hcx:lgson maintains,
''His categories, emphases, and data were continually being modified and
revised ...47
Some of the works of this period will be described in greater detail in the next chapter, others will only be named here, and briefly
commented on, to show the flow of Baur's thought.

In 1852, appeared

Die Epochen der Kirchlichen Geschichtschreitsung which was intended to
serve as the introduction to his magnum opus on the history of the Church,
and which Hirsch characterizes as "ein bis heute noch nicht durch ein
46Haussleiter, "F. C. Baur" Schaff-Herzog, p. 10.
47Hodgson,The Form. of Hist. Theo., p, 22
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gleichartiges oder besseres ersetztes Werk ••.48 Following this work,
came the first two volumes of his general Church history:

Das Christen-

tum und die Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte (1853), and Die Christliche Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrhunderts (1859).

Baur had completed the third volume entitled Die Christ-

liche Kirche des Mittelalters in den Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwicklung,
but death intervened before he could see it published.

It was published

under the editorship of his son Ferdinand Friedrich Baur in 1861, but
the form and content were F.

c.

Baur's own.

Volumes four and five, enti-

tled Kirchengeschichte der 1neueren Zeit, von der Reformation bis zum
Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhtinderts (1863) and Kirchengeschichte des
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (1862) were published under the respective
editorships of Ferdinand Friedrich Baur and Eduard Zeller.
volume of this work:

The first

Das Christentum und die Kirche. • • , is indisputably

the greatest of Baur's literary works.
1

Dilthey has written of this work:

Sie 1st Baurs reifstes Werk. • .Das Buch 1st der vielleicht
der tiefsinnigste Versuch ein historisches Phanomen durch
Zerlegung in seine wesentlichen Wirkungsformen zu erfassen.49
In addition to his works on Church history, Baur also wrote and
lectured on historical theology and the history of Dogma during the
latter years of his life, and some of his ideas were published on the
basis of his lecture notes, under the editorship of his son F. F. Baur.
The Vorlesungen uber die Christliche Dogmengeschichte was published in
three volumes with volume one containing two parts.
4

The titles were:

~irsch,Geschichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie Band V.

p. 524.
49wilhelm Dilthey,Gesammelte Schriften Band IV, (Stuttgart:
B. G. Verlagsgesellschaft, 1959), pp. 429-430.
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Vol. I/1, Das Dogma. der alten Kirche von der apostolischen Zeit bis zur
Synod.e in Nicaa (1865); Vol. I/2, Das Dogma. der alten Kirche von der
.§yncxie in Nicaa bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrhunderts (1866); Vol. II,
Das Dogma. des Mittelalters (1866); Vol. III, Das Dogma der neueren Zeit

(1867). Although F. F. Baur did not provide the dates of the manuscripts
from which he took the material for this edition, Hodgson has, through
comparing the text with Baur's Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte

(1847,1858), argued that these works cannot be considered as among Baur's
latest works.

In fact, Hodgson considers the thoughts in the Vorlesungen • • •

to have been written sometime between 1842/43 and the first publication
of the Lehrbuch • • • in 1847.

If this is correct, then the works on

Church history are not only important because of their content, but of
crucial importance to understanding Baur's most mature thought.

But

before turning to these works, two further things must be dispensed with
in this chapter:

Baur's intellectual development, and his ideas on

Christology which represent the key to his philosophy of history.

INTELIECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the previous discussion of Baur's life and works, three
names were mentioned as having a profound impact on Baur's development
and mature thought:

Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Hegel.

It has been

indicated, in general, when Baur came under the influence of these men,
and also to what extent he was influenced by them.

The purpose of this

section, is to pass beyond what has already been said, and to indicate in
what specific areas Baur was influenced by their ideas.

Although Hegel

chronologically preceeds Schleiermacher, the discussion will proceed
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according to when each individual influenced Baur, therefore, the order
of treatment will be:

Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Hegel.

Before examining each of the individuals, it is important to give

a general statement of the problem these romantic philosophers were
addressing.

As Dorner notes:

Up until 1600, the primary emphasis of

philosophy had been on the objective world, i.e., nature.50

Subjectivity,

or reason is considered here, but in the relation of subject/object, object predominates.

This position can be illustrated from the Lutheran

distinction of articuli puri et mixt1.51

The articuli puri, on the one

hand, are those principles which are known from the Word of God and are
strictly matters of faith in Holy Writ.

Includedi

her~•·

Wt)uld.1 be·:.tt.heliM.s-

torical and efficacious act of Jesus and the doctrine of the Trinity.

On

the other hand, are the articuli mixti; those principles which are to
some degree or another, known by reason.

The art1culi mixti are less

certain than the articuli puri because they are founded upon human reason
which, in its fallen state, is fallible and obscure.

Thus, the articuli

mixti are only to be embraced as they can be shown to agree with Holy
Scripture.

It is one thing to know there· is a God from rational proofs,

but entirely another to believe it because it is revealed.
At the root of this view, is the very supernaturalism which Baur
rejected because it dichotomized the subject-object relationship rather

50J. A. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology Vol. II, trans. Rev.
George Robson and Sophia Taylor (New York, AMS Press, 1970), p. 357.
51This particular example of the old Protestant orthodoxy is discussed at length in Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Vol. II,
pp. 114-118. As a source for and explication of the reaction against
the old Protestant supernaturalism, Dorner is especially good since he
was a contemporary of Baur and sympathized with his views even though he
didn't go as far as Baur in criticism.
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than considering them together.

According to this position, "revelation"

is merely the given, as Dorner explains:
"Revelation" is found solely in the positive, the historical;
nay, by degrees the'secondary, i.e. the records of historical
revelation, the Holy Scriptures, are taken for "revelation";
and thus Holy Scripture with its doctrines is put in place of the
vital facts of revelation. "Fides", moreover, was not regarded
as the Christianized form and self-certainty of the mind, i.e.
of truly enlightened reason, but only as the reception into the
mind of the contents of Scriptural and Church teaching.52
Not only does faith depend upon the Holy Scriptures, its inspiration and
miracles, but faith is equated merely with acceptingtheir actual historicity, "as if", mocks Dorner, "it were possible for an unbeliever to
believe in Scripture, without· in some way or other previously believing
in God."53

Thus, objectivity is paramountly important for true knowledge

while the subjective rational response is always to be judged and rejected
or validated by it.

The rise of the Tu'bingen school can generally be

seen as a consequence of a new subjective emphasis in theology, as opposed
to the old objective-supernaturalism, but not, at least for Baur, an
overly-subjective approach.

For him, object and subject, while theoreti-

cally distinguishable, are inseparable.
The reaction to this objective emphasis toward subjectivity really
gets underway in the eighteenth century when the subjective response of
reason assumes the role played by Holy Scripture.

This development has

already been discussed in chapter two regarding the question of faith and
history.

But the result is, in Kant, a new dichotomy between the nou-

menal and phenomenal with emphasis on the subjective, or rational.
52norner, History of Protestant Theology, p. 115.
5Jnorner, History of Protestant Theology, p. 116.
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student of Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1?62-1814), was also interested
in finding a synthetic view of the iubject-6bject relationship, but his
work, like Kant's was juiged to be lacking by the romantic philosophers
and theologians, because of its overly subjective character, which, while
pretending to embody both subject and object, actually polarized them.
Hegel criticizes Fichte's solution thus:
The basic character of Fichte's principle, is that the SubjectObject steps out of its identity and is unable to reestablish
itself in it because the diffe:rrent (i.e., pure and empirical
consciousness) gets transposed into the causal relation. The
principle of identity does not become principle of the system;
as soon as the fomation of the system begins, identity is abandoned. The system itself is a consistent product of the intellect
a mass of finitu:les, which the original identity cannot draw
together into the focus of totality or to its absolute selfintuition. The Subject-Object, therefore, turns itself into a
subjective Subject-Object and it does not succeed in suspending
this subjectivity and positing itself objectively . .54
Fichte's problem is his system, which, in analyzing both Subject-Object,
is unable to hold them together.

Hegel's basic critique of Fichte, is

that his system is too subjective and therefore, too contingent to effectively hold Subject-Object together.
tive Subject-Object.

This is what he means by a subjec-

The essay from which the above quote was taken,

was Hegel's first acknowledged publication, and appeared long before he
attained his position of overwhelming importance, yet already Hegel provides hints of his later influential ideas.

His solution of the Subject-

Object dichotomy will be found in Reason, whose "sole interest" is to
"suspend such rigid antitheses."55

"What Reason opposes", he writes, ''is

just the absolute fixity which the intellect gives to the dichotomy".

54G. W. F. Hege~ The Difference Between Fichte's and Schellin 's
System of Philosophy, trans. H. s. Harris and Walter Cerf Albany, N.Y.:
State University of New York Press, 197?), p. 155.
55G. W. F. Hegel, The Difference Between ••• , p. 90 ..
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And thus:
with respect to the given dichotomy the need is the necessary
attempt to suspend the rigidified opposition between subjectivity
and objectivity; to comprehend the achieved existence (das
Gewordense1n) of the intellectual and real world as a becoming.

Its being as a product must be comprehended as a producing.

In

the infinite activity of becoming and producing, Reason has united
what was sundered and it has reduced the absolute dichotomy to a
relative one, one that is conditioned by the original identity.
When, where and in what forms such self-reproductions of Reason
occur as philosophies is contingent. This contingency must be
comprehended on the basis of the Absolute positing itself as an
objective totality.56
This last statement of Hegel's is indicative of the general task before
the romantic philosophers and theologians, i.e., to develop a philosophical system in which both objectivity and subjectivity will become
unified in an ultimate principle.

This ultimate principle, is to be

identified with Hegel's Absolute, "which can, if there is to be any knowledge at all, be neither mere substance, the inflexible objective existence of Spinoza; nor, on the other hand, mere primary subject, the selfcontained primary monad on which Deism insists."57

Baur felt the tension

of the Subject/Object dichotomy and consequently felt the same need for
resolution and harmony as did Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.

It

was this mutual concern which attracted him to the works of these men.
Of these, Schelling was the first important influence.
Schelling
F. W. J. Schelling (1775-18.54) was fully a child of the era of the
French Revolution and the Romantic Revolt in Germany.

In 1790, at the

age of 15, he came to Tubingen when the revolutionary events were still
56G. W. F. Hege~ The Difference Between . • • , p. 91.
57Dorner,History of Protestant Theology, p. 358.
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looked on by the European intellectual community favorably.

There, as

noted earlier, he joined Hegel in planting a tree of liberty in honor of
the French Revolution.

But later, when the Revolution took on more

nationalistic overtones, Schelling showed himself to be loyal to his
German homeland.

The Revolution was, in Dilthey's words:

"Der groBe

Vorgang, der die Tubinger Freunde ergriff ," and the catalyst which bonded
the students together in a political club.58
Schelling reacted against the subjectivism of the Enlightenment,
personified in Kant, to seek a synthesis of Subject and Object.

But

Schelling represents more than just this synthesis and more than a bridge
between Kant and Hegel as he is often treated.

He is the "philosopher

of Roman.ticism" who stayed with the flow .of: _R-oma.nticism ·t~:Oughout._ Lts·_ history until it entered its existentialist phase.59

Paul Tillich, who

wrote his Ph.D. thesis on Schelling and wrote a great deal on Schelling
subsequently, sums his philosophy up as

"an attempt to show the indwelling

of the potential spirit in all natural objects and how it comes to its
fulfillment in man," which is none other than the Romantic philosophy of
nature.60

His philosophy is, to some degree, a reaction against Fichte

who viewed nature as, "only the material which man must use in himself,
58wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften,. Band IV, p. 13.
, 59Paul Tillich, Perspectives ••• , p. 142. The recognition of
Schelling's importance in his own right instead of only as the "bridge"
between Kant and Hegel seems to be breaking through in philosophic
studies. In one recent study of Schelling, the author states: "It
was Schelling who drew up the table of contents of German Idealism,
defined the problems philosophers would concern themselves with for
decades, and, indeed, probably took idealism as for as it could go
in the process." (Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy
of Nature. (Lewisburg, VA.: Bucknell University Press, 1977), p. 9.)
60rillich, Perspectives ••• , p. 145.
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in his bcxly which is nature, and outside of himself in his surroundings,
1n order to actualize the moral imperative." 61

Schelling's distaste for total subjectivism.

Here most clearly is seen
This reaction is just as

much a reaction against Kantian ethics, which stressed the role of practical reason in recognizing and acting upon the moral imperative, as it
is a response to Fichte's subjectivism, and for this reason, Tillich regards Schelling's ideas as a "resurgence of the idea of grace over against
law." He continues:
Schelling's philosophy or theology was very much a doctrine
of grace, stressing the given divine reality before our merits
and before our moral acts. So natural philosophy was a way of
rediscovering grace over against the moralism of the Enlightenment. This w~s one of the great achievements of Romanticism
for theology. 2
The portrayal of romantic philosophy as the rediscovery of grace could be
exampled to an even greater degree by the philosophy of Schleiermacher,
who will be considered shortly.

Baur was especially influenced by Schelling's conception of history
as revelation and further by his outline of an historical method which
would comprehend historical reality in both its universal and particular
aspects.

The

~stem

ential work on Baur.

des Transzendentalen Idealismus, was the most influHere, Schelling gropes for the synthetic union of

Subject and Object in all knowledge and states his guiding task as:
Im Wissen selbst--indem ich weiB--ist Objektives und Subjektives
so vereinigt, daB man nicht sagen kann, welchem von beiden die
Prioritat zukonune. Es 1st hier kein Erstes und kein Zweites,
beide sind gleichzeitig und Eins. Indem-ich diese Identitat
erklaren, muB ich, da m.ir aut3er jenen beiden Faktoren des Wissens
(als / Erklarungs-Prinzip) sonst nichts gegeben ist, notwendig
61Tillich, Perspectives, .

62T1llich, Pers£ectives.

• t

p. 146.

. .' p. 14? •.
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den einen dem andern vorsetzen, von dem einen ausgehen, um von
ihm auf den andern zu kommen; von welghem von beiden ich ausgehe,
1st durch die Aufgabe nicht bestimmt. 3
Schelling continues by noting that he can either start with "das Objektive"
in which case the question will be:

''Wie ein Subjektives zu ihm hinzu-

komme, das mit ihin ubere1nstimmt?"64, or he can begin with "das Subjektive"
which involves the questions
ubereinstimmt ?" ·• 65

"Wie ein Objektives hinzukomme, das mit ihm

In the course of the argument, Schelling selects a

subjective approach because "das Subjektive" is "das Erste, und einziger
Grund aller Realitat",66 yet his approach is a truly transcendental one,
for:
Wenn dem Transzendental-Philosophen nur das Subjektive
ursprungliche Realitat hat, so wird er auch nur das Subjektive im Wissen sich unmittelbar zum Objekt ma.chens das
Objektive wird ihln nur indirekt zum Objekt werden, und anstatt
daB im gemeinen Wissen das Wissen selbst (der Akt des Wissens)
uber dem Objekt verschwindet, wird im T:ranszendenta.len umgekehrt uber dem Akt des Wissens das Objekt als solches verschwinden. 67
Therefore, Schelling characterizes transcendental knowledge as "ein
Wissen des Wissens, insofernes rein Subjektive ist ... 68

In sum, then,

the task of Transcendental-Philosophy, according to Schelling is "vom
Subjektiven, als vom Ersten und Absoluten, auszugehen, und. das Objektive
6JF. W. J. Schelling, System Des T:ranszendentalen Idealismus,
{Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1962),p. 7 (III, 340). The figures in
parenthesis refer to the original section numbers of the text.
64Schelling,System, •• , p. 7 (III,)40).
65schelling,System ••• , p. 9 (III,342).
66schelling,System, •• , p. 10 (III,J4J).
67schelling,System ••• , p. 12 (III,345).
68schellin& System ••• , p. 12-13 (III, 345).
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aus ihm entstehen zu lassen. ••69 Starting with subjectivity, Schelling
seeks to derive his whole system of knowledge from the principle of consciousness, or ego, which he considers to be the dynamic or inner principle at work in Nature.

The task of the transcendental philosopher is

to present "das ursprungliche Entstehen des BewuBtseins"?O and, therefore,
for Schelling,. philosophy is truly "eine Geschichte des Selbstbewu.Btseins,
die verschiedene Epochen hat, und durch welche jene Eine absolute Synthesis sukzessiv zusammengesetz wird. 11 71

Although the consideration of the

history of consciousness is essentially analytical, involving theoretical,
)

practical, and aesthetic aspects, Schelling is insistent that it is all,
in effect "Ein absoluter Akt" incltrling "nicht nur das Ich selbst mit
allen seinen Bestimmungen, sondern. • .auch alles andere gesetzt, was
fiir das Ich unerhaupt gesetzt ist ... 72
These brief comments on Schelling's System ••• , its task and methodology, help" to understand Baur's transition from bis basic supernatural
stance evidenced in his book review of 1818, to a more open speculative
approach first explicit in his Symbolik und Mythologie ••• of 1824-25.
When Baur first came into contact with Schelling's work (probably around
1817 while a professor at Blaubeuren), he still maintained a supernatural
concept of Christianity with its emphasis on its objectivity.
this concept was rooted the idea of the Deus

~

Machina, from whom man

can but receive revelation but not rationally attain it.
69schelling,System. • • • p. 10 (III,

342).

?Oschelling,~stem ••• , p. 64 (III, 398).

71schelling,System ••• , p. 66 (III, 399).
72schelling,System ••• , p.

55

(III, 388).
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earlier, polarized Subject and Object and resulted in an essential dualism in all knowledge in which nature and supernature were seen to war
against one another.

Schelling's System ••• was the intellectual yeast

in Baur's mind which finally resulted in his rejection of his supernatural
stance and its attendant dualism.

The work had an almost inestimable in-

fluence on Baur who wrote of it to his one time student Ludwig Bauer, in
1822:
Ohne Zweifel wird Sie bereits Schellings wenigstens ungleich
lebendigere und. phantasiereichere Philosophie mehr angezogen
haben, und ich rathe Ihnen besonders sein System des transcendentalen Idealismus, eine Schrift die mir vorzuglich gefallen
hat, sorgfaltig durchzulesen. Sie werden find.en, daB Sie diese
Schrift auch noch fiir Fichte entschita.igt, und daB man durch sie
sich hauptsachlich den wahren Begriff von der streng wissenschaftlichen Konstruction eines Systems bilden kan. Ich weiB
keine Schrift, die man nach Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre mit
groserem Nuzen fur die besonders f orma.le philosophische Bildung
lesen kan.73

..

..

Schelling's ideas and basic methodology, according to Hester, became the
very foundation of all Baur's work beginning with the Symbolik und Mythologie. • • :
In seinem ersten Werk sieht Baur--im Einklang mit Schelling-die Idee der Einheit des Wissens im Organismus des menschlichen
Geistes vorgebildet. Diesem idealen Typus naherzukommen, ist auch
fUr Baur das wahre Ziel des wissenschaftlichen Strebens. Die
Frage nach dem Verhaltnis einer au13eren Autoritat der Offenbarung
zu den f:reien, selbstbestimmenden Tatigkeiten des Geistes, nach
dem Verha~tnis der au13eren Geschichte zu den inneren Entwicklungen des SelbstbewuBtseins--ihr begegnen wir immer Wieder in
den Schriften Baurs.74

..

73This letter has been published along with another addressed to
L. Bauer probably dated c. 1823/24 in Carl Hester, "Gedanken zu Ferdinand
Christian Baurs Entwicklung als Historiker anhand zweier unbekannter
Briefe", Zeitschrift fiir Kirchengeseh1chte (~. Band, 1973, Heft 2-3)
s. 249-269.
74 Hester,"Gedanken ••• ," p. 265. In this article Hester suggests
that Baur's reliance on Schelling's idealism ca.used him to misread
Schleierma.cher on a fundamental point and that, therefore, ''man kann nur
sehr bedingt vom EinfluB Schleiermachers auf Baur~ • • • sprechen. "(p. 264).
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Schleiermacher
Notwithstanding the tremendous impact which Schelling had upon Baur,

it was Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleierma.cher (1768-183'+) who probably
had the greatest influence on his theological thought.

This fact was at

least hinted at by Baur in the preface to his Symbolik und Mythologie.
when he admitted his dependence upon Schleiermacher's thought without
saying anything of Schelling's influence.

Baur's silence concerning

Schelling's influence upon him is almost incomprehensible in the light of
the enthusiasm with which he recommended the System des Transzendentalen
Ideal~~_mus

to Ludwig Bauer in 1822, yet the impact of Schleiermacher's

ideas on him may have been s9 strong at the time of the writing of the
Symbolik.und

Mytholog_~e

owed to Schelling.

, , • that it obscured the real debt which he

Later Baur became totally disgusted with Schelling's
~

philosophy. 75
Schleierma.cher was,.like Schelling, affected by the French Revolution
and supported the German position, specifically the Prussian position,
through sermons and through service as chaplain of the Charite Hospital
in Berlin.

Later, during the Napoleonic wars, he became even more

active in an underground resistance movement in Germany ma.de up of young
patriots.

He became manager of a small paper entitled The Prussian

75After many years in retirement, supposedly developing some new
philosophy, Schelling came to Berlin where Baur heard him. For Baur,
this occasion was disappointing to say the least, and he wro~e to his
friend Heyd about it, on November JO, 1841: "Es 1st doch en beispielloser Hochmuth, mit welchem dieser Mann auftritt. Es ist ja, wie wenn
er nur dazu nach Berlin gekommen ware, um Hegel auf seinem Grabe zu
verhohnen. Selbst sein bisheriges Stillschweigen soll nur als Hochmuth
anzusehen seyn. Ich hofe dieser Hochmuth kommt nur vor dem Fall, und
sage im Namen Hege ls: Exoria.re aliq uis."
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Correspond.ant which published articles and editorials dealing with the
German war effort.

Often the zeal of its contributors got the paper in

trouble with even the Prussian authorities.
Although Schleierma.cher had earlier shown definite leanings toward
Romanticism, it wasn't until he came to Berlin that he became associated
with the formal Romantic Movement represented by a circle of writers and
poets, the most outstanding of which was Friedrich Schlegel.

It is

because he lived in their world and spoke their language, that Schleierma.cher is to be associated with Romanticism in general.
has indicated:

But, as Redeker

"That he was neither a poet nor an aesthete, can be seen

from his own unfinished poetic efforts undertaken at the prompting of
his friends."76

It was upon the subject of religion that Schleiermacher

vented his frustration with the Enlightenment and Rationalism and showed
himself to be a true child of the Romantic Revolt.
seen in his first major work:

On Religion:

Despisers which appeared in 1799.

This was clearly

Speeches to its Cultured

Its aim, according to Rl.dolph Otto,

was:
to recapture the position religion had lost in the intellectual
world where it was now threatened with total oblivion. It aimed
to lead religion out of the remote corner into which it had been
cast, to prove that religion was not just a concern of the "uncultured" and of old-fashioned people who found in it an emergency substitute for the higher things of life, but something
that belonged to truly cultured, authentic, and well-rounded
human beings; moreover, that without religion the intellectual
life of mankind would deprive itself of its noblest ingredient.
The book had been written for the purpose of restoring religion
as a prime factor in the growth and further development of the
76Martin Redeker,Schleiermachera Life and Tho
t Trans. John
Wallhauser (Philadelphia F~tress Press, 1973 , p. 33.
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modern age.77
In this work, Schleierma.cher laid down his basic ideas on religion which
were to be further elaborated in later works.

Schleiermacher's concept

of religion was opposed to both supernaturalism and the natural religion
concept even though the objection to supernaturalism is implicit in his
work while his objections to natural religion is explicit.
natural view-point of orthodox

~otestantism

The

super~

was no longer tenable for

him because Western man's conceptualization of reality and his way of
apprehending it had been revolutionized, primarily through the work of
Kant.

The growth of science and speculative philosophy too, were sympto-

matic of a change that had overtaken the Western world.

The emphasis in

Western thought was no longer the dualistic view of the God outside the
machine who miraculously communicated to man from above, but rather, a
system of natural causes in a closed system in which reality is understood through antecedent events.

Thus, either God was to be found in the

increasingly shrinking realm of the inexplicable, and the dualism remained
intact, or, as Schleierma.cher proposed, God is to be found within a
"higher realism" whereby all dualisms are comprehended by a greater unity.
Ultimately, for him, religion is the feeling of absolute dependence before
the universe, though that is not his terminology in the Speeches.

He

writes:
Religion neither seeks like metaphysics to determine and
explain the nature of the Universe, nor like morals to advance
and perfect the Universe by the power of :f'reedom and the divine
will of man. It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition
and feeling. It will regard the Universe as it is. It is reverent attention and submission, in childlike passivity, to be
77rn the introduction to Friedrich Schleierma.cher,On Religion:
S eeches to its Cultured Des isers, trans. John Oman (New York: Harper
and Brothers, Publishers, 1958 , p. ix.
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stirred and filled by the Universe's immediate influences.
To metaphysics, man is the centre of all, the condition of all
existence; to religion, he is, like every other finite thing,
but a manifestation of the Universe. Morals proceeds from the
consciousness of freedom and seeks to expand the realm of freedom to infinity; religion re~s man as needing to be what he
is, whether he will or not.?
For the same reasons that supernaturalism in religion must be
abandoned, so must the subjective approach of the rationalists be dropped.
Not only does it fail to apprehend the essence of religion but it fails
to do justice to the Universe itself.

On this, he writes:

What, then, shall become of the highest utterance of the
speculation of our days, complete rounded idealism, if it do
not again sink itself in this unity, if the humility of religion
do not suggest to its pride another realism than that which
it so boldly and with such perfect right, subordinates to itself? It annihilates the Universe, while it seems to aim at
constructing it. It wotild degrade it to a mere allegory, to
a mere phantom of the one-sided limitation of its own empty
consciousness.79
Overall, Schleierma.cher wishes to show that religion is not something
imposed upon the human race externally but rather a capacity or intuition
within man which is a vital part of his life.
to despise man himself.

To despise it is in reality

Even the essence of the Christian faith is al-

ready existing immanently within the human breast, more specifically in
the consciousness of the subject, and is intimately connected with human
reason which is a form and modification of an absolute religious consciousness.

Thus, what is important in religion is not the external

elements of the doctrinal corpus nor the learning and appropriation of
these, but rather the heightened intuition of the Universe as a whole.
It was this same consciousness which made Jesus Christ so important.
78F. Schleiermacher, On Religion ••• , p. 277.

79F. Schleiermacher,On Religion ••• , p. 40.
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This consciousness of the singularity of His knowledge of
God and of His existence in God, of the original way in which
this knowle~ge was in Him, and of the power thereof to communicate itself and awake religion, was at once the consciousness
of His office as mediator and of His divinity. • •• With this
faith in Himself, who can wonder at His assurance that He was
not only a mediator for many, but would leave behind a great
school that would derive their religion from His?80
Schleiermacher gave more mature expression to his ideas in his later works
even though his Speeches ••• contain his essential ideas.

He also became

more systematic in his presentation as The Christian Faith (1821/22)
and the Glaubenslehre (1822) demonstrate.

It was through these later

works that Baur became familiar with Schleiermacher's ideas.
Baur first makes mention of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre in a
letter to his brother Friedrich August Baur dated July 26, 1823 in which
he mentions that he had studied the work carefully and was very impressed
by it even though he could not fully comprehend it.81

Baur went on to

try to give his basic points of agreement and disagreement on the work
from both a philosophical and theological point of view.

From a philo-

sophical point of view, Baur considers the Glaubenslehre as both pantheistic and idealistic, and he criticizes Schleiermacher at this point:
Idealistisch 1st vor allem die stete Entwicklung aller Hauptmomente aus dem SelbstbewuBtsein, pa.ntheistisch ist namentlich
die Behandlung der Lehre von Gott, welche zwar Gott als das
Absolute im reinsten Sinne setzt, aber zugleich mit solcher
Abstraktion, daB nicht sowohl das Wesen Gottes als vielmehr die
allgemeinsten Eigenschaften (ungef~ dieselben, auf welche
Spinoza nach der Unterscheidung zwischen Sein und Denken oder
Wissen alle ubrigen Begriffe zuruckfimrt) in Erwagung gezogen
werden, und um jeden end.lichen Gegensatz im gottlichen Wesen
auszuschlie!:en, auch nicht mehr von eigentlicher Personlichkeit
80F. Schleiermacher,On Religion ••• , pp. 247-248.
81The letter is published in full in Heinz Liebin~, "F. C. Baurs
Kritik an Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre", Zeitschrift fur Theologie
und Kirche, LIV: 2 (1957), pp. 225-43.
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die Rede sein kann. Selbst der Begriff der Geistigkeit Gottes
wird mehr nur in einem nega.tiven Sinn genommen, und der einzige
positive Begriff, der Gott beigelegt wird, 1st nur der der
Ursachlichkeit im allgemeinsten Sinn.82
This objection to Schleiermacher's method is an important one for beginning to understand Baur's ideas on the Absolute synthesis between
Subjective and Objective existence.

He is in agreement with Schleier-

macher that such a synthesis is necessary, but he rejects his God-concept
as too amorphous and vague to provide any real meaning for religion and
especially Christianity.

In Schleiermacher's system, consciousness is

the important locus of religion and as long as one maintains this consciousness of the Universe.in all its variety, then an affinity with
Jesus is established existentially and he becomes the mediator of religion.
But, Baur objects to this beginning with consciousness alone.

He wishes

to start with history because consciousness alone will lead to relativity.
This brings him to the theological side of his critique, i.e., a consideration of "wie fern dieses System den Charakter einer ubernat\irlichen
Qffenba.rung im Christentum anerkennt."

It was especially over Christo-

logy that Baur diverged fran Schleierma.cher.

On the one hand, says Baur,

he upholds that "die gottliche urd menschliche Natur waren in ihm verbunden, sofern das GottesbewuBtsein in ihm ein wahres Sein Gottes war."8J
But, Baur writes further, on the other hand, ..wird in 1hm ein Urbildliches und Geschichtliches unterschieden, und. er selbst hei.Bt die vollendete Schopfung der menschlichen Natur."84

Although Baur admits that he

B2H. Liebing, "F.C. Baurs Kritik ••• ~", p. 2J8.

8JH. Liebing, "F.C. Baurs Kritik ••• ," p. 242.
84H.Liebing, "F.C. Baurs Kritik ••• ," p. 242.
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is uncertain of what Schleierma.cher aeans by his discussion of Christ's
"urbildliches und geschichtliches" existence, he still expresses concern
that Schleiermacher has ultimately slighted the importance of the historical Jesusa
Wenn die Hauptmomente, die die Person des Erlosers betreffen,
selbst auch aus dem religiosen SelbstbewuBtsein abgeleite werden,
somit die auCere Geschichte Jesu als eine Geschichte der innern
Entwicklungen des religiosen SelbstbewuBseins ~nommen warden,
so ka.nn ich ndr die Person Christi als des Erlosers nur als
eine gewisse Form und. Potenz des Selbstbewul3tse1ns denken, die
nur darum in einer auCeren Geschichte erschien, Weil die na.tiirliche Entwicklung des SelbstbewuBtseins in ihrer hochsten Voll~
endung sich notwendig einma.l so ~stalten mu!3. Christus 1st
also in jedem Menschen, und die auCere Erscheinung Jesu 1st auch
hier nicht das Ursprungliche, sondern in dem Geschichtlichen soll
nur das Urbildliche, Ideale na.chgewiesen, und das innere Ber--=
wuBtsein zur klaren Anschauung gebracht werden.85
Baur recognized that Schleierma.cher had dealt with the antithesis of
rationalism and supernaturalism through transcending both, but 1n so
doing, Baur believed that another crucial problem was raised.

Schleier-

ma.cher's attempt at a rational/supernatural synthesis was carried out
subjectively.

According1.to Baur, this can only em by forshortening

the "historical element" specifically in regard to Christology.
Ba.ur's recognition of this shortcoming in Schleierma.cher's philosophy marks a crucial point in his intellectual development.

Here, as

Liebing has imicated, "Baur's theological question is turned into the
question of history."86

Thus, from his earliest work, Baur became in-

creasingly concerned with history, albeit, not with the mere facts of
history.

It was with the meaning of history that Baur was concerned.

In the preface to his Symbolik awl Mytho)Bgie •.•• , he wrote a "With out

85H. Liebing, "F.C. Baurs Kritik ••• ," p. 242
86Heinz Liebing, "Historical-Critical Theology," trans. Peter C.
Hodgson, lourna.l for Theology and the Church, J {1967), p. 60
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philosophy, history remains for me eternally dead. am dumb." Taken by
themselves, the facts of history could only present a tremendous conglomerate of values and multiplicity of separate phenomena., (collectively
meaningless) with no continuity.

What was necessary, according to Baur,

was a philosophy which would cause these facts to live and speak.
the question remained, 'what philosophy?'.

But

Certainly it had to be for Baur

.an idealistic philosophy, but an idealistic philosophy which could transcend the dualism of subjectivity am objectivity.

Schelling and Schleier-

macher were approaching such a philosophy in Baur's view, but they had
begun

from too subjective a viewpoint.

Baur' s quest was to discover a

philosophy which would allow history to speak without swallowing up its
individuality in general forms and principles.

±l!--~~~-Symbolik

Mythologie. • • , Baur was groping for such a philosophy.

und

He wrote i

The idea conditions the individual manifestations everywhere.
Without idea of religion, the nature of the individual forms
of religion cannot be grasped • Again, how can the principle
and character of a particular form of religion be rightly understocxl, if all manifestations of the same kind are not considered
in their reciprocal connection?87
Although Baur was not yet acquainted with Hegel's

philosophy,~it

is

evident that he was working towards something like it in the Symbolik
und Mythologie ••• , and in his works.

The main question with which

Baur was working was the discovery of a philosophy which would make
sense out of historical facts without doing violence to their historical
individuality.

His problem was to find a model whereby their relation-

ship might be portrayed as a unity.

UltiJnately, it was in Hegel that

Baur found h·1s philosophical key to history.

The by was the Absolute

Spirit which carried within itself both subjectivity and objectivity,
8?H. Liebing, "Historical-Critical Theology," p. 60.
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both consciousness and hist:oricity, both idea and reality.
Hegel
G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) grew up in the revolutionary environment of Europe with the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Era, the rise
of Romanticism and the continental revolutions in 1830.

Although he ha.8

often been interpreted as an opt1.mist, Hegel never viewed history as a
cumulative story of happiness, nor that happiness was just around the
historical corner.

Rather, he was surrounded by grief am seemed to be

deeply touched by its presence.

There was his friend Ho9iderlin, perhaps

the most gifted poet of his generation, who gradually went insane and
wasted away until his death.

His only sister lived on the threshold bf

madness for most of her life and his only brother was killed in the Napoleonic wars.

These personal tragedies combined with the revolutionary

uncertainty of his own time to cause him to reflect on the meaning of
history and to says

"H~sto:ry

is not the soil of happiness.

The times

of happiness are empty leaves in it ... 88 According to Wilhelm Dilthey,
Hegel was impressed and influenced by the French Revolution in a unique
way:
Die souverane fortschreiteme Vernunft wie sie die Seele der
kantischen Philosophie, war, schein ihm in der Revolution am
Werke, erdlich ihre Herrschaft zu verwirklichen. Welche ein
Erlebnis lag in ihr fiir den kopf, welcher bestimmt war, die
Geschichte als die Entwicklung des menschlichen Geschlechts
zur Freiheit zu begreifen!89
In spite of its uncertainty and tragic character, Hegel came to view
8BQ.uoted in Walter Kaufmann,Hegels A Reinterpretation (New Yorks
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 253.

B9w, Dilthey,Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV., p. 13.
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history as a rational process which he identified as "none other than
the progress of the consciousness of f'reedom"90 and more specifically
as "the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge
of that which it is potentially ... 91

Idea and history fwiction together

in bringing this process to completion.
The destiny of the spiritual World, and,--since this is the
substantial World, while the physical remains subordinate to
it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth as against
the spiritua.1,--the final cause of the World at large, we allege
to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the pa.rt of Spirit,
and ipso facto the reality of that freedom.92
Hegel goes on to identify this "destiny of the spiritual world" with
God's purpose for it:
This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the
absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will nothing other
than himself--his own Will. The Nature of His Will--that is, His
Nature itself--is what we here call the Idea of Freedom; translating the language of Religion into that of Thought. The question,
then, which we may next put, isa What means does this principle
of Freedom use for its realiza.tion?93
The means by which Spirit comes to a consciousness of its own freedom is
History itself.

According to Hegel, although Spirit or the spiritual

World is the truly substantial World, Spirit remains merely general and
abstract "principle, aim, destiny" until it finds its actualization in
History and thereby enters fully into the realm of reality.

The means

by which Spirit enters into historical existence is through human interest
or passion.

Thus, he writes, in addition to ideas

A second element must be introduced in order to produce actuali ty--viz. actuation, realizations and whose power is the Will-90G. W. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London: George
Bell and Sons, 1902), p. 19-20.

91a.

w.

92G.

W. F. Hege~ Lectures ••• , p. 20.

93G.

w.

F. Hegel,Lectures ••• , p. 18.

F. Hegel,Lectures ••• , p. 20-21.
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the activity of man in the widest sense. It is only by this
activity that that Idea as well as abstract characteristics
generally, are realized, actualized1 for of themselves they
are powerless. The motive power that puts them in operation,
and gives them determinate exist~pce, is the need, instinct,
inclination, am passion ef man.~
Therefore, in Hegel's philosophy, both Idea and History are considered
as two aspects of reality, yet, while they are differentiated, they are
not separated dualistically.

Rather, combined, they form reality itself.

"Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation;
the first, the Idea; the second, the complexity of human passions; the
one, the warps the other, the woof of the vast arras-web of Universal
History •.. 95
Christianity plays an important part in the process of Spirit coming
to self-realization.

Christianity is presented primarily as Idea which

is born historically out of the Hellenistic-Roman milieu.
the law for their Spirit wass

'Man, know thyself!'

For the Greeks,

This is a conscious-

ness of Spirit, but it still remains objectified in their divinities and
in their art where the sphere of the sensuous "is elevated only to the
middle ground of beautiful form and shape, but not to pure thought."96
The Romans bring to consciousness the subjectivity which ;is lacking to
the Greeks although it is only formal and in itself irxlefinite, taking
"its material from passion am caprice."97 The Romans respond to the
striving of subjectivity and objectivity through the concept of submission
~G.

w.

F. Hegel, Lectures ••• , p. 2).

95G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures ••• , p. 24.
96G. W. F. Hege~ Lectures ••• , p. JJ1.

97G. W. F. Hegel,Lectures •••• p. 331,_
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to fate and duty.

What is still necessary according to Hegel is:

He must feel himself as the negation of himself; he must see
that his misery is the misery of his na.ture--that he is in himself a divided and discordant being. This state of mind. this
self-chastening, this pain occasioned by our individual nothingness--the wretchedness of our (isolated) self, and the longing
to transcend this condition of soul--must be looked for elsewhere than in the properly Roman World.98
This state of mind is finally reached by the Jewish People.

Here, "Spirit

came to absolute self-consciousness--passing from that alien form of
being which is its discord and pain, and mirroring itself in its own
essence."99
At this stage the joy of reconciliation is still distant from humanity.

There is only the awareness of alienation, the comprehension and

reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity is as yet undiscovered.
Yet, at this stage, "the fullness of time" has come and reconciliation
is expressed through the Christian trinity and particularly in the God/man.
"Christ has appeared,--a Man who is God,--God who is man; and thereby
peace ard reconciliation have accrued to the World."100

He continuesa

Man himself therefore is comprehended in the Idea of God,
and this comprehension may be thus expressed--that the unity
of Man with GOO. is posited in the Christian religion. But
this unity must not be superficially conceived, as if God were
only Man, and Man, without further condition, were God. Man,
on the contrary, is God only insofar as he annuls the merely
Natural and Limited in his Spirit and elevates hillBelf to God.
That is to say, it is obligatory on him who is a partaker of the
truth, and knows that he himself is a constituent (Moment) of
the Divine Idea, to give up his merely natural beings for the
Natural is the Unspiritual. In this Idea of God, then, is to
98c. W. F. Hegel, Lectures. • • • pp.
99G.

w.

332-333.

F. Hegel, Lectures ••• , P• 333.

100G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures. • • , p.
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be found also the Reconciliation that heals the pain and inward
suffering of man.101
This annuling of the "merely Natural a!Xl Limited" was accomplished first

by Jesus Christ but it is only after his death that he achieves s1gn1f1cance for his followers as "an object for their truly spiritual consciousness."102

Hegel sidesteps the question of Christ's substitutionary atone-

ment, his superior person, and the question of miracles, as unimportant
for his discussion because, in his estimation, it all ignores the conception of the Speculative Idea, of Absolute Truth.

"The main question·;"

he writes, "is not his Divine Mission, but the revelation ma.de in Christ
and the purport of his mission ... 103
It is fairly clear why Hegel's ideas attracted Baur's attention as
an ad.equate philosophy of history.

Even before Baur•s acquaintance with

this philosophy, he was already wrestling with many of the issues Hegel
disguised in his philosophy.

In his Symbolik und Mythologie, for example,

Baur had expressed his belief that history was incomprehensible outside
of philosophy and had been toying with the concept of "Idee" in history
as a clue to history's ultimate meaning.

But up until Hegel, Baur was

not comfortable with idealistic interpretations because they tended to
dissolve the particulars of history into general abstractions.

In Hegel,

however, Baur found a philosophy which brought Idea and History together
and presented an answer to the question of how philosophy could bring
history to life and make it speak.

Hegel brought Baur to understand

F.

Hege~

Lectures ••• , p. 3J6 •

102G, W, F.

Hege~

Lectures ••• , p.

101 G.

10JG.

w.

w.

337.

F. Hege~ Lectures • • • , p. JJ8.
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"idea" as a process of Spirit which proceeds in conformity with Spirit,
and thus he began to understand history as philosophy, since it follows
an idealistic course, and philosophy as theology since that course is
determined by God's purpose for the world.

"In Hegel's system", wrote

Baur, "it {theology) has overcome its antithetical stand toward philosophy, which has prevailed since the end of the Middle Ages, and has returned to the unity of spirit."104
Yet for all that Baur learned from Hegel, (and that was a great
deal) he never read him as a philosophia perennis nor did he ever apply
Hegelian catagories upon history in any !. ::eriori fashion.

Ironically

the very aspect of Hegel's philosophy which attracted Baur also became
the aspect of divergence between them.

The possibility of taking history

seriously provided by Hegel's philosophy attracted Baur as opposed to
the overly subjective approaches of Schelling and Schleiermacher.

Yet

within Hegel's philosophy was a latent distain for historical details
in contrast to Idea.

The breakdown of the Hegelian synthesis in the

nineteenthicentury was a natural outcome of this latent distain.

Baur

seems to have had a greater concern for history than Hegel and hence
paid increasingly more attention to it in his writings.

The question of

the meaning of the historical Jesus became the most clear locus of
divergence between Baur and. Hegel.
Ba.ur's Christolog,y
Although Hegel attempted to hold the positivity of history and the
subjectivity of reason together in synthesis, he demonstrates a preference
towards Ideality in his conception of Christ,

Hegel's Christology is

1~uoted in H, Liebing, "Histarical-Critical Theology," p. 68.
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ultimately docetic in nature because he separates the meaning of Christ's
coming from l:jis actual earthly life.

What is left is a Christ of faith

and a Jesus of histery which results theologically in historicity being
swallowed up by faith.

Baur accepted Hegel's basic concept of the

relation of idea ard history, his idea of reconciliation being worked out
in the process of history, his concept of passion {conflict) as the
dynamic of history, and even his assesment of the nature of
nation and atonement in the person of Christ.

the~ll.ncar-

But wha. t he could not

accept in Hegel's philosophy was his docetic Christology, i.e. his
tendency to deny any special significance to the historic Jesus.

That

is because, according to Baur, Christianity is incomprehensible outside
of its founder.

But Baur's reason for seeking to maintain the histor-

icity of Jesus is not to present an orthodox position based upon an
historic revelation, nor, specifically, to avoid docetism in his theology.
Rather, it is because he wishes to understand Christianity historically
and believes that Jesus is its sine qua non historical antecedent.

In

his work on the early Church he writes, "When we consider the way in
which Christianity grew up, it is plain that it could have had no place
nor significance in history but for the person of its Founder."105 The
significance of Jesus far Christianity, according to Baur, can not be as
an absolute miraculous beginning of a supernatural revelation.

That

idea does violence to any historical consideration of Christianity,
indeed it lifts it above any historical comprehension whatsoever.

On

this important idea, Baur writess
The historian who approaches his subject imbued with the faith
105F.C. Baur, The Church History of the First Three C~nturies trans.
Allen Menzies {Lomons Williams and Norgate, 1878), p. JS.
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of the Church finds himself confronted at the very outset with
the most stupendous of airacles, the fact which lies at the
root of Christianity being in his eyes that the only-begotten
Son of God descended fro• the eternal throne of the Godhead to
the earth, and became man in the womb of the Virgin. He who

regards this as simply and absolutely a miracle, steps at once
outside of all historical connection. Miracle is an absolute
beginning, and since as such it must needs qualify all that
follows, the whole series of phenomena which fall within the
range of Christianity must bear the same miraculous character.
Historical connection having once been severed at the outse~,
the same interruption of the hfstorical process is equally r
possible at any further point. 06
If Christianity is to be considered historically then every point of its
existence must find its root in history, incl\liing Jesus Christ himself.
But the question naturally arisess

'How does he avoid ma.king Christian-

ity merely a particular historical phenomenon no different than say,
Stoicism or Cynicism?'

Batn"

fourd his solution to this question in

Hegel's philosophy which allowed him to step out of the dualistic natural/
supernatural dichotomy arxi to conceive of both Idea and History as intima.tely connected.

Idea, specifically the Idea of reconciliation which

is the preeminant theme of history for Baur, must find its actualization
in History, thus, Idea and History are intimately connected.

But, at

the same time, Idea never find• its absolute realization in History for
that would bring History to an end and destroy the dialectical relationship of Idea and History.

Therefore, Christianity is truly a fully his-

torical manifestation like Stoicism or Cynicism, but it is superior to
them by virtue of its greater historical actualization of the idea of
reconciliation.

This idea of reconciliation is clearly present in the

consciousness of Jesus but the transaission of this consciousness to his
disciples and on to Christendom comes only through his death on the cross.
106F. C. Baur, The Church History. • • , p. 1.

10)

As Baur examines the gospels and the teachings of Jesus, he finds
tn them the consciousness of reconciliation most explicitly in the moral
realm.

On this point, he writesa

If the Christian is conscious of his absolute standpoint,
he must be able to abstract from himself, from his own ego, and
to know himself as so much one with all others, that he regards
each other man as one who possesses equal rights with himself.
And this is what Jesus means when he says of the requirement we
are speaking of, that it is the law and the prophets, or equivalent to the Old Testament co:mma.nd, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself." He who loves his neighbour as himself must renounce
everything egotistical, subjective, or peculiar to himself; above
the purality of separate subjects, each of whom now is the same
as we are, there· comes to stand the objective universal, where
everything particular and subjective is done away.107
This impulse towards the "objective universal" is, for· Baur, the most
characteristic feature of

t~e

original Christian principle which is recon-

ciliation." "It looks beyond••, writes Baur further, "the outward, the
accidental, the particular, and rises to the universal, the unconditioned,
the essential ... 108

In short, the ethical teaching of Jesus is the prin-

ciple of reconciliation translated into ethics for it, "asserts itself
in the demand to do away with the individual ego by raising it up to the
universal ego, the general self, that humanity which is present and is
identical with itself in every separate individual."109
But as lofty and noble as these moral precepts are, they would not
have entered into general
nation in Jesus.

cons~iousness

had it not been for their incar-

Baur writes:

How soon must all the true and weighty precepts of Christianity
have been num'bered. with the faint echoes of wards spoken by many

1O?F. C • Baur, The Church History • • • , pp. 32-33 •

10~. c, Baur, The Church History. • • , p • )) •
109F.

c. Baur, The Church History ••• , P• JJ.
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a friend of humanity and philosophic sage of ancient times, had n.
not its doctrines been ma.de words of eternal life in the mouth
of its Founder?110
It was the belief of Jesus ':~followers that he was the Messiah, which made

the later birth of Christianity possible, i.e., allowed it to enter on
the pa.th of historical development.

From this beginning, "the conscious-

ness of Jesus was thus taken up by the national consciousness .• rand: enabled
to spread ard become the general consciousness of the world." 111
Baur never conceives of Christianity as su:idenly being born.

It

is rather, the unfolding of an idea which comes to gradual historical
realization.

Every step in this development has its place of importance

in the historical chain and every step is fully historical in nature.
There is, far Baur, no invasion of the Deus ex machina into nature or
history.

This conception of the rise of Christianity determines Baur's

understanding of the resurrection which he considers as a vital link in
the historical chain, but not a powerful enough event in itself to give
rise to the Church.

On the occasion of Jesus death, he writes:

Only two alternatives were possible: either with his death
the faith wli11ch had gathered round him must be extinguished,
or this faith, if it were firm arxi strong enough, must break
through the barrier of death itself, and force its way from
death to life. Nothing but the miracle of the resurrection could
disperse these doubts which threatened to drive away the faith of
the disciples after its object into the eternal night of death.112
Baur will not discuss the nature of reality of thts "miracle" since that
"lies outside the sphere of historical enquiry. 1111 3 In any case, he
11~. C. Baur,The Church History ••• , p. J8.

111 F. C. Ball4,The Church History ••• , p. J9.
112F.

c.

Baur, The Church History ••• , p. 42.

11Jr. c. Baur, The Church History ••• , P• 42.
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notes:

"the view we take of the resurrection is of minor importance for

the history."114 What is important, however, is that "the resurrection
of Jesus became a fact of their consciousness, and was as real to them
as any historical event."115
Notwithstanding the importance of the resurrection event, Baur
still believes it was too narrow to produce the universality of Christiani ty and the Church.

He writes:

Had no new development taken place, the only difference between
the believing disciples and their unbelieving fellow-countrymen
would have been that to the former the Messiah would have been
one who had come already, and to the latter one who was still
to come. The Christian faith would have become the faith of a
mere Jewish sect, in whose keepin~ the whole future of Christianity would have been imperilled.11
What made the 41fference, in Baur's mind was the dialectical conflict in
which the disciples engaged after his death.

It was none other than the

struggle between Paulinism and Judaism, which Baur first believed he had
discerned in the Corinthian epistles, that brought Christianity to its
epitomic development as the universal principle of salvation through a
synthesis of Paulinism and Judaism in the idea of the Catholic Church.
In sum, then, according to Baur, the historic Jesus is essential
to Christianity as the historical embodiment of its original principle .•.
which is reconciliation.

Jesus is fully historical and, therefore, can-

not be the absolute God-Man since the Ideal, while it finds its actuality
114F.

c.

Baur, The Church History ••• , p. 4J.

115F. C. Baur, The Church History ••• , p. 4J.
116F. C. Baur, The Church_Bistory • • • , p.

.
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in History, must never be identified. absolutely with it.117 This conception of the relation of Idea and History is born QUt in Baur's writing
on the Trinity am Incarnations

If the idea once succeeds to its absolute existence in a single,
definite individual, then not merely the drive but also the possibility of actualizing itself in other individuals is taken away
from the idea •••• It is therefore clear that one cannot absolutely say that the idea must become absolutely real in a single,
definite individual. But the relationship of idea aDi reality
also embraces in itself the element of distinction1 and for this
reason idea and reality can never be joined together in such
absolute unity that the idea does not transcend every manifestation given in reality, indeed, every single individual; therefore
the idea can actualize itself only in an infinite series of
individuals. In every single individual the nonbeing of the
idea must also be posited, be it only as a minimum. • • • As
certainly as the idea of humanity must actualize itself, and as
certainly as it is established essentially in the unity of God
and man, just as certainly can it be actualized only by virtue
of the fact that it enters into the consciousness of humanity at
a definite point in a definite individual. However, no matter
how highly in other respects one may place this individual, in
virtue of the idea of this unity which comes to consciousness in
him, he must still stand in a subordinate relationship to the
ideas and a God-man in the sense of ecclesiastical doctrine embraces in itself an irresolvable contradiction,118
Jesus is special because the idea of God-manhood is maximized in Him and,
further, it is through Him that the idea of reconciliation finds historical reality and becomes a part of general human consciousness.

It is by

virtue of his heightened consciousness of the idea of reconciliation.
He lives as but a man, in the flesh, yet his existence is not according
117The absolute identification of Idea and History can only happen,
of course, transhistorica.lly, and as Hodgson has clearly perceived,
this represents Baur's eschatology. (P. C. Hodgson, The Formation of
Historical Theology, p. 105).
118Quoted and translated in P. c. Hodgson, The Formation of Historical Theology, p. 104-105, taken from F. c. Baur, Die Christliche Lehre von
der Dreieini keit urn Menschwerdun Gottes in ihrer Geschichtlichen
Entw1cklung 1. Vol. III Tu ingena c. F. Osiarner, 1 3 , pp. 9 -999.
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to the flesh because he lives conscioua+y _..aoco.rdiJ'.!8·~t;o·::.the~])irit.
Christ's work therefore, is accomplished by bringing the consciousness
of reconciliation to man by submitting himself to the Spirit.

Atonement

for him, is not a substitutionary death in satisfaction of a divine judgment, but rather the reestablishment of an estranged relationship.

The

resurrection means that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself ...

It is not important to ask of the nature and reality of that

event, but only that one understand the meaning of the event and then to
appropriate it by faith.

Through faithful appropriation man enters into

the unity first established in Christ.

Thus, is the atoning work of

Jesus efficacious to deliver man arxl it is the work of his followers to
proclaim this kerygma.

Beyond Christ is the Church which carries out

the idea of reconciliation first demonstrated historically in Jesus,
through historical continuation and development.

The actualization of

the idea of reconciliation is, indeed how the history of the Church is
interpreted by Baur as will be demonstrated in the next ehapter.

Yet,

before proceeding from his Christology on towards his Church history, it
must be emphasized here that the two areas are intimately connected.

In

fact, as Hodgson has stated, "the real clue to Baur's thought is his
historically explicated Christology. ••119 For Baur, there was to be no
separation of New Testament history and Church history.

Christianity,

for him, was a great historical chain which is still in the making, and
therefore, the task of historical criticism is the awesome an:I religious
undertaking of understanding the ongoing revelation of Spirit.

x&semann

indicates this fact in his introduction to Baur's Ausgewanlte Werkes
119p.

c.

Hodgson, The Formation of Historical Theology, p. 213.
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Historisch-kritische Arbeit 1st fUr Baur also ef£ensichlich
mehr als eine ha.ndwerkliche Methcxle,
namlich zutiefst re11g10se
,.
Au:fgabe und das Medium religioser Vergewisserung. Denn sie
1st die sachliche Entsprechung der geschichtlichen Offenba.rung
als einer Anrede an den zum Glauben gerufenen Menschen, n&mlich
das adaquate Horen und Verstehen der Offenba.rung, soweit sie
bisher in der Vergangenhei t erging. Historische Kri tik ist die
Funktion des lebendigen Glaubens auf seinem Wege aus bewul3t
gewordener Verga.ngenheit in die eigene Gegenwart und Zukunft,
welche eben diese Vergangenheit in den ubergreifenden Zusammenhang der Gesamtgeschichte stellt.120
In this statement, K&semenn has captured the true spirit of Baur's theological and historical work.

It was natural for Baur to arrive at a

comprehensive treatment of Church history at the end of his life.

All

of his work on the early Church brought him to a dynamic conception of
history, to an awareness of history as a growing organism.

The earlier

works had convinced him that the message of Christianity, i.e. reconciliation, had aeen its beginning in Jesus, yet he did not believe the
Church was simply a static institution born out of one single event.
To him the Church was fully involved in the historic process and as such
had its own distinct message in every successi;ve epoeh.

The task of the

historian of the Church and theology was to uncover that message, not only
as it had occured in the past,,but as it was occuring in his own present
as well.

This conception of the Church became the foundation of his

criticism of the writing of Church history and the formal basis for his
wwn reconstruction of Church history.

120rn the Intrcxluction to F.C. Baur's Ausgewablte Verke vol. I,
p. xix.

CHAPI'ER IV

BAUR ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
CHRISTIAN DOGMA AND THE CHURCH
Baur came to the consideration and writing of Church history toward
the end of his life, yet to a great extent ,J ·history was the problem he
was addressing throughout his entire career.

It is only in the light of

his overriding concern with history, that Baur's work is properly understood, ard, tfurther, all of his work prior to his actual treatment of
Church history can be considered as the acquisition of equipment for this
final crowning achievement.

Otto Pfleiderer, one of Baur's earliest

sttdents, wrote in memory of him:
Baur war zum Historiker geboren: eine ungepure Arbeitsk:raft,
ein vortreffliches Gedachtnis, ein k:ritischer Verstand., der s1ch
be1 keinen zweifel hasten Ueberlieferungen beruhigte, ein scharfer
Spli:rsinn, dem auch die Bedeutung des scheinba.r Xleinen nicht
entging, und. eine geniale Combinations gabe, die das Entlegenste
zusammenzuschauen und in dem Ma.nnigfaltigen der geschichtlichen
Erscheinungen die Einheit der beherrschenden Idee, den treibenden
und leitend.en Geist einer Zeit zu endecken wuBte,--das war die
••
Ausrustung
Baurs zu seinem Beruf als theologischer Kritiker und
Historiker .1

As has been earlier discussed, Baur was greatly indebted to three philosophers, Schelling, Schleier:ma.cher,
standing of history

am

am

Hegel, for his conceptual under-

its relationship to Idea.

From Schelling, Baur

derived a fundamental perception of history as revelation itself ,;a
perception which effectively began to undermine his earlier supernatural
10tto Pfleiderer, "Zu Ferdinand Christian Baurs Gedachtnis, ''
Protestantische Kirchenzeit
fUr das evan lische Deutschland,
XXXIX: 25 June, 892 , p. 5,
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view•point.

Schleiermacher's philosophy strengthened Baur in his

idealistic views and taught hia to understand consciousness as the
essence of religion.

However, Baur never read either of these philoso-

. phers uncritically, notwithstanding their tremendous influence upon him
at his most formative stage of scholarly development.
on the work of these two

me~

as too subjective.

Later, Baur looked

From Hegel, Baur derived

a mcxlel· in which both History and Idea, both Subjectivity and Objectivity
were considered in close relation without either taking precedence.

Idea

and History appeared in dialectical relationship to one another a.nd together were considered as the means by which the development of the Spirit's self-consciousness becomes actual.

For Baur, Hegel's model was

the key for understanding the Church historically, and as Pfleiderer
remarks, it was Baur's application of the Hegelian model to the Church
and dogma.tic development which "1st das epochemachende Verdienst Ba.urs."2

Still, as in the case of Schelling's and Schleiermacher's philosophies,
Baur did not simply borrow Hegel's philosophy and use
own purposes.

it~

priori for his

He recognized that he could learn something from Hegel's

speculative approach, am was therefore willing to listen to Hegel's
views.

But, at the same time, both by admission and personal scholarly

example, Baur demonstrated that his ultimate commitment was to the truth
of the facts, particularly the historical facts, and that, further, he
would not allow any overly-subjective speculative approach to obscure
the facts of history.

Thus, Baur-!s ideas on Church history and histot-

ical theology, while unquestionably influenced. by the idealistic
philosophies of Romanticism, are still uniquely his own, as Baur always
20tto PflH.derer, "Zu Ferdinam Christian Baurs Geci&chtnis," p. 567.
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sought to maintain his scholarly distance from!:. priori systems.
In considering Baur's historical theology and Chllreh history, the
following discussion will focus on two works of major importance, the
Introduction to Lectures on the History of Christian Dogma., for his
thought on the history of dogma, and The Epochs of Church Historiography,
for his thought on the writing of Church history.3

In this chapter, the

concern is not the actual production of Church hist0ry or historical
theology, but rather Baur's conception of the historiography of these
two fields including·such things as his general philosophy of history as
applied to the church, but also, more practically, his periocliza.tion of
Church historiography.

His thought on the development of dogma will be

treated first, since it represents his earlier thought, but also because
he considers theology to be the inner key to an understanding of Church
history.
BAUR ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMA
To begin with, Baur conceives of the history of dogma as but the
inner aspect of a historical individual, i.e., Christianity whose outer
aspect is the Church.

History of dogma, therefore, is prior to the insti-

tutional Church am is placed above the institutional aspects of the
Church since, "Everything external has its basis in the internal life
from which it proceeds."4 Yet both the history of dogma and the

3r

will be using P. c. Hodgson's translations of these two works
which are found 1n his book Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of
Church History. All quotation will be taken from this work, and will be
cited as LHD for the Introduction to Lectures on the History of Christian
Dogma and Epochs, for The Epochs of Church Historiography.

4LHD, p. 262.
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institutional Church are considered as only different aspects of Church
history.

History of dogma is therefore defined as "that discipline which

enables us to see into this inner aspect of Church life aJXi which ac-

qUA.ints us with the

~ourse

of the api!'itua.1 movement to which the external

phenomena. are attributable as their ultimate ba.sis."5 The inner aspect
of the Church which Baur indicates here, is in no way a static principle
like the Vincentian quod ubique, quod semper, __ quod ab ominibus creditum
est.

That is the very principle Baur wishes to avoid because of its

fundamental supernaturalistic foundation.

Rather, he considers the inner

aspect of Christianity, i.e. dogma, to be radically historical.

Dogma.tics

always ends in the history of dogma, because each age has its own common
eonsciousness and must therefore write its own dogma.tics.

He writes:

The inescapable fate of dogma.tics is that it continually
reverts to the history of dogma, which here discloses itself
in its all-embracing power--a power that masters dogma.tics.
But dogma.tics already appears in a deperxlent relation to the
history of dogma because it cannot be orientated to its substantial content--namely, what is publicly received arxi fixed
in the total consciousness of the time--except from the standpoint of the history of dogma. It must have sufficien~ly broad
recourse to history to obtain a firm basis for itself.
Because the history of dogma is a continually flowing and changing
historical phenomenon, it has not been written correctly until it has
been traced up to its present form.
Just as history in its own objective course is a never-resting
movement, so historical reflection and presentation cannot stop
at any point until it has reached the final phase of development
in the present. To terminate the whole at any earlier point
that might be established would only be an arbitrarj.ly determined
suspension which in the nature of the case could not be justified.?
That the appropriate terminus ad quem for a history of dogma is the

5LHD, p. 262.

6LHD, p. 265.

7LHD, p. 271.
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present does not mean that the past is unimportant, for the idea of
Christianity has been working itself out in all periods of the history
of dogma, and the imividual stages of this past provide a perspective

from which to understand the present.
Concerning the

terminus~

it begins with Uesus.

quo of the history of dogma., Baur believes'

But, as has been noted earlier, Jesus does not

represent the absolute beginning from above, and thus the unchanging
element within the temporality of the history of dogma.

For although in

Jesus the idea of Christianity finds its first concrete expression and
thereby enters into history, this event does not happen from above.
Rather, what Jesus teaches emerges out of history through his higher
consciousness of Spirit, and, therefore, this teaching itself is a historical question.
This does not eliminate the concept of revelation, according to
Baur, but rather reconceptua.lizes it to avoid the dualism attend.ent upon
supernattn""alism.

Baur normally does not use the term •revelation" in

his writings, no doubt because he fears he will be misumerstood.

Yet,

when he does nse it, it is in a special sense as the self-manifestation
of the Absolute Spirit inaod to the finite human spirit.
self," he writes, "is

ess~ntially

"Religion it-

a relation of Spirit to Spirit, in

which Spirit mediates itself with itself through the activity of thinking. "8 And furthers
Revelation is an act of Spirit in which an objective reality
confronts subjective consciousness as an immediate given, and
becomes for the subject the object of a faith whose content is
the Absolute Idea. Moved by the power of the Absolute Idea, the
entire thinking activity of the subject feels the compulsion to
become absorbed into this objective reality, given as an immediate

Bum,

P• 297.
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divine power, in order to bring its content into consciousness-as it were, to lay it out in all its components for the representative consciousness.9
Within this process there is a certain sense of givenness which can be
classified as revelation but it is not the objective revelation of a God
staming outside of the world who merely presents it to man.

Man, because

he finitely•partakes of the Absolute Spirit, knows revelation through the
historical manifestation of reconciliation in Jesus.
tion is something which happens within history.

Therefore, revela-::

This view, is akin to

the romantic conception of religion as it was developed by Schleiermacher
but Baur goes beyond him by drawing on Hegel and developing a concept of
history as the concrete actualization of Spirit.
It is primarily his concept of revelation which allows for the
possibility of religion apart from subjective philosophy, yet philosophy
and religion are couterpa.rts in the manifestation of Spirit.

He writes:

Religion and philosophy, as two forms of the manifestation
of Spirit, are implicitly identical in the nature of Spirit but
are essentially different in the form of their manifestation.
It is characteristic of religion that Spirit knows the truth
which is the content of religion only as something received,
something abso]Jltely given--an external revelation which, even
though it contains nothing in contradiction to thinking reason,
nevertheless has at least its historical origin outside of reasons
arxi on this account it exists only in the form of representation,
as something immediate, which is not yet mediated with thinking
consciousness. In philosophy, on the other hand, Spirit knows the
truth as something immanent to itself, as the result of its own
thinking.10
Baur's basic critique of Schelling and Schleiermacher was centered. upon
their overly-subjective approach to truth.

In his own terms, it was

their over-emphasis on the finite hWR&n connection to Spirit.

Religion,

specifically Christianity, as interpreted by Baur, however, corrects

9LHD, p. 298.

_, p. 320.
10um
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this imbalance by its assertion that the truth is not simply within :aa.n
but rather comes to him apart from his subjective reason, in an historical event which confronts man's subjective
own being.

consciousness-ifi~th:.-Ui.ith· of.~.11.s

Thus, Christianity is the answer to subjectivism and brings

subjectivism in proper relation to object.

Accarding to Baur, it consists:

In a revolution out of subjectivity into the objective, into
Being itself, Le., a return to God. Consequently, Christianity
appeared in the world not as philosophy but as religion. As
divine revelation in the form of religion it was something absolutely given, which in its immediacy could be the object not
of thinking and knowing but above all only of faith. Thus
Christian dogma has its starting point in faith. It is itself
faith in a representational modes and all thinking connected with
dogma. has its final, determinative principle ~i3-Y in faith,
regardless of how free it might otherwise be,
The above comments on Baur's concept of revelation represent his
essential critique of rationalism.

Ultimately, he sees it as too sub-

jective and failing to properly relate itself to its object.

On the

other hand, Baur knows full well the danger of an overly-objective approach
which can only lead to Confessionalism.
opted for a specul&tive methodology.
tive and subjective.

This is preceisely why Baur

The process of dogma is both objec-

It is objective because it is truth given to ma.n's

consciousness by the absolute truth of Infinite Spirit, a truth which is
demonstrated. in the historical person of Jesus Christ.

It is subjective

because the task of dogma is to translate belief from mere assent into a
faith response whereby absolute Spirit comes dialectically to greater
self-knowledge through its encounter with finite Spirit.

He writes:

The whole aovement of dogma proceeds between two mutually
opposing points, which should be brought together in the union
of objectivity and subjectivity. On the one hand stands dogma
in its objective truth before Spirit, whose task is to assimilate

11.IJm' p. :329.
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it into its subjective consciousness and to become ever more
certain of its content1 on the other hand, the absolute truth
of dogma can only correspond to the equally absolute certainty
of the subject within himself. Between these two poles the
entire movement of dogma. takes place as the unending work of

Spirit struggling with itself, aspiring toward a free selfconsciousness in the absolute content of dogma. Every new
configuration of dogma is a new attempt by Spirit to become
more certain of truth, to take deeptr and more comprehensive
possession of the content of dogma. 2
To sum up the discussion thus far, Baur holds a very broad view of the
content of the history of dogma.

He begins the history of dogma with

the teaching of Jesus and the New Testament, because to set them apart
as unchanging, as transhistorical, is to set a precedent for the severence
of the historical process at still a later point.

This had been the

major problem of the Catholic understanding of the history of dogma
which, he says, considers the "external manifestation of dogma. as the
essence of the subject matter itself, whereas dogma can have its true,
vital unity only in Spirit, which is objectified in dogma."13

On the

other end of the historical continuum, the terminus ad quem for the
history of dogma is the present dogmatic situation.

Thus, the history

of dogma does not come to an end with the Ref ormati on, according to Baur.
This is because, for him, dogma is not limited to the official creeds,
confessions and symbols of the Church, but rather incltdes the whole
history of Christian thought.

"The term "dogmas" means the doctrines

or teachings of the Christian faith, insofar as they contain the absolute
Christian truth."14 Therefore, the history of dogma is an ongoing story
because the iqea of Christianity is still being historically worked out.
This idea, and with it, the history of dogma., will only find its telos

12LHD, PP• J05-Jo6

1JIBD, p. )62.

14LHD, p. 269
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beyond history.

Baur believes that Protestantism, in its opposition to

Catholicism's objectivism, is always in danger of subjectivism.

While

both views have their individual strengths, neither is adequate in itself
to produce a balanced conception of the histary of dogma,

And that is

why Baur presents his idealistic conception of the history of dogma,
because in his thinking, it provides both for unity (the Catholic principle)
and diversity (the Protestant principle).

He writes:

Just as the Catholic view of history, in conformity with its
principle, cannot move beyond the substantial unity of dogma, so
on the opposite side the Protestant view could only lose the substantial unity of dogma by dissolving it into the endless mulU.plicity of individual representations ani beliefs; the whole of
the history of dogma. appears to fall into subjectivity. An objective view of history can therefore only be one that remains
equally far from the bias of both extreme arxl is able to conceive
the two divergent tendencies in their inner freedom as two
correlative sides of the same spiritual process. The more that
further treatments of the history of dogma succeed in detecting
this process, based on the nature of Spirit, in the historical
course of dogma, and in bringing it to clear perception, the
more they will thereby fulfill their scientific conception,15
Baur believed that the development of Catholicism and subsequently
Protestantism were but stages in the development of the synthetic concaption of the histary of dogma which, in his own day, was coming to
realization.

Thus, according to him, the ver:y course of the history of

dogma itself, apart from its intellectual substance, had meaning.

He

writess
The entire history of dogma is a continual procession of Spirit
in never ending conflict with itself, never able to become truly
one with itself1 it is a constant binding and loosening, a neverresting work in which Spirit, like Penelope, continually unravels
its own web, only to begin again anew. No sooner does it impose
15This quote is taken from P. Hodgson,Ferdinand Christian Baur on
the Writing of Church History, p • .'.363 in footnote #44. It was taken and
translated from Baur's Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte {3rd
ed., Leipzig, 1867), pp. 55-58, and was probably written before Baur
wrote his Lectures on the History of Dogma..
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upon itself a limiting and determining authority, thus binding
itself, then it desires to be free, to withdraw from that authority.
Whatever, under the compulsion of its internality, it has produced
from within in order to become objective to itself, will at just
that point have been outgrown. It will have become an external
and alien force, and all the efforts of Spirit must now be directed
toward reintegrating that force into itself', so ~s to regain its
power and be internally reconciled with itself .1
In the first stage of the history of dogma "Spirit becomes objective to
itself., It distinguishes itself from itself, issues forth from itself
by means of that distinction, confronts itself as an other distinquished
from itself ."17 Historically this means that the first period of the
history of dogma is characterized by "dogmatic assertions.,: doctrinal
determinations, and propositions of faith, all propounded as incontestable truths."18

It is the period of definition and confession, of

councils and conciliar proceeding, whereby dogma becomes an external
concrete body of defined propositions of faith set forth by the phenomenal Church.

Initially, this process emerges out of the religious

consciousness of the subjeet himself.

Thus,

As the subject surrenders himself to the compulsion that moves
his religious consciousness, as with all his power he enters into
and objectifies himself in dogma, and as he finds himself thereby
internally satisfied, he can also---once dogma. obtains this determinate form---come to know himself as one with it, for the
simple reason that the formation given to dogma is taken entirely
.from what the subject already possesses in himself • 1 9

Yet, as this process progresses, the subject inters increasingly into
bondage to the object of religious consciousness.

"The more the subject

objectifies himself in dogma in order to enter into it, the more he
surrenders hts own freedom to it."20 The process through which dogma
comes to its specific formulation, has the effect of investing it with
16LHD, p. JOO.

17LHD, p. 298.

19Lffn, p. 299.

2

~ p. 299.

18LHD. p. 299,
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an unchanging authority and therefore it ceases to move along with the
reflective mind.

What itself was generated out of the religious con-

sciousness of the subject, now becomes a confining barrier, which confines
theological thought to within prescribed limits.

The result, according

to Baur, is thats
Since dogma confronted him in all the determinations that were
regarded as so essential, it became the opposing limit that he
was not permitted. to transgress, and by which he could only feel
himself restrictr{ the more he became aware that it was a purely
arbitrary limit.2
The reflective mind becomes increasingly restive in its bordage to
external object, i.e. dogma, am begins to seek a way of mediation between
objective dogma am himself.

Here, the second stage has already

commenced.
Historically, Baur associated the secorxl stage in the history of
dogma with the Scholastic movement of the twelfth century.

At this time,

he writes:
Since dogma had become so firm and objective a power in the
authority of the Church ••• the subject had now to feel himself
driven to oppose dogma with all the energy of his self-consciousness, in an e22ort to see the extent to which he was in a position
to master it.

On this point Baur provides a glimpse of his view of the dialectic at
work in the history of dogma.

Subject (thesis), in the first period,

gives birth to Object (antithesis) and finally Subject, confronted by
Object, firds a way of mediation with it whereby both become synthetically
related.

Baur identified this dialectical process with the Absolute

Spirit, thus his philosophy of history is ultimately idealistic, yet
it is not abstractly so because it is ultiaately history itself which
provides the dynamic for the dialectic and, further, provides the means
21IJID, p. 300.

22IJID, p. 301.
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by which Spirit comes to increasingly greater self-awareness.

Su11ject

always has within it the aspiration to mediate Object, yet that could
only be accomplished if Subject is first drawn "back from the overwhelming pressure toward objectifying himself in dogma.. 11 23 This
happens historically through the process described in period one of the
history of dogma. and through this process the dialectic receives a
dynamic impetus to complete its cycle.

"It was thus now legitimate to

try to maintain the freedom of the subject against the predominance of

dogma. n24
Scholasticism is the historical signal for stage two.

Baur writesz

The major point of view under which Scholasticism must be .·
placed is precisely the endeavor, which lies at the basis of all
its major manifestations, to remove dogma from the externality
and immediacy it possessed as an absolute given, resting on the
bare authority of ecclesiastical faith, and to place it in subjective consciousness, to mediate it with consciousness.25
In the Scholastic period, knowledge becomes parallel to faith although
not above it.

Thus, the Scholastic method of theology is primarily to

demonstrate the truth inherent in Church dogma through the systematic
application of reason.

This is, according to Baur, "a very significant

progression of Spirit,"26 but, though its dynamic is "the liberation of
self-consciousness in its relation to dogma,"27 it is ultimately impotent
to achieve the realization of this dynamic.

Dogma ultimately retains

its externality along with its autonomous authority, .. simply a thing
absolutely given, a solid, impenetrable authority into which the subject
could never enter with the power of his self-consciousness ••• an
absolute presupposition beyond which Spirit could not move."28 What
2 JLHD , p. J01.

24LHD, p. J01.

25LHD, p. 301.

26LHD, p. J02.

27LHD, p. )02.

28LHD, p. )02.
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Scholasticism aspired to find is realized in the Reformation.
Historically, the Reformation represents the transition from stage
two to stage three.

At this point the Subject does not merely stand

abreast with dogma, rather, he must stand above it in jmgment.

"Nor,"

writes Baur, "should one hesitate to break completely with dogma the
moment it appeared simply to be untrue and irrational to thinking reason
or religious consciousness, or antithetical to religious interests."29
The principle on which the truth of dogma rests undergoes a radical
change in this period from authority to the divine authority of sola
.scriptura.

And thus,

through the Ref o:rmation the subject obtained for the first
time the consciousness of his freedom, or the freedom of his
self-consciousness, in relation to dogma. Dogma no longer confronted him in its externality and with the externally imposed
authority of ecclesiastical doctrine1 rather, it derived its
significance only from the subject's knowing himself to be internally at one with divine truth, which he recognized as the
essential content of dogma.JO
But, Baur notes, the cycle is still incomplete because the principle
embod.ie~

in the Reformation, i.e. that the constitutive principle of the

history of dogma rests with the free subject, is unable to penetrate into
the general consciousness because many still "held all the mose firmly
to the old principle of authority, and wanted to know nothing of a
liberation of the subject from the bonds of ecclesiastical authority."31
Thus, the final outcome of stage two is the antithesis between Catholocism
and Protestantism, yet the Reformation is not simply the end of stage
two, it also represents a transitional stage toward stage three.

This

transition is worked-out through a greater realization and application of
29LHD, p. JOJ.

30LHD, p. 304.

31LHD,

P•
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the Protestant principle.

One thing that Protestantism accomplishes

which works toward this realization, is the demolition of the aedieva.l
bifurcation of knowledge into two separate ca.tagories; philosophical,
He writesa

and theological.

What in the Middle Ages was for so long held as the highest
axiom--that there exists a double truth, one truth for theology,
another for philosophy--must increasingly be discounted de facto
as a false assumption. As certainly as there is only one truth,
so must the antithesis between theology and philosophy increasingly be resolved and transcended.32
This method of the use of philosophy in theology is, as has been discussed,
Baur's own method.

It is the only approach which will result in a syn-

thesis of Object and Subject and the penetration of this synthesis into
the general consciousness.

This does not mean, for Baur, a reversal of

the Protestant principle, rather, it is a more radical and truer application of it.

Speculative method in theology is not only the logical

outcome of the Reformation and the Protestant principle, it is also,
according to Baur, the only hope far a new synthesis which will transcend the antithesis of Catholic and Protestant and issue in a new general
religious consciousness.33 The following quote, which is Baur's concluding statement in the Lectures ••• , not only serves as a good summary
statement with which to close this discussion of Baur's views of the history of dogma but also gives an inside view of

h~s

hope for what a specu-

lative approach could do for a new religious consciousness transcending
~ LIID, p.

305.

331 consider Baur to be a prophet of the later ecumenical movement,
although he was in his own time, almost a "voice crying in the wilderness." Baur, at this early date, anticipated many of the issues of the
later ecumenical debate and·in his insights on the question of doctrinal
development and the nature of the Church, also anticipated some of its
proposed solutions.
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Catholicism and Protestantism.
Hence only fran the speculative standpoint can we perceive
in the history of dogma. and in the multiplicity of its contents
a unity, the unity of a moving principle. For this reason, this
speculative mode of reflection belongs essentially to the Protestant conception of the history of dogma--but not the Protestant
conception as long as it sees in the history of dogma only that
which is singular, contingent, arbitrary, subjective, constantly
changing and moving in colorful disarray. This is merely the
rationalistic view and is no less one-sided--only in an opposite
direction--than the Catholic. The one-sided, restricted, and
limited character of these two opposing and mutually self-negating
vantage points can be transcended only in the Absolute of the
speculative conception. This alone can be the goal of the further
development of our science. The task of my previous efforts in
the field of the history of dogma was to guide our discipline
increasingly toward this goal. In these lectures I would also
hope to keep the same task constantly in view.34
BAUR ON THE WRITING OF CHURCH HISTORY
Baur's consideration of the writing of Church history was developed
in connection with his ideas on the history of dogma just surveyed.

His

main concern overall in both the Lectures ••• , and the Epochs ••• , was
to demonstrate the inadequacies of either an exclusively supernaturalistic methodology or an exclusively rationalistic methodology in the writing
of the history of dogma and Church history.

The idea that one's theo-

logical viewpoint will determine the method of writing Church history is
still present in the !;poohs ••• , and further, the problem· of subjective
consciousness coming to know objective consciousness remains the found.ational problem for history.

Yet, in the Epochs ••• , the discussion

centers not so much on the relation of Subject and Object, but rather on
Idea and Manifestation in Church history.

The key to correctly perceiving

the Church historically is to understand. its moving Idea as it has been
manifested in history.

34L}ID '

p.

J64 •

The Church historian goes wrong when he misper-
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ceives this Idea of the Church because of his own theological orientation.
Characteristically, Baur begins his discussion by establishing that
"history has both an objective and a subjective meaning", and therefore:

"History is both what has happened objectively and the subjective knowledge of what has happened."35 Therefare, history is not directly accesible to the subject, as if he were a mere observer, or mirror, of history
wie es eigentlich gewesen 1st.
relation is

considered~

"The more precisely", he writes, "this

the less can it simply be assumed that historical

presentation is nothing but the true, adequate reflection· of what objectively has happened. ••J6 The answer to this dilemma. is not, according to
Baur, simply a closer exam'ination of the facts.
only obscure the true Idea of history.

Such an approach will

Rather what the historian must

do is step back from the facts of history to view them in their wider
context.

This "stepping-back" from history is accomplished through spec-

ulation.

"The truth itself thus emerges in something like genuine objec-

tivity only through the comparison of various possible standpoints, from
each of which must be removed whatever has too subjective a character."37
These preliminary comments on history in general, apply as well to
the history of the Christian Church, in fact, "the nature of historical
presentation becomes all the clearer when its task consists in setting
forth the objectively given for subjective consciousness",38 within the
Christian faith.

The process whereby this setting forth of "the objec-

tively given for subjective consciousness", is not to be accomplished
through an examination of all the manifestations of the Church down through
35Epochs, p. 46.
38Epochs, p. 47.

36Epochs, p • 46 •

37Epochs , p • 47 •
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history and then abstracting the moving Idea and end out of which, and
toward which, the Church is moving.

Such an approach is too subjective

and will result in reading meaning back into the history of the Church.
Rather, Baur proposes:
Everything proceeds from a starting point in which the Idea
that is to be realized through its entire temporal manifestation
is clearly and definitely expressed; and once initiated, the
development proceeds from one point to another in a continuity
in which it should not be difficult to relate everything individual to the Idea that is the basis of the whole, or to determine
the relation in which one thing stands to another.39
Thus, as seen earlier, the key to the historical understanding of the
Christian Church goes back to the life of its founder, Jesus.
recognized

But, Baur

as demonstrated through his awareness of the subjective as-

pect of hi!tory, that one cannot simply go back to the life of Jesus
since this also is a fully historical question and thus is itself subject
to the problems of historical understanding.

Therefore, the real issue

in the writing of Church history is not from which historical point its
development is to be understood, that can only be from its beginning
point.
stood?

Rather, the question is; How is that beginning point to be under1
•

"All the difficulties to be overcome by a historical presentation,"

he writes "are concentrated in the beginning itself ."40
The history of the Church, then, is to be explained not simply
materially, by an outward description of its changing institutions, but
rather ideologically, because the actual production of one's Church history is so determined.

He writess

Just as the Church, which at the beginning was at unity with
itself, split asurxier and divided into the great antithesis of
Protestantism and Catholicism; and just as other religious parties
39Epochs, pp. 47-48.

4~pochs, p • 48.

126
appeared in addition to the Protestant Church, as well as views
that emerged within the Protestant Church itself, deviating more
or less from orthodox doctrine and claiming for themselves the
same title to the Protestant principle--so also all these differences embrace equally numerous and varied points of view from
which the ea11re development of the Christian Church could be
understood.
There are many different theological perspectives, and consequently,
there are many different views on

th~

history of the Church, such as the

Catholic, Protestant, supernatural, and rationalistic views.

Yet Baur

believes, these approaches have "outlived their usefulness, having each
evolved to a degree that oversteps the antithesis between the two.•.4 2
This view of the obsolescence of each of these methods of considering
Church history is, of course, based on Baur's own conception of the process of Church history, which understands each of these views as themselves as but the manifestation of the Spirit in history.

And once again

is manifested Baur's conception of ma.n's radical historicity, and thus,
his connection with the Absolute Spirit.

Thus, he writesa

Takep together, all these attempts, representing the various
possible points of view in particular historical presentations,
form the epochs of Church historiography, in whose course the
Spirit working in the depths and struggling toward the solution
of its task has raised itself, at first gradually, to the level
on which it stands in the present mode of perception. 4 3
It was therefore, Bau:r's task to examine the various points of view on
Church history through a sttdy of individual Church historians, in order
to gain a historical perspective on how the original Idea of Christianity
had developed in the manifestation of the Church and finally to argue
for a new conception of writing Church history which would transcend
these now obsolete methods.
41Epochs, p. 48.

42Epochs, p. 48.
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The first section of his historiography of Church history, Baur
entitles "The Old Catholic View of History a Euaebius and His Successors".
Baur chooses to begin with Eusebius rather than to begin with the gospels
or Acts, to avoid getting entangled with questions of New Testament
criticism, even though, as already pointed out, he regards the history of
Christianity as beginning with the life of Jesus or the gospels.

The

whole period is the story of the development of the dualism which emerges
out of a supernat\ll"'al world-view.

This development is most clearly seen

in Eusebius' conception of the beginning point of Church history.

He

writes:
A conception of Church history such as Eusebius, which is in
principle so dogmatic that it makes the dogma of the divinity
of Christ its starting point, must regard dogma in general as
the substantial content of the history of Christianity. If the
divine Logos has become man in order to proclaim the
{saving dogma), then everything depends upon the pure and
unfalsified ~servation of the teaching delivered by Christ and
the apostles.
Ba\ll"' finds in this view the understanding of dogma as that which was
"once delivered", as absolute divine truth, and, therefore, transhistorical.

The effect of this view upon the writing of Ch'ln"'ch history is

that, a lately developed orthodoxy, which has emerged out of a historical
process of theology, goes back and condemns the very historical figures
who contributed in one way or another to the development of that orthodoxy.

The result of this method is to surround dogma, as defined by the

later Church councils, with an aura of absolute authority and to read
this "orthodoxy" back into Church history as well as project it into
the future.

Each time that theological ideas are measured by this ortho-

doxy and jl.Xlged by· its confines, the myth of its absoluteness becomes
44Epochs, p.

58.
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stronger.

Thuss

While dogma remains always the same and represents in its
whole temporal manifestation only the pure apostolic tradition,
the heresies form a self-composed sequence of continually changing phenomena, which in their continual reaction to dogma only
serve to place the eternal unshakable truth of the latter in a
vivid light.45
This dualistic nature of Eusebius' Church history also emerges, according
to Baur, in his concept of history itself which is portrayed not as an
organic flowing whole, but rather as the conflict between two forces,
good and evil.

On this he observes:

The content of history as a whole is by no means an immanent
development proceeding through various phases that mutually
condition one anothera it is simply a conflict of hostile powers
between which no reconciliation and settlement, no fluid transition mediate~ by the inner nature of the subject matter itself,
is possible. 6
Baur traces this dualistic view initiated by Eusebius through the course
of the ancient world and very quickly through the Middle Ages which, he
claims, "possessed a historical sense only insofar as it was necessary
to continue the thread of the historical transmission of events.•47
This lack of historical sense, which reaches its epitomic development in
the Middle Ages, is best illustrated. by the false decretals of Isidore,
in which "pa.st and present were identified. outright, and what belonged
to the present was believed to exist for the first time in its true historical significance when it had been given the character of a tradition
from the past •..48 The signal for the end of such lack of historical
sense, Baur sees in Lorenzo Valla's discovery that the Donation of
Constantine, which had been among the false
45Epochs, p. 60.

4~pochs, p. 78.

46Epochs, p. 62.

de~etals,

was an utter

47Epochs, pp. 77-78.
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forgery.

And

he states;

"With this a beginning had already been made

in tearing away the veil that lay upon the historical consciousness of
the Middle Ages."49

With the Reformation comes an essentially different conception of
Church history which, in Baur's thinking, becomes the antithesis to the
Catholic view.

The Catholic view had asserted that within the true

Church, there had occurred no change nor development.

Therefore, it

represented the true Church because it could historically trace its continuity with the early Church.

The Reformation denies such a continuity

on the grounds that the Catholic Church has deviated from the original
Christian idea, that it, in short, has been subject to the historical
process and has undergone change.

On this antithesis, Baur writes:

For Catholicism, actually, there is so little sense of historical
becoming that it regards what has developed temporally as something
that has been from the beginning. But in Protestantism there arose
for the first time a truly historical consciousness of the Church,
such that it cannot accept the origin and the continuation of the
Church as simply identical but must keep them separate in their
essential differ.ence. It sees in the history of the Christian
Church an ever more radical alteration--and only of such a sort
by which the Church has moved ever further away from what, in
accord with its Idea, it ought to be.50
But, granting that such a development did in:leed take place, the task
still remained to demonstrate how this had proceeded historically.

The

task became urgent because of the antithetical claim of the Catholic
absolute claim over against the Protestant absolute denial, and the historical consciousness which emerged out of this conflict aow proceeded
in a critical fashion.

"The basic principles of the Reformation",

writes Baur, "could not be maintained, nor the objections and reproaches
49Epochs , p. 78 •

5~pochs, p. 80.
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of opponants refuted, without returning to history and demonstrating
from it the justification of the newly won point of view."51

And, there-

fore, he concludes, it "lay in the interest of the Reformation itself to

bring ever more clearly into consciousness the special view of history on
which it rested ... 52
The great Protestant work which answered the need for such a justification of its new view of Church history was, according to Baur, found
in the Magdeburg Centuries, a work conceived by reformer Matthias Flacius
Illyricus (1520-1575) and designed to show the historical process of the
Catholic Church in order to remove the myth of apostolic continuity which
the Church was claiming.

"No other Church historical work," Baur testi-

fied, "was to have been initiated, and carried through as far as it went,
with such a clear awareness of the task that Church history in general,
must perform, and in accord with so definite and methodical a plan."53
Essentially, the Centuries conceived of Church history as an
ing apostasy by the Roipan Church from true Christianity.

ever.~increas

The Papacy was

seen as the pernicious center of this ongoing development and further,
as Antichrist itself.

Therefore, the history of the Church was a criti-

cal task which consisted. in "the rigorous tracking of the Anti-Christiani ty "from its very beginnings through its gradual growth up to the point
at which it found in Protestantism the opponant by whose resistence its

power was broken." 54
Even though the Protestant view of Church history up to the time of
the Reformation was manifestly reflective of a higher historical
51Epochs, p. 80.

52Epochs, pp. 80-81.

53Epochs, p. 8).

54Epochs, p.
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consciousness, and represented in this consciousness an antithetical
view to the Catholic position, still it was just as biased as the older
view.

Actually, the Protestant view, reflected in the Centuries, was

just as dualistic as the Catholic view even though the symbols of light
and darkness had been reversed.

He writes:

Where for Catholicism the luminous aspect of history is to be
found, Protestantism sees only darkness, and vice versa. But
when light and darkness, truth and error, confront each other
once and for all in such sharp antithesis, fundamentally it
makes no difference for historical reflection whether the two
parts of the antithesis are related in one manner or another.
This whole way of viewing things is dualistic, and in the final
analysis it has its roots in a basic conceBtion that is purely
dogmatic, either on one side or the other.55
The Catholic view, as expressed in Eusebius, saw the story of Church
history as a struggle between gocxl and evil, in which the Church represented the good, the Devil represented the evil.

Within this view, the

Church is harrassed by evil, as for example seen in the martyrdom of the
early Christians, but evil never overcomes the good.

The Protestant view

antithetically sees the evil principle in the Church itself, and the good
only in the early Church before the rise of Catholicism and further in
those throughout the course of Church history who have kept themselves
pure from the stain of the Roman Church.

Thus, the Protestant view,

which envisions the Church as invisible and existing in its perfection
from the beginning, merely surviving through its struggle with the Roman
Papacy and hierarchy, is not essentially different from the Catholic
view which identified itself with the early Church in institutional
continuity throughout the course of history.

The only difference here

is that Catholicism regards itself as the true Church and therefore
55Epochs, pp. 91-92.
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exempt from the historical process while Protestantism regards Catholicism as the realm of Antichrist and can, therefore, be shown to have a
history of wickedness.

But the result is what is important for Baur, 1.e.

that a new critical historical consciousness is injected into the writing
of Church history which will later bear fruit in the dissolution of all
dualisms in hist·orical thinking.
But before the process of this dissolution could begin, another
stage had to be reached in the conception of Church historiography which
would demonstrate the inadequacy of both of these dualistic systems.
This stage was accomplished, according to Baur, through the influence of
Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714), whose thought ha.cl been molded by Philip
Spener, a mystic and pietist.

Arnold, in his mystic aild :piet.1stic

leanings, regarded the Church, or rather Christianity, as not consisting
in "dogmas and symbols, but only in repentance and confession, in faith
and love, and in everything that shows its practical efficacy in the
inner life of man as a whole."56

Therefore, true reformation, or rather

restoration, of Christianity cannot come about through polemics or be
accomplished through "dogma.tic formulas and definitions and upon the
authority of syrnbols."57

And on this point, according to Baur, Arnold

holds even the great reformers such as Luther, Zwingli, and Melanchthon
accountable.

Armed with this conception of inner piety as the true mark

of the Christian combined with the old protestant view of the Catholic
Church as the habitation of evil, Arnold develops a new procedure in
writing Chtn'ch history which results in a new antithesis.

This he

develops in a work entitled Unpa.rtheiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorien
56Epochs, p. 118.

57Epochs, p. 118.
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vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis auf das Jahr Christi 1688, which was
published in Zurich in 1699.

In this work, according to Baur, Arnold

deviates from the Centuriators at several significant points; first,
in holding that the important element in Christianity is inner piety
and outward righteousness as opposed to dogma and creed, and second,
in going beyond the Centuries in denunciation of the catholic Church.
For Arnold, the Papacy does not have "the same concrete and particular
significance as he does for the Centuriators.

The same guilt attribu-

table to the Pope affects the papal clergy in principle as well.

Pope

and clergy belong together."58 Baur agrees with Arnold on this point
and writes approvingly:
If the Papacy itself is merely the consequence of Catholicism,
the culminating point of the self-developing hierarchical system,
then it is shallow and superficial to remain with the Papacy in
investigating the causes of the decay of the Church, and to make
the Popes responsible for everything in the Church that is to be
censured. If in the Church before the Reformation everything
depends so exclusively on the Papacy as the Centuriators represent
it, then there cannot be a satisfactory explanation of how the
evangelical Church, after it had freed itself from the Papacy,
could nevertheless so quickly have sunk into a condition wholly
similar to what had existed before.59
Arnold finds his explanation for this phenomenon in the assertion that
the important element of Christianity is piety and that the piety of
individuals is to be measured by the apostolic age and the period of
the apostolic Fathers.

Each one is to have his hearing, especially

those called "heretics" who have stood outside the Roman Church.

So

strongly does Arnold feel about this approach, that he ultimately comes
to regard "heretics" as the only true Christians.
by Baur:
58Epochs, p. 121.

59Epochs, p. 122 •
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The process is described
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The negative judgment, in itself justified, that the heretics
could not be what the orthodox Church regards them to be, because
the latter proceeds upon a false assumption, was far too quickly
changed by him into the positive judgment that they must be good
Christians to the same extent that the orthodox are not, •• his
"unpa.rtisan history of heretics~ was ma.de just as partisan by his

deciding in advance to take the side of the heretics against the
orthcxiox as a basic principle, and to find in them as much that
is good and praiseworthy as the orthodox saw in them to condemn. 6 0
Ultimately, Arnold's view of history is as narrow and dualistic as the
Catholic and Protestant views, and further, it is fully in line with
Protestantism's hatred of the Papacy even though he carries this beyond
to the clergy itself.

Here, according to Baur, Arnold shows himself

as "a reflection of the total impression ma.de upon him by the present
day. 61
11

On

the other hand, Arnold moves forward the emerging historical

consciousness by becoming the champion of heretics,

It is not that he

convinces his opponants of their particular Christian virtue, nor even
brings them to the point of accepting his concept of Chrlstianity as
primarily pious living.

Rather, it is his questioning of "whether those

who hitherto had been so quickly dismissed with an adverse judgment did
not also have the right to be evaluated according to another more equitable
criterion."62
two-fold.

The result of this questioning, according to Baur, was

First, it resulted in a "mowe from the abstract transcendence

of the mutually exclusive antitheses to the firm ground of concrete
historical truth. u63 And this meant, of course, that it now became
"possible to see more deeply into the natural continuity of events, so
that it might be grasped through the inner course of its development,
according to the various moments determining its historical existence."64

6~pochs, p. 127.

61Epochs, p. 133.

63Epochs, p. 135.

64Epochs, p. 135.
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Second, the polemical atomosphere with which the task of Church history
had been surrounded, began to dissipate.

The question of what constituted

heresy was clearly a problem for Protestantism as well as Catholicism,

and, thus, unless "heretics" were to become the orthodox as Arnold had
argued, it had to be addressed and answered.

For, "if hitherto there

had been no scruples about giving free rein to polemical zeal against the
Catholic Church even in the realm of history, it was now seen from Arnold
how the same weapon could also be turned against one's own Church. 65
11

"Here," Baur goes on to conclude, "Arnold:'s work provided a not unfruitful
lesson," ·which resulted in ''a quieter, gentler tone, more in accord with
the dignity of history."66

What emerged out of this intellectual milieu

was a transition away from the dualistic conception of history characterized by Eusebius, the Ma.gdeberg Centuries and Gottfried Arnold, to a
conception of historical development.
The next stage in the development of Church historiography,
according to Baur, happens roughly within the context of the Enlightenment and is characterized by an increasing subjectivism, yet it is considered to be a transitional stage and, therefore, still partakes of many
of the elements of the previous stage.

Baur now provides a clear

statement as to what this stage means for the progress of Church historiographys
The further we advance into the course of the eighteenth century,
the more we come upon a period in which the previously dominant
religious and dogmatic ecclesiastical interests must yeild to a
freer, more manifold and mare universal aspiration. The restrictive bonds of ecclesiastical authority grow weaker. The more
independent one becomes of them, the more does Spirit, returning
into itself, not only become conscious of its freedom and autonomy,
65Epochs, p. 135.

66Epochs, p. 1)6.
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but also occupy a standpoint from which what previously was of
very limited and particular interest for it now appears in a
wholly d1f;ferent light, opening up a new area of spiritual
endeavor. 7
Baur finds this ongoing process to be present in several select
individuals, Johann Lorentz von Mosheim (1694/95-1755)1 Johann Salomo
Semler (1725-1791); and, Christian Wilhelm Walch (1726-1784).
Mosheim's significance lies chiefly in his methodology which
perceives the writing of Church history as:
the clear narration of what has happened in the society of
Christians, outwardly and within, in such a fashion that from
the continuity of cause and effect we can recognize divine
Providance as it establishes and sustains, and thus become
wiser and more pious.68
Clearly, this indicates a move.beyond the strictly dualistic consideration
of the older views and seems to indicate an organic conception of the
Church.

But Baur firds the apparent organic concept of Mosheim's

historiography to be illusory.

What Mosheim's historiography amounts to

is mere des~iption whereby "the Church becomes a state."69 And as such,
it lacks an inner dynamic which would transform it into a truly organic
conception.

Thus, ultimately, notwithstanding the great impetus he

provides to the awareness of the historicity of the Church, Mosheim
fails to develop an adequate Church historiography in Baur's estimation.
Semler pressed the method of critical historiography upon the
Church in a much more radical f'ashion t.han had Mosheim, and thus, he
represents an even greater manifestation of the burgeoning subjectivism
Baur detected in the eighteenth century.

Semler had much in common with

Arnold in his attack on the Roman Church, and in his emphasis on the
moral aspect of Christianty as predominant.
67Epochs, p. 141.
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according to Baur, in his assertion that all Church history is utterly
subjective, and that, therefore, elevating the early apostolic Church
to a position of superiority is just as invalid as elevating the medieval
Church to such emminance.

In Semler, according to Baur, the outward

existing structures of the Church in any age are not only of no importance
to the nature of Christianity, which is moral, but they are diametrically
opposed to it.

Thus, Baur writesa

The ma.in thing at which Semler takes offense in the history of
the Christian church is not, as for Arnold, the steadily increasing depravity and wickedness brought on by the guilt of the
rulers, but the immutability of the system dominant in the Church
which contradicts the moral nature and infinity of Christianity.? 0
It is his conception of the predominantly moral nature of Christianity
which leads Semler to attack the historical institutional aspects of the
Church.

His attacks were aimed not only at the apostolic and post-

apostolic periods, but even the teachings of Jesus and the New Testament
as well.

Tlie result, comments Baur, was that "there was for him on the

whole no objective conception of religion and

Christianity,~·

and further a

Whereas Mosheim reduced the Church in the old sense to the conception of a society analogous to the state, according to Semler
it is an aggregate of individuals, who are bound to one another
by no other bond than the purely formal claim of the individual
existing for himself. What can the history of such individuals
l::.~;-..-..-ha:ve_as its· . e:ontent but. a constant. ·succession. of, cha~ges, .::whose. :
moving principle is only the subjective tendency of individuals
to react with all the power of their subjectivity against whatever
may strive to impose the pressure of uniformity and unalterability
on the infinite multiplicity of single individuals?71
1

Thus, Semler represents for Baur almost the epitome of the subjective
response characterized by the Enlightenment.

In the process ·Of his

critical work, which functioned as an antithesis to all dualistic
70E;pochs, p. 156.

71Epochs, p. 159.
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conceptions of Church history, Semler did the study of Church history a
great service in providing much raw data and in furthering the conception
of the Church as an historical individual.
Baur discusses Walch as a subordinate individual to Mosheim and
Semler, and as a transitional figure from the subjectivism of these
latter two men to the pragmatism of such Church historians as Johann
Schrockh {1773-1808), Ludwig Spittler (1752-1810), Gottlieb Planck {17511833), and Heinrich Henke {1752-1809).

By "pragmatism" Baur means a

Church history which is rationalistic, subjectivistic and utilitarian.
It is a method which utilizes history for purposes of edification or the
validation of a particular idea held by the historian.

Such a method,

Baur detects, is already at work in the writing of Walch, especially in
his treatment of heretics.

Of his approach, Baur writesa

Indeed, we might think we were d~aling here with a police officer
or examining magistrate, rather than with a Church historian!
In fact, upon examination of the entire apparatus that is constructed here--in order first to give a general personal description of the defendant and to bring him forward and interrogate
him, then to set in motion the calling of witness, to ascertain
the facts, to enter the results of the investigation in the
proper place, and finally to pass sentence with the necessary
practical recommendations--such a procedure can be compared only
with a police or judicial undertaking, in accord with the most
stringent rules of a bureaucratic machin~.72
Walch's historiography and that of those who follow him later results,
finally, in the "absence of all higher ideas."73 According to this view,
Baur observes, "history is only the freeplay of subjective freedom and
subjective caprice," and further, "there can be no insight into the
objective continuity of history, and pnrely subjective and individual
elements are all the more dominant."74

Walch's method is subjectivism

taken to an extreme and therefore, destructive of the balance between
72Epochs, p. 164.
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subjectivity and objectivity which Baur sought.

With Church historio-

graphy in such a subjective corner, the only way out was a new objective
view of history, "if the stream of Church historiography is not to run
dry

in the sands of subjectivistic pa.rticularism.75
The great pericxl of transition or synthesis Baur located in the

first decade of the nineteenth century which he referred to specifically
as "the pericxl of transition from the subjectivity of Ka.ntian-Fichtean
idealism to the objectivity of Schelling's philosophies of nature and
of identity."76

This transition was but one aspect of the larger

Romantic revolt and the time of the re-emergence of "higher ideas,"
yet it still contained some of the short-comings of the preceeding
epoch.

This is clearly seen, according to Baur, in the example of

Johann Neander (1789-1850) who represents the first historian of the
most recent epoch of Church historiography.
Neander was a Jewish convert to Christianity who had stt.rlied Plato
early in the Gymnasium and later became a devoted student of Schleierma.cher through the latter's On Religion:
Despisers.

Speeches to its Cultured

Baur found Neander to be prcxluct of Romanticism especially

in his treatment of history.

He writes:

The most characteristic trait of Neander's historiography is
here (in his monographs) revealed as a preference for the individual aspects of history, a joy in everything that allows
us to look deeper within·its spiritual organism, a pleasure and
affection with which it traces now this arxi now that personality
not merely in monographic presentations but also en the broad
stage of general Church history.77
What prevents the meaning of history (objectivity) from being swallowed
up in this individuality,
75Epochs, p. 167.

~is

Neander's ability "to transpose himself
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with self-effacing fidelity into the full circle of that individual life,
in order to understand it in itself, in its peculiar nature and circwnstance.••78

It is this transposition which guards against over-subjectivism

in historiography and allows history to speak for itself.

Thus, the

task of the historian is to familiarize, indeed immerse, himself in the
consciousness of the age he studies and then examine individuals in the
light of such consciousness.

Only then can history obtain ''that

objectivity which according to its very conception it must have. 11 79
Baur approves of Neander's methodology because he recognizes that
it provides for diversity while still maintaining "a common bond of unity,"80
To a great extent, Baur believes, Neander has managed to preserve the
objectivity of history.
on two related points.

But he accuses Neander of not going far enough
First, Baur sees Nearder's ideas as providing

too much freedom to historical individuals and, thus, endangering the
overriding unity of history.

His understanding of a consciousness in

each age, which is ultimately derived from Schleiermacher, does not provide a true unity at all but only a psychological or abstract unity which
is essentially subjective.

Second, Baur finds in Neander a lack of a

"principle of movement and progressive development ••• 81

In its place he

finds a lurking dualism between Christianity, on the one hand, which
Neander considers as "an absolutely supernatural miracle,"82 and human
nature on the other •. Baur challanges this view:
If Christianity is so different in principle from human nature
that its origin cannot even be explained from the depths of human
nature, then Christianity and human nature are two essentially
78Epochs, p. 210.
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different principles, opposites, which as such are related only
externally • They work on each other externally, jostle each
other, affect each other this wa:y or that, but can never become
internally one with each other.BJ

Such a conception of history could not provide an adequate dynamic to
uphold an organic view of history, according to Baur, for "where there
is no unity of principle, but only a duality of principles, there can be
no immanent development, no progression."84 Yet the dualism of Neander
does not call for

demolition,~as

the old Catholic or Protestant views do,

because:
Where there are spiritual tendencies, there must also in principle be a unity; and where could this unity be found but in the
common religious Spirit of humanity? That Spirit alone is the
true, living and concrete mediation between a Christianity that
is not absolutely supernatural but natural as well, and a human
nature embodied in the multiplicity of individuals.85
Thus, Neander is an extremely important step toward the objectivization
of Church history in his postulation of spiritilal tendencies, but he
fails to be objective enough to suit Baur.

Neander's ultimate subject-

ivity derives from Schleierma.cher who taught him to think in terms of
immediate consciousness, and,.therefare, writes Baur, notwithstanding
his emphasis on the individuality of history, "all these forms are
repeatedly dissolved and carried back to the subjective element of feeling
which alone i~ the true, inner ground of the life of history.••86

This

was essentially the state of Church historiography when Baur wrote and,
therefore, the immediate context of his proposed solution, which he put
in terms of Idea and Manifestation.
Baur noted in the concluding section of the Epochs ••• , that
83Epochs, p. 214.
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historiographic methcxl was ma.king great strides in his day, both in terms
of the appropriation of data, and the development of a greater historical
consciousness.

This advance was especially evident to him in the ac-

knowledgment "that the historian can be equal to his task only in so far
as he tra..nsposes himself into the objective reality of the subject matter,"
and, thus, become "simply a mirror for the perception of historical
phenomena in their true and real form ... 87 Yet, among Church historians,
Baur detected a lack which "prevents them from achieving greater.
perfection. ••88 The old dualistic conception of Church history was dying,
as the Church's historicity was increasing being uncovered, but as
important as this development was for Church historiography, it had not
led to an adequate understanding of Church history.

Rather, Church

history had become essentially pragmatic and subjective,

Baur conceived

his task to be the transcending of this "pragmatic mode of treatment, .. 89
toward a balanced objective and subjective mode of treatment, and he
discovered the key to this new understanding in idealistic philosophy.
The basic problem, according to Baur, could be a.ocated in "a wrong
relation of the Idea to the manifestations in which its historical development is to be presented ... 90

What happens in current Church historio-

graphy, he wrote, is that:
The Idea still hovers itdefinitely and at a great distance over
the manifestations to which it must be related. It is not yet
strong and vital enough to penetrate and vivify the historical
material, as the soul animates the body, or to become, through
such an organic unity, the moving principle of the entire series
of manifestations in which the history of the Christian Church
takes its course.91
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This charge that no acceptable dynamic had been suggested to account for
the organic life and growth of history was Baur's major criticism of
Mosheim, Semler and those who followed.

Indeed, the work of these his-

torians marked an advance in Church historiography in that they stepped
beyond the dualism of ancient and medieval Church historiography wherein
Church history was considered static, to a new historical consciousness
which understood the Church as fully involved in the flow and flux of
history.

Yet, according to Baur, although their treatments of Church

history were more aware of the historicity of the Church, they still remained somewhat static because of their failure to show why there should
be

any historical progression and change at all.

In short, they showed

that the Church had a history but they had not shown why it had a history.
The major problem of Baur's life, was to discover a speculative philosophy which would provide such a dynamic for historical understanding, a
problem which he evidently conceived early in his career when he wrote in
his first major work Symbolik und. Mythologie. • • :
bleibt mir die Geschichte ewig tot und stumm."92

"Ohne Philosophie
Baur had found such a

philosophy in Hegelian idealism and thus wrote twenty-five years later
in the Epochs ••• :

If it is right to speak of an Idea of the church, then that
Idea, like any other, must possess within itself the living
impulse to go out from itself and to become actualized in a
series of manifestations that can only be regarded as various
aspects of the relation that exists generally between the Idea
and its manifestation.93
92Quoted in A. Hilgenfeld, "Ferdinand Christian Baur nach seiner
wissenschaftlichen Entwickelung und Bedeutung", Zeitschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Theologie, XXXVIa -112, (1893), p. 229.
93Epochs, p. 242.
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The true understanding of Church history, for Baur, was to be found in
the relationship between Idea and manifestation and this relationship,
he illustrated by the two great epochs of Church history, the
post-Reformation periods.

pre-~_a.nd

In the pre-Reformation period, the Idea of

the Church comes to be closely identified with the external historical
Church, thus, Idea and manifestation become closely identified and come
together "in an inseparable unity.··~

The Reformation was the point of

a great shift in which the Church now sought to ''separate Idea and manifestation to the full extent of their distinction."95

Now, writes Baur:

The Idea of the Church is torn away from its manifestation as
the visible Church; it is in itself the driving and moving principle of progression away from one form of consciousness, in
which as an untrue existence it can no longer remain, to another
form, in which it is freely related to tb~ manifestation in the
same proportion that it stands above it.~
But this is mere description of what has happened to the Church historically and too external for his purposes.

Baur wanted to go behind the

manifestation and here the ''question surely arises as to what content
the Idea of the Church intends to transpose from itself and to realize
in the visible Church, or, since it can realize nothing other than itself,

what it is essentially. 0 97
To begin with, for- ·Baur, ''the Church is the real form in which
Christianity is made manifest ... 98 Therefore, the real question concerns
the Idea of Christianity itself.

On this, Baur statess

Christianity can be essentially nothing other than that which
the Christian consciousness of all times, in whatever form it
may have occurred, has perceived in the person of Christ: the
unity and union of God and man • • • it has ~ts absolute conception

~Epochs, p. 24J.

95Epochs,

97Epochs, p. 244.

98Epochs, p. 244.

p.

24J.

96Epochs, p. 248.
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and expression in the unity and union of God and man, as that
unity is perceived in the person of Christ, and in this perception becomes a fact of Christian consciousness.99
The whole story of Church history was summed up and explicated for Baur

which first ca.me to consciousness in

in the Idea of reconciliation,
Jesus Christ.

All the external manifestations of the Church, represented

by dogma (the theological aspect) and polity (the institutional aspect), too
were considered to be developments whereby "the Church proceeded to
realize the Idea of that unity in such fashion that Christian consciousness could find in it the adequate expression of its Idea.~·101
With this Idea of Christianity as a basis for the consideration of
Church history, then, Baur hoped to go beyond the impasse he saw in the
Catholic/Protestant antithesis.

Neither one possesses absolutely the

Idea of the Church, and neither one is immune from historical flux.
Rather, they are like stages passed through on the way toward a higher
development.

Thus, for example, he writes that Catholicism is justified

in its pa.st (even though now obsolete) "since only by means of it could

the Idea of the Church progress to a new form of realization, and
Christian consciousness to a higher level of development."102 The incongruity of Catholicism's ultimate identification of Idea and manifestation as synonymous, first, in dogma, and then in polity, explains the
Protestant Reformation as a reaction to such identification.

The opposi-

tion which began with polity or, more specifically, the Papacy, spread
99Epochs, p. 244.
10~ur's representation here of dogma and polity as but two equal
manifestations of the Idea of Christianity, represents a shift away from
his earlier conception of dogma as the inner aspect of Christianity in
contrast to polity, which he conceived of as the outer aspect. Cf. LHD, p. 262.

101Epochs, p. 244.

102Epochs, p.-250.
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to the other element of the manifest Church, dogma.

Thus, he observes:

just as the realization of the Idea of the Church in Catholicism progressed from dogma to hierarchy and its completion in
the Papacy, so the dissolution of the unity that Catholicism
perceived in the visible Church proceeded from the denial of the
Papacy to the denial of dogma. What was denied in dogma concerned
first of all only the elimination of elements introduced into
dogma by the hierarchy and the principle of tradition on which
it rested. But once ignited, the process of dissolution had
here as well to pursue its further course, and it did so in
tne same fashion as with the Papacy.103
The realization of this dissolution of the dogmatic principle did not
come about until the eighteenth century, yet it was fully contained as
a presupposition within Protestantism from the beginning.

With this

realization comes the final freedom of the subject and the triumph of
criticism.

But Protestantism is not the end of this development for it

too evidences its historicity.

In the end, he writes:

"What alone must

remain forever incomprehensible is that which could in advance make the
claim to stand in the midst of history outside of all historical continuity. "1~

The life of its founder provides the paradigmatic model for

the Church's own life.

It can never, in any form or historical age,

achieve the Ideal in a manifest way.

Rather, it approximates the Ideal

as it, as closely as possible, expresses and structures itself so that
the Idea of Christianity, i.e. reconciliation, finds its most adequate
expression.
Therefore, for Baur, Christianity partakes of both idea and manifestation; it is both a universal Idea and an historical manifestation.
Because Christianity is historical (and its history begins with its
founder), then it can to a great extent be examined and known historically.

As already indicated, Baur never held back from applying a
103Epochs, p. 251.

104Epochs, p.

253.
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critical method to Church history even to Jesus and the canonical books.
This he could do without fear because of
Christianity.

h~s

view of the historicity of

Yet Baur asserted that Christianity was not merely a his-

torical phenomenon as Strauss did in his Leben Jesu.

Baur believed

Christianity to be a revelation given f'rom God even though he meant revelation in the special sense of a consciousness first provided and exhibited to man in Jesus.

Thus, Christianity was not only to be understood

historically and critically, but also theologically.

The true under-

standing of its nature was to be found in its original Idea of reconciliation.

Baur was opposed to all dualisms and never conceived of Christian-

ity as being split into categories such as Geschichte and Historie.

In

his understanding, Idea and manifestation, while not synonymous, were
nevertheless inseparable, functioning in a dialectical relationship •.
This relationship was the dynamic of Baur's Church history that he found
lacking in others.
which

b~ought

It was this conception of Idea and manifestation

together in him the critical judgment of the historian and

the universal awareness of the theologian.

CHAPI'ER V
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In this pa.per, Baur has been interpreted primarily as a romantic
theologian.

His romanticism is most clearly seen in his concern for a

synthetic understanding of Subject and Object, or, more specifically,
Idea and manifestation.

In his view, the Subject does not autonomously

stand apart from nature and history, and directly perceive them.

Rather,

Baur held that the Subject himself is involved in an objective process
of development proceeding in the world.

This position is not so much a

contradiction of supernaturalism a:rd rationalism as it is a redress of
the balance between the two.

For him, it was not a question of the pri-

ority of either Object or Subject, but rather of the necessity of both
Object and Subject together.

Baur draws on both the objectivism of

supernaturalism and the subjectivism of rationalism, and, therefore, as
his former student Hilgenfeld says, he is "noch ein Sohn des 18. Jahrhunderts, des Jahrhurrlerts der Aufklarung."1

Yet, he transcends both of

these views in his conception of a higher synthesis, and it is precisely
at this point, that Baur is to be understood as a romantic.
But, Baur does not quite fit the category of "romantic", because
while many of the romantics 'ultimately failed to maintain the balance
1n. Adolph Hilgenfeld, "Ferdinand Christian Baur nach seiner wissenschaftliche Entwicklung und Bedeutung'', Zeitschrift fiir wissenschaftliche
Theologie XXXVI: 1: 2, (1893), p. 223.
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between the infinite and finite, he managed to hold them together, at
least to his own satisfaction, successfully resisting the tendency to
subsume the finite under the infinite,

In all his works, he consistently

demonstrated his resolve to take the events of history seriously and not
to understand them as merely the insignificant expressions of the abiding
Spirit.

At this point, Baur appears as a representative figure of the

growing historicist movement, in both his emphasis upon the growth of
history and his attention to historical facts,

His own personal stl.dy

of history and classics, combined with his stl.dy of B, G. Niebuhr, no
doubt instilled in him the scientific attit\Xie towards historical facts.
Thus, Baur appears as a unique historical figure who cannot be fully
identified with pietism (supernaturalism), rationalism, romanticism, or
historicism: he drew on all of these sources, yet he cannot simply be
reduced down to them.

Rather, these influences came together in Baur to

produce a view of Christianity which was at once both fully historical
and ideal.
Baur's mediating place between romantic idealism and positivistic
historiography drew two different accusations against his work,

On the

one hand, are nineteenth century historicists, most notably Ernst Troeltsch,
who accused Baur of sacrificing the particulars of history to the schemes
of speculative philosophy.

Troeltsch wrote, for example:

Baurs Werk grUndet auf die besondere Fassung des Entwicklungsgedankens in der Hegelschen Dialektik. Er stellt die Geschichte
des Christentums als die Selbstentfaltung und Selbstbewegun~ der
christlichen Idee und die christliche Idee selbst als den Hohepunkt der in ~~r Universal- und Reli~onsgeschichte sich entfaltenden religios-metaphysischen Idee uberhaupt dar. Die Folge
davon 1st, daB die selbstandige Glaubenslehre ganz uberflussig,
daB die ganze Kraft und FUlle des Christentums gera.d.e in seiner
Geschichte sichtbar und wirksam, daB die Kirchengeschichte die
Menschwerdung Gottes und die Explikation Christi, alle Theologie
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und Christologie also uberflussig wird.2
From this point of view, therefore, Baur is too idealistic and fails to
consider Christianity in its full historical variety.3

On the other

hand, are dialectical theologians, most notably Rudolph Bultmann, who
have accused Baur of placing too much importance on historical details.
The point of this criticism is not so much that Baur has erred in his
conception of the relation between truth and history, but rather, in the
words of Bultmann, "by reducing faith's self-understanding to a consciousness which arises in historical development out of man himself so that in
him the mind comes to consciousness of itself, he eliminates the kerygma.."4
Thus, man is no longer confronted with the kerygma; rather, it dawns upon
him gradually through historical consciousness.

These two criticisms

are among the most serious which have been leveled at Baur and,

~here-

fore, must be examined more carefully.
Troeltsch' charge that Baur is too speculative in his treatment of
history is really not consistent with the evidence.

In the first place,

on many different occasions, .Baur denied that he ever sacrificed the facts
2Quoted by Klaus Scholder in "Ferdinand Christian Baur als Historiker" Evangelische Theologie, XXXIi 10 (1961), p. 435.
3This particular criticism of Baur's historiography has been rehearsed more recently by Christoph Senft, a former student of Rudolph
Bultmann. He claims, "der Hegelsche Geschichtsbegriff, den er adoptiert
hat, verhindert letztlich doch die erstrebte wahrhaft objektive Erkenntnis,"
and that, therefore, for Baur, history is only "ein blol3es Attribut des
SelbstbewuBtseins." (Christoph Senft,Wahrhaftigkeit und Wahrheits Die
Theolo ie des 1 • Jahrhunderts zwischen Orthcxloxie und Aufklarun
Tu ingens J. c. B. Mohr, 195
4Ruiolf Bultmann,Theology of the New Testament Vol. II, trans. by
Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 244.
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of history to the confines of a system.5

On the.contrary, he maintained

that any historical sttdy begins with the facts and must stick closely
to them.

In his Epochs • • • , for example, he wrote:

"There is no his-

torical presentation that must not first be critically tested in order
to determine the relation in which its author stands to the pure objectivity of historical truth."6

Yet, after the critical testing has been

accomplished, there is still the question of what it all means.
fore, he concludes, "history itself,

~s

There-

the essence of what has happened,

remains something so infinitely large that its contents can never be
exhausted by historical knowledge."?

In these statements, Baur's method

is shown to be just the opposite of what Troeltsch claimed it to be.

It

is not "grtindet auf die besondere Fassung des Entwicklungsgedankens in
der Hegelschen Dialektik", but rather, based upon Baur's own historical
research.

A speculative method of approach in understanding the facts,

after they have been collected, is valid and indeed useful if it does
not take priority over the facts themselves.

But the facts must inform

one's speculation and, therefore, Baur asks rhetorically, "On the whole,
can history have a higher task than the ever deeper investigation of the
historical continuity linking all phenomena that lie before it as given
objects?"B Thus, Troeltsch's charge that Baur's idealism makes Dogma,
the history of Christianity, the incarnation and the revelation in
5see, for example, F. c. Baur,Ausgewahlte Werke in Einzelausgaben
Band I, pp. 267-268; and also Hod.gson's comments in The Formation of
Historical Theology, p. 4.
6F. C. Baur,Epochs • • • , p. 46.
7F. C. Baur,Epochs ••• , p. 46.

BF. c. Baur,Epochs.

. ., p. 253.
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Christ "u'berflussig, is not true.

On the contrary, as has been shown in

the discussion of his concept of revelation, Baur's system actually depends and, indeed, insists upon the historicity of these things.

Histor-

ical events. carefully examined, provide the clues to the truth of history, and are, therefore, of primary importance.
In the second place, Baur's scholarly production supports his own
testimony that historical facts are of primary importance.
Christuspartei ••• , is especially illustrative.

Here the Die

In this work, which

precedes Baur's contact with Hegel by about two years, he began with a
careful consideration of I Cor. 1112 in the light of its literary and
historical context and from this, asserted that the verse,provided evidence of a great struggle going on in the Corinthian congregation between
a Peterine party which was essentially Judaistic and a Pauline party
which was ma.de up of Hellenistically oriented Christians.

Later, on the

basis of this observation, Baur went on to apply this insight to the other·
Pauline epistles, such as Galatians, where he believed he discerned the
same struggle to be present, and also to the gospels.

Yet in all of his

monographs, even those coming after his acquaintance with Hegel, Baur
sought to base his conclusions soundly upon his prior historical research.
His aim was the bigger picture, but he never reached for it prematurely,
as Scholder notes:
Zweiundzwanzig Jahre also liegen zwischen dem ersten Aufsatz
und der Kirchengeschichte. Urxl an jeder einzelnen historischen
Arbeit, die im Laufe dieser zweiundzwanzig Jahre entstand, kann
man nachweisen, daB Baur zu keiner Zei t den gro!3en Entwu:rf der
friihen Kirchengeschichte aus den Augen verloren, vielmehr in
ebenso unermUdlicher wie unbestechlicher Arbeit an den Texten
diesen Entwurf Zug um Zug ausgebaut, erganzt, uberpriift und.
abgesichert hat.9
9naus Scholde:i; "Ferdinand Christian Baur al Historiker", p. 447.
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As the above quote suggests, Baur's consistent attention to historical
facts in all his works, in addition to the fact that he came to the writing of his Church history (the big picture) only late in his life, only

after he had laid a vast foundation of sound scholarship and erudition,
argues against the contention that Baur ignored history in favor of
philosophy.

Historical particulars were integral to Baur's understanding

of revelation; indeed its sine qua !!2!2•
Bultmann's accusation that Baur gives too much importance to the
historical process and consequently eliminates the necessity for the kerygma is incorrect because it is based upon a misunderstanding of Baur's
concept of revelation.

The misunderstanding involves this controversial

passage from Baur's Lehrbucn der christlichen Dogmengeschichte (1847):
What history is generally--as the eternally clear mirror in
which spirit perceives itself, views its own image, in order to
be what it is in itself also for itself, for its own consciousness, and to know itself as the moving power of historical becoming--is concentrated in an all the more intensive significance
in the restricted field of history of dogma. 10
The controversial words here, are 'history' and 'spirit'.

Does he mean

here by 'history' the study of history or the process of history?

And,

further, does he mean here by 'spirit' the eternal Spirit or merely the
human spirit?

Those who read Baur strictly as a romantic idealist tend

to understand him as meaning by these terms, the self-realization of the
eternal Spirit in the historical process.11

Thus, man arrives at his

10Quoted by P. Hodgson in The Formation of Historical Theology,
p. 182. I am ~ndebted to Hodgson for his observation of the ambiguity
between the words 'history' and 'spirit' in this most difficult passage.
11Barth has interpreted him this way.
in the Nineteenth Century, p. 507.

See his Protestant Theology
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awareness of reconciliation by virtue of his involvement in the eternal
Spirit and the historical process,

According to this view, Baur has no

real concept of revelation, and historic events are only temporal, ephemeral manifestations of the Eternal Spirit.

But this goes contrary to

what has already been shown regarding Baur's concept of revelation and
history•
Another way of understanding Baur in the passage from the Lehrbuch,
is to interpret 'spirit' not as the Eternal Spirit, but as the human
spirit.

Thus, the human spirit recognizes the truth as it unfolds "in

the totality of the historical course of development."12

This is Bult-

mann's understanding of the passage and consequently, he writes:
Since, therefore, historical reflection is the way to grasp
the truth, then historical investigation of the history of
Christianity--primarily of its origin and hence of the New Testament--is the way to grasp the truth of Christian faith, a truth
which for Baur is unquestionably no other than the truth of the
human mind in general. Hence New Testament theology must understand the interpreting of the New Testament to be the unfolding
of Christian consciousness, which is itself understood. as a
decisivI stage in the process by which the human mind comes to
itself. 3
Thus, according to Bultmann, Baur holds that history as a process is an
"eternally clear mirror" in which the human spirit "perceives itself,
views its own image, in order to be what it is in itself also for itself,
for its own consciousness,"14

Based upon this interpretation, Bultmann

then voices his objection that Baur's view makes faith only "a consciousness which arises in historical development out of man himself ... 15
12R. Bultmann, Theology • • • , Vol. II, p. 244 •
1

~. Bultman~ Theology • • • , Vol. II, p. 244.

~R. Bultmann, Theology • • • , Vol. II, p. 245.

15R. Bultmann.Theology • • • , Vol. II, p. 24 5.
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consideration of this interpretation, Hodgson has observed that Bultma.nn's critique is based on the assumption that by 'history', Baur meant
'historical process' rather than the study of history.

Although, given

this assumption, Bultmann's critique is valid, Hodgson questions the
validity of the initial assumption.

Rather, on the basis of the context

and a strikingly similar passage from another work, Hodgson maintains
that by 'history' Baur means the study of history and concludes:
The past is by no means merely a moment in the present dialectic
of human thought, as Senft claims. The study of the past is rather
the "inexhaustible source 11 ;rom which the present obtains its moral
and spiritual foundations. 1
Whether or not, Barth; Bultmann, or Hodgson understands Baur correctly on this point, the real problem underlying their debate, is the
larger question of how Baur finds a place for both God and man in his
system.

He is clearly intention having them both in a free relationship

where the freedom of both is maintained, i.e. neither God becoming a
projection of man himself nor man becoming an idea in the mind of God.
This is seen in his insistence, that the finite is not to be sacrificed
to, or subsumed in the Infinite, and vice versa.

Yet, in spite of this

insistence, he never clearly explains their presumed connection or relation, and this is Baur's greatest weakness, one he shared with other
idealists.

The ambiguity is clearly seen in his Christology where Baur

draws back from identifying the historical Jesus as divine.

By conceding

to Jesus only the highest consciousness of reconciliation, albeit not in
absolute consciousness, he hopes to preserve both God's transcendence and
the ultimate meaning in historical events.

He accomplishes this

16p. Hodgson, The Formation ••• , p. 184.
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philosophically by combining, as Hodgson notes, an historicism with a
panentheistic monism17, but he still leaves the question of how Spirit
impinges upon historical events without becoming entangled in them.
Baur's task is complicated by his profession of the Christian faith.
He must preserve the importance of the historical Jesus and the Gospel,
and, to do so he draws on philosophy to provide a model.

But the quest.ion

that needs to be asked is: Does Baur really preserve these two things?
From the standpoint of orthodoxy, the answer is no.

Orthodoxy has always

held and maintained that the historical Jesus was very God and very man
in one person and, further, that his death was a substitutionary or
representative sacrifice on behalf of man, through which reconciliation ·
between God and man has come,

Baur deviates from the orthodox position

in seeing Jesus as only relatively divine; in holding that his death has
only a psychological significance for the believer; and, finally, that
reconciliation comes via the initial consciousness of Christ.

The his-

toricizing of Jesus has far-reaching consequences for theology although
they were unrealized by Baur,

Partly as a consequence of Baur' s own

work, Christianity itself, or more specifically the Gospel, became relativized in the work of later theologians. 18 Still, in spite of his
unorthodox Christology, Baur's work is important for today, in that,
17Hodgson,The Formation. , ., p. 269.
18Here, the paradigmatic· example is Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923),
who, from a more posi ti vis tic posi td.on·: ~ban ..Baur,.- so~t: to_.harmonize
the historicity of Christianity with the Gospel proclamation of its
absoluteness. In The Absoluteness of Christiani~y and the History of
Religions, he sought to establish the normativeness of Christianity
among all religions, while arguing for its superiority over them. In
his later work, 'I'roeltsch evidenced an even greater conviction that
Christianity is radically historical. On this development, see E.
Troeltsch,Protestantism and Progress Bostons Beacon Press, 1958.
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while Protestant theology has demonstrated a marked tendency to separate
faith and history, or, at best, to equivocate on the meaning of history,
Baur calls theology back to the problem of history .19

On this, Hodgson

writes:
Baur is correct in suggesting that an historical event or an
historical process is one which is in principle knowable--not
necessarily actually known--through historical understanding, i.e.,
by a discipline which is at once critical and imaginative. Although it is quite probable that an historical event can also be
known in non-historical ways, e.g., through faith, an event from
which historical understanding is totally excluded in principle
is not an historical event. Therefore, the Protestant tendency
~o say that God reveals himself in history, but not in the sort
of history knowable by historical study, implies an incipient
docetism.20
The problem of faith and history is not solved for theology by Baur, but
the issues and terms are clearly laid out by him.

The question of faith

and history has never been so important as it is today, and the rediscovery of Baur's work has contributed to its current importance.

Here,

Baur has done theological posterity a great service.
The same can be said, especially of his work in the field of Church
history where Baur's awareness of, and emphasis on, the historicity of
all phenomena produced a more realistic concept of Church history.

From

a methodological standpoint, Baur's work represents not only a significant
advance in the writing of Church history, but also the foundation for the
scientific study of Ecclesiastical history.

His constant attention to

the facts of history helped him to escape from the earlier treatment of
19see Heinz Liebing. "Historical-Critical Theology", especially
p. 69, where he writes, for example: "we cannot avoid the question
which Baur pressed upon the theology of his time, when he taught it to
understand that history was its own deepest problem."
20p. Hcxlgson,The Formation ••• , p. 273.
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Church history as the servant of polemics, apologetics, or edification.
For him, Christianity is and remains an historically given religion
(eine geschichtlich gegebene Religion), open and accessible to the consideration of the historian.

Concerning the results of his own researches,

he would have been the first to admit the incorrectness of his theory on
the rise of the early Church in its historical particulars.

Yet, as

earlier indicated, this does no damage to his theory in its essence.
Baur's assertion that the early Church

~as

a conglomerate of heterogenous

factors, involving various theological points of view, in contradiction
to the earlier view of a homogenous early Church, has never been more
established than it is today~

The only difference is, that the modern

understanding of the heterogenous character of the early Church is more
complex than Baur conceived it.

Thus, Baur stands as one of the most

important figures in Church historiography.

On his significance as a

historian, Scholder concludes:
Die neue Grundlegung die Baur hier der ganzen kirchengeschichtlichen Arbeit gibt, ist filr diese Disziplin bis heute unverandert
gUltig, wenn wir allerdings auch ~~ der Beurteilung ihrer Ergebnisse vorsichtiger geworden sind.
But Baur's work goes beyond being significant only as a method of
Church historiography.

In his insistence that history cannot be fully

understood. apart from philosophy or at least speculation, he established
implicitly that Church history could not be only a historiographic task,
but a theological task as well.

For Baur, Christianity was not only a

historical (geschichtlich) religion, it was also a given (gegebene)
religion.

Therefore, a mere historical understanding of it was not only

adequate, but, really, impossible.

For him, historiography and theology,

21K. Scholder, "Ferdinand Christian Baur ••• ", p. 449.
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like history and faith, must always remain together.

For example, in the

concluiing section of the Epochs ••• , he wrote1
The singular and the manifold are two equally essential basic
forms of Church life; but we must also think of the two in an

immanent relation to each other such that the singular opens
itself to the manifold and the manifold is comprised of the singular. In proportion as the historian must, on the one hand,
become absorbed as deeply as possible in the particular, individual, and concrete aspects of historical phenomena, in order
to attain the complete reality of historical life, so on the other
hand he must also raise himself to the heights of the universal
Idea, in order to grasp the particular from the universal and to
see in it only the particularity of the universal. The task of
historiography is completed only in the union of these two mutually complementary methods, which make up the two aspects of the
same process--moving from the particular to the universal and
from the universal to the particular.22
It is in his maintenance of both historiography and theology within his
Church history, that Baur's real significance lies.

His insistence that

the form of the Church never absolutely embodies its idea is adequate to
comprehend the Church's historicity, while his assertion that history is
dead without some speculative system makes room for a theological consideration of the Church's absolute idea.
The awareness of the Church's historicity, which began with Baur,
has emerged in our own day as a movement for change and reform among the
major denominations.

Ecclesiology has become self-conscious and this

self-consciousness stems from the very

conce~t

of the Church which Baur

helped to establish; that the Church, as a worldly, social structure,
partakes of temporality, even as other social institutions, such as
political structures or economic systems, do,

It involves a shift in

ecclesiological thinking from the categories of nature to the categories
of history.
22F,

Within the categories of nature, the Church was conceived

c.

Baur,Epochs ••• , p. 257,
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as "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab ominibus creditum est."
was dependent upon the dualism of the old supernaturalism.

This view

But such an

ecclesiological model, as Baur clearly saw in his own day, is inadequate
for the mcx:lern world, since the world is no longer conceived in static,
but rather, dynamic, catagories.

A sample of the new ecclesiological

thought is provided by Colin Williams, who writes:
There is need to think of the church-world relation in much
more humble and much more dynamic and secular fashion than we
have been accustomed to in the past. It must be more humble in
the sense that we must learn to stop thinking that the role of
the.:.church is to draw the world into the order of the church.
We must cease thinking pf the ultimate salvation of the world
as the process by which· Christ's Lordship over the bcx:ly (Col.
1:18, Christ as head of· the church) is expanded until at last
it draws the whole world into its realm (Col. 2:10, Christ as
head of the creation). Christ in his movement toward the fulfillment of his Lordship in the creation uses the community of
those who already know him as Lord. The church is the servant
of his struggle to bring this new and free life to expression
in the communities of the world. But the goal is the new life
of the creation. The church is to be seen as an instrument that
Christ uses for realizing the goa1.23
The results of this new conception of the Church have been profound for
its practical ministry in the world, but to rehearse them here is beyond
the scope of this paper.

More relevant here, is the impact of this new

conception on the writing of Church history.
After Baur's death, his unique conception of the process of history
23colin Williams, The Church Vol. IV. of New Direction in Theology
Today (.Fhiladelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 22-23. The concept of the Church here expressed by Williams is not an isolated view
but representative of a virtual revolution in ecclesiological thinking.
The foundation of this new ecclesiology were laid down in the 1960's,
but the implications for the practical ministry are still proceeding
vigorously. On this, see Donald Bloesch,The Reform of the Church
Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerclmans Publishing Company, 1970;
and Howard A. Snyder, The Problem of Wineskins: Church Structure in a
Technological Age,Downers Grove, Ill.a InterVarsity Press, 1975.
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itself as having meaning was lost, either to a reactionary conservatism
which sought to reaffirm the dualistic concept of church/world, or to
positivistic historiography which lead to a complete relativism.

Those

who followed Baur's method at all, usually applied his sense of historicity to the Church while tending to neglect its theological significance.
Consequently, as Bultmann observes:
t~icism

"Investigation fell victim to a his-

which conceived early Christianity and with it the New Testament

as a phenomenon within the closed continuum of world history linked together by cause and effect."24

The Neo-orthodox movement was a reaction

against this reduction, and an attempt to recapture the transcendent aspect within Christianity, but· it failed, on the other hand, to adequately
account for the historicity of the Church.

Thus, both nineteenth century

liberalism, which terned to over-emphasize the historical aspect of
Christianity; and Nee-orthodoxy, which tended to over-emphasize the ideal
aspect of Christianity, failed to maintain the balance which Baur had.
sought.
The increasing realization of the worldly aspect of the institutional Church by theologians which can be termed simply ecclesiastical selfconsciousness, has resulted in a new redress of the balance between historiography and theology in the writing of Church history.
historians exemplify this development:

Two Church

Jaroslav Pelikan, a Lutheran

pastor and teacher, who has been actively involved in the ecumenical
movement; and Jan Walgrave, a Dominican, and specialist on the problem
of doctrinal development am the life and thought of Cardinal John Henry
Newman.
2

4It.

Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. II, p. 245.
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Pelikan, like Baur, is intent upon preserving the unity of both
theology and history.

He wishes to understand the Church historically,

but not merely historically.

In his own terms there must be a balance

between tradition (the abiding), and history {the transitory), if the
Church is to be truly understood.

He writes:

Tradition without history has homogenized all the stages of
development into one statically defined truth; history without
tradition has produced a historicism that relativized the development of Christian doctrine in such a way as to make the distinction between authentic growth and cancerous aberration seem
completely arbitrary •••• The history of Christian doctrine is
the most effective means available of exposing the artificial
'theories of continuity that have often assumed normative status
in the churches, and at the same time it is an ave~ue into the
authentic continuity of Christian believing, teaching, and confessing. Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith •Of the living.25
Although Pelikan diverges from Baur on such points as the proper subject
matter of Church history, and the identification of the abiding element
within Christianity (Pelikan-tradition/Baur-idea), they are still in
agreement over the necessity of a balance in Church history, between theology and history.

Pelikan, like Baur, places his history of dogma upon

a theological presupposition which he states as, "the variety of theologies and the unity of the gospel--the unity as well as the variety, and
the unity within the variety ••• Credo unam sanctam catholicam et apostolicam ecclesiam." 26 Thus, Pelikan, in agreement with Baur, sees the task
of Church history as both theological and historical, but Pelikan's
approach is less idealistic than Baur's.
25Jaroslav Pelikan,The Christian Tradition: A Histor of the
Development of Doctrine Vol. I Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1971), p. 9.
26J. Pelika.n,The Christian Tradition ••• , p. 10.
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In some respects, Walgrave is even closer to Baur's thinking than
Pelikan by virtue of his more extreme idealism, even though Walgrave does
not carry his idealism as far as Baur.

He is intent on understanding

the Ohurch, both theologically, as a divine ideas and historically, as a
human institution.

He writes:

As historicity belongs to the very nature of the forms (human
forms), the temporal Church is not exempt from the necessary laws
of all historical existence. On the level of cultural incarnation
no distinction can be made between a pa.rt that is supra-historical
and beyond change and another pa.rt that is historical and subject
to change. The ontological reality of the Church is simply suprahistorical and therefore always the same, but its expression in
human forms of life and thought is entirely historical and therefore always moving with the stream of history •••• The dogmas
of the Church are not immovable monuments erected on the shore of
the ocean, but living currents and streams in the flux and reflux
of its waters.27
According to Walgrave, the formal directive principle of culture is human
freedom therefore, he diverges from Baur's concept of the Spirit as the
directive force of culture.

Man responds to God's self-revelation prior

to theological reflection, "but in order to live by faith, the consciousness of divine revelation, or its living idea in man, has to become articulated so that men possess in a htunan way the glorious truth that
divinely possesses them." 28 Thus, for Walgrave, Church history is a
fully historical matter which can be treated by modern historiographic
methods.

Still, the Church is more than just an historical expression.

Its historical expression is but the human response to abiding ideas for
"self-conserving development is the only way in which ideas are able to
keep themselves alive in the conditions of earthly existence."29
27J. Walgrave,Unfolding Revelation, pp. 14-15.
28J. Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, p.

37.

29J.· Walgrave,Unfolding Revelation, p. 16.
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Ultimately, 'Walgrave finds the phrase "development of tradition" a more
fitting description for what has been called "development of doctrine",
or "development of dogma", and on this point he is close to Pelikan,
Both theologians regard the doctrines and structures of the Church as man
made institutions while, at the same time, both uphold an element of continuity within Christianity itself.
Baur's thinking.

On this point, they are in line with

Their divergence from him comes over his assertion that

the process of development itself, has meaning.

Here, perhaps, Baur

carried his idealism a little too far.
In conclusion to this study, it is important to reemphasize the
great debt that the stuiy of Church history and historical theology owes
to F. C, Baur.

Not only did he demonstrate the ultimate historicity of

the Church and theology, but, through persistence and courage, he forced
many theologians to face the problem of faith and history as their own.
The fact that his historical works on the Church are still valued tcxlay,
and, further, that a minor Baur renaissance is going on in theological
circles tcxlay, is itself adequate testimony to his penetrating insight
into the problems of Church history and historical theology.

The prob-

lems which Baur wrestled with are still our own, and even though his
solution may not suffice for our time, certainly his catagories and ideas
provide a wealth of theological material out of which may come an answer
for our own time.
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